A LCANCES Y RESTRICCIONES

41. This particular interpretation of Kant is an historically rooted one. One of Kant’s earliest reviewer’s, Christian Garve (1783), for example, ascribes to Kant a phenomenalistic idealism, which entails that outer objects are reducible to subjective representations (Christian Garve, ‘The Garve Review’, in Brigitte Sassen, Kant’s Early Critics [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], p. 76). However, this particular interpretation is not confined to Kant’s contem- poraries. P. F. Strawson, for example, argues that Kant’s appeal to synthesis and faculties commits him to subjective idealism. Strawson writes: ‘What really emerges here is that aspect of transcendental idealism which finally denies to the natural world any existence independent of our “representations” or perceptions, an aspect to which I have already referred in remarking that Kant is closer to Berkeley than he acknowledges’ (P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense [London: Routledge, 1966], p. 35). Nietzsche’s interpretation was most likely influenced by Fischer, Schopenhauer and Lange, all of whom argue that Kantian objects are mind-dependent (See Hill, Nietzsche’s Critiques, p. 16). However, this view is in contrast to the predominant ‘analytic’ reading, which claims that Kant is putting forward what have been called ‘transcendental arguments’, which are intended to have anti-sceptical import by revealing necessary conditions for knowledge. These arguments attempt to de-psychologise Kant and abstract his arguments from his talk of synthesis and faculties. Transcendental arguments begin with some undis- puted fact about our experience (that we have experience, make judgements, and so on), followed by the claim that some disputed factor is necessary and must obtain if this fact of our experience is to be possible. Proponents of this reading of Kant’s arguments tend to take the uncontroversial starting point to be that of self-consciousness and Kant’s target to be the Cartesian sceptic. In such accounts the independent existence of objects is deemed to be a necessary condition of our experience of self-consciousness (see Strawson,The Bounds of Sense, pp. 26–7). 42. Kant, CPR, A114.

43. Ibid., A114. See also A104. Kant’s claim that we introduce order into nature (ibid., A125) has given rise to a debate as to whether he includes particular empir- ical laws in this account. Gerd Buchdahl argues that Kant treats the issue of par- ticular laws at the level of regulative research and discovery. Michael Friedman contends, in contrast, that particular empirical laws, the laws of Newtonian mathematical physics, are a necessary component of Kant’s constitutive account of knowledge. See Gerd Buchdahl, ‘The Kantian “Dynamic of Reason” with Special Reference to the Place of Causality in Kant’s System’, in Lewis White Beck (ed.), Kant Studies Today (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1969); Gerd Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); Michael Friedman, ‘Regulative and Constitutive’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XXX, Supplement, 1991; Michael Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

44. Nietzsche, BGE, 11. Nietzsche interprets Kant as reducing the empirical world to a mental representation from his earliest writings where he describes Kant’s empirical object of knowledge crudely as a ball tossed about in the heads of men (Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘The Philosopher: Reflections on the Struggle between Art and Knowledge’, paragraph 106, in Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870’s, edited and translated by Daniel Breazeale [London: Humanities Press, 1991]) to his later writings where he interprets Kant as putting forward a distinction between appearance and reality (Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, included in Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ, translated by R. J. Hollingdale [London: Penguin, 1990 (1889)], ‘“Reason” in Philosophy’, 6. Henceforth cited as TI ).

Nietzsche’s Appropriation of Kant 49

Meditations, translated by R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994 [1873–76]).

46. Nietzsche, GS, 335.

47. Nietzsche, HAH, Volume I, ‘Of First and Last Things’, 16. 48. Nietzsche, WP, 553.

49. Gerd Buchdahl maintains that when Kant appeals to the thing-in-itself , the tran-_{scendental object and appearances, he is not appealing to different objects but} to one epistemological object under different interpretations (Gerd Buchdahl, Kant and the Dynamics of Reason, Essays on the Structure of Kant’s Philosophy [Oxford: Blackwell, 1992]). Borrowing from Husserl, Buchdahl argues that Kant engages in a dynamic ‘reduction-realisation’ process whereby his references to transcendental objects, things-in-themselves and appearances stand for differ- ent stages in the realisation of empirical objects. See also Nathan Rotenstreich, Experience and its Systemization: Studies in Kant (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965).

50. Kant, CPR, A258/B314. 51. Ibid., A257/B313.

52. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, translated by Paul Carus (Cambridge, MA: Hackett, 1977 [1783]), 13 remark II, p. 33.

53. Kant, CPR, A190/B235.

54. See Moltke Gram, ‘Things in Themselves: The Historical Lessons’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 4, October 1980, pp. 407–31, especially pp. 414ff.

55. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Volume I, trans- lated by E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1966 [1819]), Appendix, p. 503. Henceforth cited as WWR, I. See Nietzsche’s rejection of the thing-in-itself in BGE, 16. For a discussion of this ‘traditionalist’ reading of Kant and why it might be incorrect, see Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Introduction. 56. Schopenhauer thinks that the concept of the thing-in-itself is meaningful to the

extent that it can be intuited directly asWill . However, within a strictly Kantian framework it becomes, in Schopenhauer’s view, a meaningless concept. (Arthur Schopenhauer,The World as Will and Representation,Volume II, translated by E. F. J. Payne [New York: Dover, 1966 (1844)], p. 196. Henceforth cited as WWR, II.) 57. Kant, CPR, B275.

58. See HAH , Volume I, ‘Of First and Last Things’, 16 where Nietzsche states there is no epistemic connection between things-in-themselves and the realm of appearances.

59. Nietzsche, WP, 530. 60. Ibid., 497.

61. Ibid., 555.

62. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, translated by Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1998 [1887]), III, 12. Henceforth cited as GM.

63. Nietzsche, BGE, 11. 64. Ibid., 3.

65. Ibid., 11, 12. 66. Ibid., 210.

67. Nietzsche, WP, 530. It is to be noted that in this passage Nietzsche does not recognise Kant’s distinction between formal and transcendental logic.

68. Nietzsche was familiar with both texts. In ‘On Teleology’ [1867–8] he makes page references to Kant’s Critique of Judgement (Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Zur Teleologie’, in Werke und Briefe. Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe, [München: C. H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1933–42], 3: 371–94). These