LECTOR RFID

7.1 Divergence of national preferences

In the case of Belarus, if we are to scrutinise only the time period between the elections (19/12/2010) and the adoption of the Council conclusion, which decides to impose the sanctions (31/01/2011), there is no information to be found regarding V4 and Belarus. There had been no meetings by the Foreign Ministers in this time period, only two visible media statements and no joint statements. There has been a National Coordinators meeting, but it did not produce any official documents. The fact that the sanction regime was approved by the Council in a matter of a month means that not much adjustment was needed. The divergence of national preferences was not spanning across a wide range and the interest to sustain friendliness with other members of the EU was larger than the costs incurred for putting up a fight at the Council. In the Belarus case, the range of preferences was narrow as their formulation was not subject to analysis of such a wide array of political and economic considerations as in the case of Russia. In the case of Russia, the range of preferences was wide, exactly because relations with Russia were of such high political salience, reinforced by the fear of retaliatory measures. From the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, Poland advocated a hawkish stance, while the other 3 V4 members were more moderate. Reinforced by the high stakes that were in the equation for the individual countries, the range of preferences were difficult to narrow.

Therefore, a hypothesis can be formulated: Greater the divergence of preferences, lower the possibility of adopting a common position.

7.2 Uncertainty of outcome

The rapprochement from 2008-2010 was a proof that Lukashenko is willing to satisfy the EU demands in order to thaw the relations with such a large and important market as the EU, especially when he tries to use that as a bargaining chip against his economically and politically more important partner, the Russian Federation. (Portela, 2011) Therefore, the uncertainty that the sanctions will not be effective tool to be employed was low. Additionally, the politics of CFSP sanctions dictates that from the signalling point of view, not imposing sanctions would be a blunder that the EU could later regret. Thus, there was a high certainty that imposing limited, travel ban sanctions, was a correct move. In the case of Russia, the uncertainty whether economic sanctions against it would be a functional instrument to utilise

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was high. Politicians questioned whether the economic sanctions would make a difference in regards to Russia´s behaviour. On the other hand, there was a high certainty that Russia will impose retaliatory measures, which will hurt the economies of the V4 countries. The cost/benefit analysis was thus involving high costs and an uncertainty in benefit.

Therefore, a hypothesis will be: Greater the uncertainty of the outcome, lower the possibility of adopting a common position.

7.3 Salience of the issue

In the case of Belarus, the political salience of the issue was quite low for the individual V4 members, as the interests in this country were of lower key and were mainly formulated in the V4 cooperation itself. Their disagreements were easily set aside in favour of remaining committed to a unanimous EU response. Although Belarus is not a regionally powerful country, nor is the trade volume between Belarus and the V4 very significant for the latter, Belarus has other attributes which make V4 countries interested in it. It directly borders Poland (and thus the EU) and is within the scope of EU´s Eastern Neighbourhood Policy, which the V4 is so fervently aiding. It is one of the countries of the Eastern Partnership and therefore an important object of attention for the activities and projects of V4. This shows that there was a strong preference on the side of the V4 to act united. In the framework of the V4, Belarus is one of the countries that is on the list of their projects and thus the need to act and to formulate a common position was desired at the Visegrad Group´s meetings. In the case of Russia, the political salience was very high. Russia is a superpower on the borders of the EU, it has large volumes of trade with the member states and is an important supplier of energy to the Union. On the other hand, Ukraine is a Partner Country of the Eastern Partnership and the process of her integration with the EU was well advanced, considering that the AA/DCFTA was prepared to be signed. Russia´s direct involvement in the affairs of Ukraine, made this a very politically salient issue for the members of the V4.

Poland is a larger country than the three other members of the V4 and was willing to sacrifice its business with Russia in exchange for a tough EU action, which would present an adequate European geopolitical response and confirm the EU as a politically formidable opponent. Czech Republic was worried about the economic damage that they would bring upon themselves, however, did not seem to be willing to sacrifice the high level of commitment and cooperation of the Council. Slovakia and Hungary were the most pronounced in opposition to

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the third level of sanctions, albeit the targeted measures have never been an issue for them, as we could see from the swift agreement at FAC from the 3rd of March. Economic sanctions against Crimea and Sevastopol were not an issue of quarrels either, since the salience of the issue was smaller compared to sanctioning of the entire Russian Federation. Despite all 4 countries voting in favour of the CFSP measure on the 29th of July, at the V4 level the four countries were unwilling to formulate a common position. This shows that the interests in the unity with the EU and the same geopolitical preferences overcame individual interests, but as well that the V4 enjoys a high degree of freedom to refrain from inconvenient adjustments of preferences.

Thus, a hypothesis can be formulated: Greater the political salience of the issue, lower the possibility of adopting a common position.

7.4 Presence of contacts between the target country and the V4 platform

In the case of Belarus, the presence of V4-Belarus contacts helped the four countries to find a common ground on the issue. As mentioned in the previous section, this led the V4 countries to have vested interest in Belarus. Belarus was in the scope of projects funded by the V4 countries through IVF as they were part of the V4´s long term external policy priority – the Eastern Partnership, or directly involved in its activities. However, in the case of Russia, V4- Russia contacts were missing. The contacts between the countries manifested on a bilateral basis and enjoyed a high level of salience. But a lack of a common V4 interest, combined with a high economic impact, allowed each country to be rigid in regard to their national foreign policies. As the case of Belarus showed, with an intensive presence of contacts on the V4- Belarus level, the Group was able to produce a joint political declaration. Russia does not engage in contacts with the V4 but with each country individually, thus the nature of the bilateral ties contributed to divergent relations with Russia. Declarations were produced on the level of political condemnation of Russia´s actions, but not on the level of economic sanctions.

A hypothesised relationship emerges: Greater the contacts between the target country and the V4 platform, greater the possibility of adopting a common position.

68 7.5 Increase in the institutional “socialisation”

Since the signing of the Kroměříž Declaration of 2004, the institutional settings were kept constant, as the Guildines on the Future Areas of Visegrad Cooperation, defining the mechanism of cooperation did not change. Although the Bratislava Declaration of 2011, which was signed during the period of the Belarus case, did specify and broaden the institutional base of V4 cooperation, it did not in any way alter the institutional mechanisms set into practice in 2004. Visegrad Group remained an informal regional cooperation structure, which was an essential factor determining success or failure of cooperation on a given issue, however, only in connection with other variables that varied. What did change was the “socialisation” aspect. Informal links connecting the countries improved in the timespan between the Belarus and Russian case. This can be seen from the “natural instinct” to convey an emergency V4 meeting when the Crimean crisis escalated, from increased number of meetings, increased IVF budget and greater utilisation of conferences such as GLOBSEC. Nevertheless, in the case of Russia the outcome was negative, despite this positive trend of “socialisation”. According to the theory framework, greater “socialisation” should lead to stronger cooperation. Instead of formulating a hypothesis that would claim that greater “socialisation” leads to weaker cooperation, it is logical to conclude that the forces mention above are stronger and if present, they have the power to overturn the logic of this hypothesised argument. Therefore, this variable cannot account for the difference in the outcome.

7.6 Summary of hypotheses

 (H1) Greater the divergence of preferences, lower the possibility of adopting a common position.

 (H2) Greater the uncertainty of the outcome, lower the possibility of adopting a common position.

 (H3) Greater the political salience of the issue, lower the possibility of adopting a common position.

 (H4) Greater the contacts between the target country and the V4 platform, greater the possibility of adopting a common position.

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