Both marine and terrestrial governance can be characterized by various historical
governance regimes. Arguably, in the beginning resource use was open access given the absence of state oversight. Low human population densities were joined with narratives that describe bounty and a lack of the need for restrictions or closed zones (e.g., Ospina 2005; Engie unpub. data). The fishing and tourism sectors grew organically and informally; local residents and fishermen often took visitors out on their small boats for day trips. As tourism and industrial fishing in the coastal areas of the Islands both grew and attracted actors from the mainland and abroad, conflicts between local fishermen, industrial fishermen, and tourism groups grew as well. With the establishment of the Galápagos National Park (GNP) in 1959 and the affiliated CDRS in 1960, conservation interests came to the archipelago, with great international networks of participants and interests. By the 1990s, these sectoral conflicts had grown to extraordinary levels.
The writings of MacDonald (1997), Grenier (2000), and Ospina (2006) have dissected this period. MacDonald (1997) argues that the intense conflicts of the 1990s have at their heart a disagreement between local residents and institutions over the nature of resource use and rights. Locals have always considered Galápagos resources common-property due to their longstanding
use of the landscape. In reality, resources are public property and the Ecuadorian State rather than the community has always owned them. Such divergent viewpoints lay dormant until hands- on governance intensified in 1959, when the State decided to enclose 97% of all land inside the newly created Galápagos National Park, introducing tensions with island residents. MacDonald advocated for managing resources as if they were communal property, putting community-based management in action with participatory processes that would give local people more inclusion and say in policies.
Grenier (2000) also argued for the necessity of local control of resources, and believed the Galápagos faced a choice between further connections to outside, global networks of capitalist development, or local use of resources that compromised some development and amenities for the sake of the fragile environment. The former would continue to erode ecosystem and cultural diversity. Both works had great influence over the structure of the landmark legal reforms implemented in 1998, called the Organic Law for the Special Regimen for the
Conservation and Sustainable Development of Galápagos (LOREG) or simply, the Special Law. Formed with intense effort put into consensual and participatory processes and incorporation of known ecosystem science, the Special Law represented a paradigmatic shift for local governance (Baine et al. 2007; Heylings and Bravo 2007). It gave significant power to the province, making the Galápagos the most autonomous of all Ecuador’s provinces. Part of this autonomy stems from a dedicated source of income, since 45% of income from entrance fees to into the archipelago9 go directly to the GNP, 25% to municipalities, and 20% to the provincial-level Governing Council, formerly known as INGALA (GNP 2013). Making up over $21 million from 2010-11 (GNP 2013), these funds enable the National Park and local governments to plan and
9 In 2012 these entrance fees were $100 per adult of foreign descent, $50 per child under age 12 of foreign descent,
execute their mission with significant flexibility. Ospina (2006) argues for an “optimistic” interpretation of what the Special Law represents, which is a mutual limitation of economic self- interests by conservation, tourism and fishing actors, each of whom agreed to previously unheard of limits in territory and practices.
The Galápagos Marine Reserve was established in 2000, modifying the prior-existing Galápagos Marine Resources Reserve, so that it’s borders extended offshore to 40 nautical miles beyond the outer edges of the islands, enforceably excluding industrial fishing for the first time (Heylings and Bravo 2007). This space encompasses 133,000 km2 and represents over one-third of all waters protected in Latin America for conservation (Guarderas et al. 2008).
Out of this era was born the constellation of documents, institutions, agencies and boards that currently govern resource management and fishing in the Galápagos Islands. Major
documents are a Fisheries Management Plan that lays out the major rules of catch, gear, timing, and commercial access by permit registration to be renewed every two years. This Plan was revisited in 2009 and updated. While subsistence fishing was previously entirely unregulated, anyone can still obtain a subsistence fishing day permit to do so. Entry into commercial fishing has hardened, and only children of currently registered fishermen may now apply for a license (Wilen et al. 2000). The 5-year fishing calendar mentioned above was also begun. As new laws or modifications are created over time, they are put into effect largely by the publication of Resolutions (by the GNP) and Executive decrees (by the national government). All governing decisions are formally funneled through the GNP, which has final authority on actions (Fig 2.3). The Participatory Management Board (JMP in Spanish) hears issues and proposals and votes on resolutions, with each member organization carrying one vote. By consensus, resolutions are passed to the Inter-institutional Management Board (AIM in Spanish), where again, each
member group casts one vote. The AIM commonly takes recommendations given to it by the JMP and approves them. The JMP and AIM represent official channeling of the community’s participation in management issues.
Figure 2.3. The participatory management structure within the Galápagos Marine Reserve. Spanish acronyms are used for the AIM, JMP, CEDENMA, and UCOOPEPGAL. Modified from Heylings and Bravo 2007.
*The CDRS serves an advisory role to the GNP and no longer has voting power.
The constellation of institutions in the Galápagos is prone to fighting amongst themselves and exerts relatively weak control over law enforcement. Further, “the Ecuadorian State transfers to the Galápagos its structural weaknesses: regional disputes, budgetary and technical shortages, the inability to apply its orders and politics, and the lack of confidence of the citizens in the integrity of its decisions” (Ospina 2006: 124). In many ways, policies are designed to contain contradictions and competing uses, and there are many inherent tensions.
International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also played key roles in Galápagos governance, drawn to the archipelago by high levels of endemism and role in the science of natural history. NGOs serve as environmental advocates and partners in finance, research, and development with local and state institutions. Major environmental NGOs with offices in the Galápagos (mostly Santa Cruz) are Conservation International, WildAid, the World Wildlife Fund, and Sea Shepherd. Others more oriented toward local social issues as well as the
environment include Fundacion Natura and the University San Francisco de Quito. The US, Spain and Japan have also funded major initiatives through their development agencies. In fishing, NGOs have funded major initiatives to develop the processing capacity of the sector and foster ties between the fishing and tourism sectors around sustainable seafood. Prominent
ventures include building processing plants on both Santa Cruz and San Cristobal, the latter by the Spanish Aid Agency ARAUCARIA. Other projects have included strategy and financial support for local value-added seafood initiatives, pilot projects for recreational sport fishing ventures, and periodic assessments of the Marine Reserve. WildAid and Sea Shepherd specialize in giving the GNP vessels and mechanical support for monitoring, and have significantly funded the recent satellite vessel monitoring system.