Normative nonideal theory mandates specific rules that are “morally permissible, politically possible and likely to be effective” (LP: 89). However, Rawls does not explain how these three conditions are to be weighed against each other, e.g. is that which is politically possible but morally questionable (although it may be effective), going to be given a greater value than morally valuable but politically undesirable and questionably effective? Or is the goal to find the optimal policy that satisfies all the three requirements in the best possible way (Simmons 2009)?
However we decide to answer these questions, it is certain that demands for moral permissibility, political possibility and factual effectiveness need interdisciplinary collaboration of philosophers, politicians and lawyers on the one hand and extensive and solid ideal theory on the other. Rawls’ theory is capable of living up to this task.
2.4. CONCLUSION
Rawls’ theory of justice, in its domestic as well as in its global version, is aimed at defining the principles of justice. Rawls defines an ideal theory capable of serving as a goal for the world here and now. An ideal for a domestic case is a well-ordered society. An ideal for the world at large is a society of satisfied peoples. The changes that need to be implemented in our world, here and now, in order for it to approach the ideal need be undertaken in gradual steps. Ideal theory establishes the principles of justice; normative nonideal theory then provides, in outline form, the steps towards it. Hence, Rawls specifies the rules that need to be followed in order for the ideal to be reached.
Both theories, the ideal and the nonideal, are indispensable aspects of a comprehensive theory of justice. Nonideal theory on its own lacks an objective, an aim. Nonideal theory takes its elements and the natural circumstances at their face value, without any idealization. This means that the conditions in which the theory emerges may be “unfavourable”, i.e. there may be wars, natural disasters, extreme scarcity of goods, diseases, etc. It also means that the political will of the peoples may not be stable enough for everybody to comply. Nonideal theory can provide a proper answer to these “unhappy conditions” only when there is an ideal theory on hand. Responding to the concrete case, giving a concrete rule, presupposes the existence of some principles. These principles direct the order of rules and resolve their conflict.
The key component of Rawls’ ideal theory is the concept of a well-ordered society with its conditions of internal well-orderedness or conditions for their foreign policies. In LP, a well-ordered society is called the peoples, and it is the world of satisfied peoples, which is the ultimate goal of Rawls’ theory of global justice. If all that has been delineated thus far were conclusive, my next step would be to elaborate on the concept of peoples in order to explain the goal of ideal theory. Consequently, the principles that relate to this goal will be easier to understand. The transitional nonideal rules or guidelines for our world cannot be formulated before the ideal has been clearly stated.
CHAPTER THREE THE PEOPLES
“All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”
General Assembly Resolution 1514
“We the peoples of the United Nations determined:
-To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
-To reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
-To establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
-To promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.”
United Nations Charter, Preamble
“We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”
Constitution of the United States of America, Preamble
Rawls titled his last book The Law of Peoples, thereby using, instead of the familiar notions of the nation or the state, the concept of peoples. Rawls explains his choice as follows: "I first chose the name 'peoples' rather than 'nations' or 'states' because I wanted to conceive of peoples as having different features from those of states, since the idea of states, as traditionally conceived with their two powers of sovereignty (cf. §2.2), was unsuitable." (LP:v).32 Hence, the key element of Rawls’ ideal theory of global justice is the notion of peoples. The notion of ´peoples´, in the way Rawls uses it, has been much criticized. The most common objection is that the notion of peoples does not differ substantially from that of the modern nation-state. Rather, the concept brings another terminological and conceptual confusion to already existent notions of nation, ethnicity, and state (cf. Pogge: 2008; cf. Pettit 2008; cf.
Van Parijs 2002; cf. Gerhardt 2006).
32 In the essay “Fifty Years after Hiroshima” he gives a similar statement: “I sometimes use the term ‘peoples’ to mean the same as nations, especially when I want to contrast peoples with states and a states´ apparatus” (CP: 565 ft.1)
In what follows, I will elaborate on the notion of ´peoples´ from two different perspectives: political and legal on the one hand, and philosophical on the other. I will try to defend Rawls’ terminological and conceptual choice in the face of the developments in international law provoked by actual political changes. My approach is justified because Rawls himself says that he is writing a book that is to guide changes in international law (LP: 3). This means that Rawls wants to formulate an ideal theory of global justice, which then may be approached through concrete rules of international law (for which the ideal theory would provide guidance). The rules of international law would then directly correspond to the non-ideal political challenges. The ideal theory is still logically prior to the nonideal, or to the concrete rules of international law, but the state of affairs it advocates is causally secondary. Both theories, the ideal and non-ideal one, operate together in one framework that needs to be kept in mind at all times.
The politico-historical framework Rawls is referring to is the world 50 years after the Second World War;
even more so, LP is influenced by changes in the global political arena in the last quarter of the twentieth century, i.e. after the publishing of TJ. In TJ, Rawls still wrote about nations or states, whereas some 30 years later, he changed the terminology. The question of what provoked him to do so imposes itself. Careful examination of political events, followed by changes in international law, may lead us to a better understanding of Rawls’ reasoning and consequently a better understanding of his theory as such. Rawls himself declares that LP should fit these basic changes and challenges of the new world order, and give them a suitable rationale (LP: 27).
I will start by discussing the legal and political notion of ‘state’ since this notion was, and still is, substantial for any theory of international law and politics. Thus, any philosophical theory that aspires to be seen as a guideline for international law needs to take it into account. At the same time, I will discuss the emergence of the concept of ‘peoples’ in the documents and the practice of international law, analyzing the causes and outcomes of this phenomenon. Finally, in the last part of the chapter, I will give a philosophical account for the concept of peoples by giving an ontologically - substantive definition of ´the peoples´. It should account for the normative aspect of the concept in the overall Rawlsian discussion. The results I hope to reach in this chapter are first conceptual clarity about what Rawls means by ´peoples´, and second how, if at all, his peoples can be normative for modern political societies.