Legislación de la publicidad de los alimentos para niños

5-1. The targeting cycle portrays an analytical, systematic approach focusing on the targeting process that supports operational planning to achieve the objectives of the JFC. The interrelationship of the target development and mission-planning phases dominates the six phases of the targeting cycle.

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5-2. The commander’s objectives, guidance, and intent originate at the national level as broad concepts, such as the national security strategy and the national military strategy. The President and the SecDef communicate national security objectives through the CJCS, who in turn prepares the biennial Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP provides short-term (2-year) strategic guidance to the GCCs and the Service chiefs. The JSCP assigns tasks, apportions major combat forces and strategic transportation for deliberate planning, and directs the GCCs to develop plans supporting specific national security objectives. The GCCs translate broad national and theater strategy into strategic and operational concepts through the development of theater campaign plans. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) facilitates this planning process.

5-3. JOPES is the DOD-directed, JCS-specified system that provides single-process, interoperable planning and execution. The GCC’s staff uses different procedures to develop plans depending on the purpose of a specific plan. The procedures are labeled as crisis-action, campaign, or deliberate planning;

however, they are interrelated. The planning procedure the staff uses is determined by the amount of time available.

5-4. Campaign planning embodies the JFC’s vision of the arrangement of related major operations necessary to attain theater operational or strategic objectives. If required by the scope of the contemplated operations, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It continues through crisis-action planning, thus unifying both planning processes, described in JP 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.

5-5. Deliberate planning prepares for a possible contingency based on the use of forces and resources apportioned for deliberate planning. It relies heavily upon assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist upon implementation of the plan. Deliberate planning takes place mainly in peacetime to develop joint operations plans for contingencies identified in strategic planning documents.

Deliberate plans are prepared as an OPLAN, a concept plan (CONPLAN) with or without time-phased force and deployment data, or a functional plan.

5-6. Crisis-action planning is based on current events and is conducted in time-sensitive situations and emergencies using assigned, attached, and allocated forces and resources. Planners base their approach on the actual circumstances that exist when planning occurs. They follow prescribed crisis-action planning procedures that parallel deliberate planning but are more flexible and responsive to changing events.

5-7. In all three types of planning, the GCC and subordinate JFCs—

z Specify the mission.

z Organize the operations area spatially into joint operations areas (JOAs), AOs, or JSOAs.

z Organize the forces (task organization and command relationships).

z Assign missions and tasks to subordinates.

5-8. The GCC provides a clear, concise intent (a broad purpose and required end state). His concept for SOF may—

z Provide the concepts for SOF activities and sustainment that will transform national, alliance, and theater strategic guidance into military objectives.

z Describe the GCC’s vision of SOF employment, including command relationships.

z Identify requirements for USSOCOM and Service components to prepare, provide, and sustain theater-assigned and augmented SOF.

z Identify priority operational, weather, and IRs that theater SOF must address.

z Define interagency coordination requirements.

5-9. The TSOC is the primary link for integration of SOF into the CCDR’s planning process. The Commander, Theater Special Operations Command (CDRTSOC) has several ways to integrate SOF.

Integration can be achieved through the theater CDRTSOC’s principal roles as the theater SO advisor and the theater JFSOCC, or the CDRJSOTF, if designated. The CDRTSOC provides input into the CCDR’s OPLANs, the theater campaign plan, subordinate plans, and theater security cooperation. Subordinate joint

Targeting and Joint Fires

SOF commands have similar responsibilities to their superior JFCs. SO staff officers on JFC staffs are essential in ensuring integration of SOF into campaign and major OPLANs.

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OMINATION

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RIORITIZATION 5-10. This phase of the process involves the systematic identification and evaluation of critical target nodes vulnerable to effective direct attack or indirect exploitation. Component commanders, including the JFSOCC, nominate targets to the JFC. Supported commanders’ nominations and priorities (for example, JFLCC target nominations in the JFLCC AO) are given special emphasis in the JFC target development process. The JFC may establish a JTCB to evaluate nominations to assess whether targets will achieve desired objectives. The component commanders receive the details of targeting and execution. Typically, the JTCB reviews targeting information, develops targeting guidance and priorities, and prepares and refines joint targeting lists. The JFSOCC and the POTF commanders are represented on the JTCB as separate functional component commanders.

