1. INTRODUCCIÓN
1.7. Legislación medioambiental en aguas
A quarter of a century after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany, there are those who believe that the path to the development of Europe and Germany are no longer unified and coordinated, which automatically triggers fears and resistance from other nations and countries of the European Union. Once again, the current concern is that it will not be easy to establish the desired balance and stability in a now much larger, more populous and unstable European Union. The tendency of the
continuous growth of German power within Europe is in sharp contrast to the post-war guiding principle - to never allow the emergence of a German Europe, but to build a European Germany. Even twenty-five years later, European countries are still trying to understand the importance, the substance and the extent of the geopolitical upheavals, and are trying to deal with all of the consequences of such tectonic disturbances.
The fact is that for many, Germany continues to represent a potential hegemony in the heart of Europe, suggesting that its past reality, or its particular interpretation, can be a powerful prism whereby it, often mistakenly, interprets the ambitions and capabilities of certain countries and peoples in the present.
Fear and distrust of Germany are deeply rooted in the collective memory and shared historical experiences because of the two world wars, the consequences of which strongly shaped the mentality of almost all European nations. Remembering the Holocaust and the occupation regimes constitute an important part of the historical context within which German intentions are often evaluated, which frequently leads to unwarranted and excessive suspicion. Confronting this is a long-term process from which Germany itself has not been spared. After 1945, it was equally important for the Germans to inextricably link Germany and Europe, as well as to rebuild the stability of the state system. It is shocking and immensely instructive to follow the history of post- war German society’s efforts to, along with its struggle to regain the confidence and respect of other nations and its difficult and painful confrontation with the past and the building of a prosperous economic structure, link its future and destiny to the survival of the European community of nations.
The fact is that for many, Germany continues to represent a potential hegemony in the heart of Europe suggesting that its past reality, or its particular interpretation, can be a powerful prism whereby it, often mistakenly, interprets the ambitions and capabilities of certain countries and peoples in the present. This perception that Germany is once again seeking supremacy in Europe cannot be a positive factor that will encourage understanding and rapprochement in relations between countries. Therefore, it is important to properly understand modern Germany, the character of its foreign and European policy, its view of Europe and the essence of the changes that occur between Germany and Europe. It is this understanding that can lead to obstacles - which could be a product of stereotyping, as well as the view of others created almost solely on the basis of serious and painful historical experiences - being overcome in mutual relations. The debate on Germany’s role in the European Union and its alleged policy of hegemony occurred at the same time as the crises Europe has increasingly been faced with in the past years. The question is whether Germany is trying to be a hegemony. Does Germany want to be a hegemony? Is it in its interest or the interest of the entire European Union? Terms such as threats and blackmail were used to describe the tactics that Germany implemented in negotiations with Greece and the imposition of harsh conditions that the Greek government must fulfil in exchange for loans. Thus Germany, with this method, lost a lot in the solving of Grexit.
Europe up to 2009 had the ambition to be a global actor and through internal evolution evolve into a genuine political union. Such a union would have had the strength and means to neutralize the handicaps of individual Member States and to reconcile differences in the level of development of Member States through funding cohesion and solidarity. That was the Europe which knowingly turned a blind eye to the Greeks regarding some things in order to for them to become part of the Eurozone and in return received a strategic station in the Mediterranean and a beacon for other Balkan states. Just ten years ago the entire Balkans was given a guarantee that within a reasonable amount of time and without any additional conditions it would become part of a prosperous European Union, and Greece was supposed to be the engine for that integration. The Hellenic Plan for the then rapid completion and continuation
of the pan-European Corridor 10 was started, the seat of the European Agency for Reconstruction of the Balkans was located in Thessaloniki, and the organisation of the Olympic Games in 2004, were a testimony to the prestige of Greece.
However, since the outbreak of the 2009 crisis, Europe is becoming uniform, with a single economic model, which has been raised almost to a level of ideology. Budgetary discipline and savings must be enforced immediately, regardless of the specifics of individual countries and their different development cycles. Deviations from the prescribed model cannot be justified or explained by objective conditions and limitations. Ten years later, Greece has found itself in the situation where Slovakia is cited as an example that it should look up to, and Greece‘s Prime Minister is questioned by members of the European Parliament like in primary school at the end of a trimester. The European countries surrounding Greece, which includes Serbia, today belong to the so called Ottoman Group, and its integration into the European Union is de facto suspended.
In this way, Germany loses out not only in terms of the awakening and incitement of (ir)rational fears of its continental domination, but also in terms of its ability to find a solution to the crisis which will allow the hardest hit countries to come out of it more resilient to possible further turbulence. If Germany wants to be a leader, it must be prepared to help those on the periphery more and instigate their political, economic, and institutional strengthening. Greece did remain in the Eurozone, but Germany did not help to create preconditions for it to grow and strengthen. Consequently, Greece has become a weak link in the refugee crisis, the impact of which was felt well before the turbulence caused by the financial crisis subsided.
Therefore, the Balkans was not a zone of primary interest for Germany, which was painfully apparent during the resolving of the Greek crisis. However, with the strengthening of migrant crisis and the negative consequences for the European Union, in the eyes of Berlin and Brussels the Balkans is growing in importance. Therefore, in the foreseeable future the status of the Balkans in Europe depends firstly on the formulation of a European strategy towards the Eastern Mediterranean in order to resolve the crisis and the decision of whether Serbia and the Balkans will be a bridge to the Middle East or a buffer zone.
What was the response of Europe to the initial stage of the refugee crisis? It seemed that it had abandoned the idea to formulate a genuine policy towards the Middle East. It seemed that Europe, busy defining its core, had no ambition to deal with neighbours and countries on its periphery. The outlines of what was originally called the concept of “the fortress of Europe” began to emerge with the fencing at the Hungarian borders. Due to fear of the consequences of new conflicts in the Middle East, Europe, politically and physically, began to hedge itself from the hilly Balkans in order to preserve its soft Germany must be prepared to help those on the periphery more. Greece did remain in the Eurozone, but Germany did not help to create preconditions for it to grown and strengthen. Consequently, Greece has become a weak link in the refugee crisis, the impact of which was felt well before the turbulence of the financial crisis subsided.
belly in the Central European Plain. Instead of being a European springboard and a bridge to the Middle East, there was a real danger that the Balkans in the coming period would become an anteroom – a neutral zone - which is ironically reminiscent of the Turkish request for the north of Syria. However, it is expected that sooner or later European countries will understand that the fence does not solve the problem and that it only fires the imagination of immigrants and creates authoritarian regimes on both its sides. It should be understood that the heart of the construction of Europe is not the monetary union, although it is of key symbolic value, but the interior space of free trade and movement of people. The European Union could survive the exit of Greece from the Eurozone, and even a new cold war, but not the physical return of national borders and border controls. It is the chaos in the Middle East, followed by potential mass migration and frequent terrorist acts of those European citizens who have since pledged allegiance to the caliph El Baghdadi, which could lead to a rise in xenophobia, protectionism and political pressure for the restoration of physical boundaries in Europe, in other words, revocation of internal freedom. That would definitely mark the end of the enlargement of the European Union. That is why the Middle East and North Africa, where the Islamic State has already declared two of their provinces, is a more important stage for Europe than the Greek and Ukrainian crisis. It entails a new space for cooperation between Germany and Serbia, which is by nature and position, is more a Mediterranean country than a Central European one.