Lomasky answers in the negative. He makes it clear that his idea of a project pursuer does not depend on a robust view of autonomy. In Lomasky’s view, a robust concep- tion of autonomy entails the idea that ”[o]ne acts autonomously only if one decides on a course of action through rational consideration of the prospects before one, and if one is unconstrained by external influences that make one behavein a manner that was not freely willed.”28Lomasky names both J.S. Mill and John Rawls, two liberal exemplars, as promi- nent proponents of this idea. Nonetheless, he rejects the idea that mature project pursuers must consciously subject their deep commitments to deliberative scrutiny to make them their own. In addition, he does not believe that a project pursuer can (nor should they) attempt to entirely extricate herself from her experiences, traditions and values in an effort to evaluate the merits of different ways of life from an ”objective” point of view based on some impersonal standard of value. Lomasky thus regards this particular conception of autonomy as impractical and undesirable as an attribute of a project pursuer. It is imprac- tical because, due to one’s prior experiences, upbringing and the like, certain nonrational factors will always influence one’s judgments no matter how rigorously critical ones tries to be when deliberating about ones beliefs or values.29 There is no such thing as a com-
pletely unconditioned judgment. On the other hand, it is undesirable because the attempt to make such unconditioned judgments threatens to alienate one from her deepest commit- ments and call into question her most fundamental sentiments as if they stand in need of justification.30 This last criticism is reminiscent of Bernard Williams’s ”one thought too
28Ibid p.43.
29Ibid p. 44.
many” objection.31 Williams’s worry centered on the idea that it is inappropriate to always
prioritize the dictates of an impartial morality over one’s deepest commitments. Although we should not dismiss out of hand moral reasons if they conflict with actions prescribed by our projects, we must realize that in some instances our projects themselves provide us with sufficient reasons for engaging in certain actions even if an impartial morality would prescribe otherwise.
Similarly, Lomasky is concerned about what it means to question one’s deepest com- mitments for the sake of autonomous choice in the sense described above. Does not such questioning make tenuous our commitments by either opening them up to serious revision or diluting our support for them by evaluating their worth from an unfamiliar perspective? Remember, on Lomasky’s view of this ”detached” conception of autonomy one chooses his commitments unencumbered by previous attachments or relationships. Stripped of these, how is one to make a rational decision about which way of life is best? Lomasky believes that in order to make autonomous decisions in this way in the absence of personal value (the particular values, beliefs and views of the good one comes to have primarily through ones experiences, relationships, and exposure to specific cultures and traditions) one must rely on impersonal (or impartial) value, as in a view like utilitarianism. However, both Williams and Lomasky believe that personal value is prior to impersonal (or moral) value as one’s personal commitments are what provide her with her richest sources of motivation and desire (and, consequently, what lead one into conflict with others giving rise to the need for moral rules in the first place). These commitments make her who she is and provide her life with meaning. In Lomasky’s view, respecting others’ pursuit of their personal projects offers proper recognition of the ”separateness of persons”.32 Individuality is understood as
31Bernard Williams, ”Persons, Character, and Morality”, p. 18.
a person’s particular commitments and attachments and the reasons and actions these give rise to. These reasons of course have a normative scope limited to the commitments that they spring from; Person A’s commitments give A reasons for action that do not hold for Person B if B does not have the same list and priority of commitments as A.
Project pursuers occupy a special place in Lomaskys view precisely to protect per- sonal value. If liberal theory is to provide true protection for individuals by affording them basic rights and liberties, it must recognize this amounts to ensuring that they can pursue their projects relatively free of interference from other entities, particularly the state, for their pursuit of their projects is the manifestation of their individualism. Liberal theory, then, cannot be predicated on the detachment view of autonomy, because if it were then this would fundamentally threaten one’s projects (and so one’s individuality and identity) by subjecting them to appraisal by impersonal (and impartial) standards that are themselves not necessarily adopted by the person herself. In addition, and more importantly, imper- sonal values attempt to make all projects commensurate by applying the same standards to them for evaluation in order to provide a basis for making objective and rational choices. Lomasky applies this same critique to the question of whether the state has authority to impose on parents standards for child-rearing aimed at providing children with the ”best upbringing”: ”if some particular standard of the proper exercise of parental authority is given official sanction, personal value is crushed. A socially imposed impersonal standard of value impermissibly coerces those who see their ends lying elsewhere.”33 The same is
true of a metaphysical impersonal standard of value employed in making ”autonomous” choices. Both severely imperil pluralistic identity and individuality.
Given the preceding, it appears that Lomasky embraces what I will call a ”minimal- ist” conception of autonomy. The minimalist conception of autonomy says that an agent,
A, is autonomous if (1) she is capable of developing deep attachments and commitments, (2) she is reasonably capable of pursuing goals and aims she believes are set by these at- tachments, and (3) she does not suffer from indoctrination or a calculated effort to induce servility by some other agent. This conception of autonomy only requires that an agent be able to live a goal directed life based on her deepest commitments, beliefs and values. Some level of rationality is obviously required for her to both recognize and be able to form rough plans to achieve her particular goals and aims. I say recognize, because the agent should be able to distinguish between her stronger and weaker attachments. This does not mean, however, that the agent must understand eitherwhycertain commitments are felt so deeply or their origin. Moreover, this level is far below a level of rationality that would al- low her to critically engage reasons for adopting or maintaining her deepest commitments themselves. This conception is silent on how these deepest commitments are formed, save for excluding repressive processes of indoctrination or externally induced servility. The minimalist conception of autonomy sets a relatively low bar for ascriptions of autonomy as we might expect. This is important for Lomasky, because he believes that such a thin conception of autonomy is crucial to protecting individual personal value.
Lomasky applies this minimalist conception of autonomy to both adults (indepen- dent project pursuers) and children (potential independent project pursuers). Thus, parents do not interfere with the autonomy of their children by exercising exclusive educational authority over them. As long as children come to have ends to which they are deeply at- tached and for which they are capable of forming reasonably pursuable plans of action to reach these ends, the minimalist conception of autonomy is satisfied. Furthermore, both the personal value of the constitutive commitments of both parents and children cannot be, for the most part, morally impugned by others who happen to take up different commitments, beliefs and values.