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APABILITIES

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NALYSIS

5-11. Capabilities analysis is the process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal weapon required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target. Analysts determine target vulnerability, weapon effect, munitions delivery accuracy, damage criteria, probability of kill, and weapon reliability. Normally, component representatives to the JTCB conduct this analysis.

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ECISION AND

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5-12. Selection of forces for the mission is determined by the commander’s decision and force assignment.

Either the JTCB or the JFC’s staff recommends the appropriate forces. The goal is to select the available lethal or nonlethal forces that can best accomplish the commander’s objectives within the specified period.

The JFSOCC advises the JTCB or JFC’s staff on the capabilities, limitations, and feasibility of supporting SOF. The JPOTF advises the JFC on PSYOP capabilities. The JFC’s CMO staff officer advises the JFC on CMO and CAO capabilities.

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ISSION

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LANNING AND

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ORCE

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XECUTION

5-13. Upon receipt of tasking orders, detailed planning must be performed for the execution of operations.

The hallmark of ARSOF planning is decentralization down to the actual operational element that will execute the mission. Operational elements conduct their detailed mission planning and coordination with the assistance of PSYOP, CAO, or SF planning elements. The ARSOF elements tasked to perform a mission develop a concept of operations (CONOPS) and produce an operation order (OPORD) (with contingencies) that they brief to a designated senior SOF commander for approval. ARSOF mission planning should—

z Contribute substantially to the strategic or campaign plan being executed.

z Include complete orders or plans (insertion, resupply, fire and maneuver support, and extraction).

Planners must coordinate SO mission planning with all applicable supporting and supported forces and agencies through the JFC. Detailed targeting and mission planning are vital to successful mission execution.

z Address the specific mission window of opportunity, since SO targets normally are perishable, either from a military or political viewpoint.

5-14. During the deliberate planning process (a continuous and ongoing process), the JFSOCC issues mission letters to selected theater-oriented ARSOF units, facilitating the creation of the unit mission-essential task list. GCCs issue PSYOP and CA mission planning requirements to determine specific training, readiness, and equipment needs to target certain geographic areas and target populations. The mission letters allow ARSOF units the time to gain a complete understanding of the geographic, political, social, psychological, and military situation in the target area. For some missions, ARSOF units must also master the culture, language, customs, and ethnic and religious affiliations or antagonisms of the target audience that could affect mission execution.

5-15. ARSOF units focus their training on their assigned task. They prepare assessments (cultural nuances, language, and targets) of the region. They conduct the appropriate training during peacetime deployments and CONUS training events. When preparing for missions, SF, CAO, and PSYOP units normally already have detailed knowledge of the region, people, culture, and requirements of the targets. Thus, they can focus on detailed mission planning, training, and rehearsals during crisis-action planning. This information is available to Ranger and SOA units in the form of area studies.

5-16. This intensive mission preparation should result in a thorough, comprehensive plan that is fully coordinated and rehearsed with all participating forces and agencies. A deliberate plan must include an exhaustive number of contingencies and a high degree of flexibility. Crisis-action planning includes as much detail as time allows.

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OMBAT

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SSESSMENT

5-17. In the final phase, combat assessment is composed of three interrelated components: battle damage assessment (BDA), munitions effectiveness assessment, and future targeting or reattack recommendations.

The JFSOCC assesses the executed mission to determine if the employed SOF element accomplished the assigned mission. If the results do not meet the criteria established during the capabilities analysis phase, the JFC’s staff or JTCB then determines the resources required to reacquire the target and to achieve the desired effect. As stated in the above principles of SO mission planning, retasking a deployed ARSOF unit is frequently not a viable COA.

In document Aspectos bioéticos de la investigación, marketing y publicidad de los alimentos para niños y adolescentes (página 67-73)