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Public Assembly Act of 1985 (Batas Blg. 580) A permit to hold a rally must be filed with the Office of the Mayor at least, five working days before the day of the rally.

But no permit from the mayor is required in case the rally is going to be held in (i) freedom parks, (ii) inside a private property (provide with consent of the owner), and (iii) campuses of state universities (which are left to university authorities)

The application must be in writing and must include: (1) names of the organizers and leaders, (2) date and time, place and street, (3) size (4)manner of the use of the street, (5) sound system to be used (6)purpose. It must also have a statement of the duties of the rallyists.

The written application is filed with the Office of the Mayor. Acknowledgemet is given of its receipt. If the Mayor refuses to accept the application, then it is enough for filing purposes if a copy is posted in the premises.

The Mayor has 2 working days to act on the application. If he does not act, it is deemed granted.

But if he thinks that the rally creates a

"clear and present danger" to public peace, order, health, etc., and he has proof of this, he should not deny the application right away. He should hold a hearing during which the applicant can be heard. If after hearing he is still not satisfied that no danger exists, then he can deny the application.

The applicant can then go to any court other than the Supreme Court for the review of the decision of denial of the mayor. The courts have 24 hours to act on the petition. If the judgment is a reversal of the denial, or in any case if the applicant is satisfied with the decision, the judgment becomes final and executory immediately, and no appeal can be taken by the local authorities anymore.

But if the decision is not satisfactory to the applicant, then he has 48 hours from receipt to appeal to the SC.

During the rally, the police must be limited to maintaining peace and order and so must stay away by 100 meters from the rallyists. They must be in full uniform, with their names visibly written. They can carry no firearm except a nighstick, but they are allowed protective devices.

If they anticipate trouble, the police must call the attention of the leader of the rallyists. When trouble actually erupts, the police must not disperse the crowd right away but first give a warning. If violence persists, they must give a second warning. If still violence continues, only then can they fight back.

If a rally does not have a permit, the police can disperse the crowd, but they cannot use violence. Penalty is imposed only on the leaders and organizers.

Among the duties of the rallyists are: (a) to inform the members of their duty under the law, (b) to police their own rank, and (c) to cooperate with local authorities in maintaining peace and order.

Notes: The freedom to use public places to peaceably assemble is best expressed thus:

"Wherever the title or steets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of time have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thought betwee citizens, and discussing public questions." (Justice Roberts.

Hague v. CIO)

Although under a "permit system", before one can use a public place, one must first obtain prior permit from the proper authorities, the principle has always been that one has the right to a permit, subject only to reasonable regulation. The validity of the permit system has been upheld by the Court, provided, (a) it is concered only with the time, place and manner of assembly ad (b) it does not vest on the licensing authority unfettered discretion in choosing the groups which could use the public place and discriminate others.

As held by the SC in Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71, the City Ordinance of Manila giving authority to the Mayor to issue permits for parades should be construed to be limited to the time, place, and manner of the parades socially to secure public order, convenience and welfare. Thus, denying the Nacionalista Party a permit to hold a rally at the Plaza Miranda on the ground that passions raised by the recent national election were still high and a rally to protest election anomalies could only exacerbate the matter, was overturned by the court.

Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71

F: This is an action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Primicias, campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties, to compel Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila to issue a permit for the holding of a peaceful public meeting at Plaza Miranda for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of grievances. The Mayor denied the application on the ground that passions still run high due to the recent election, and a rally to protest election anomalies might threaten breaches of the peace and disruption of public order.

ISSUE: W/n the Mayor can refuse to grant the permit.

RULING: NO. The police power granted to the Mayor under the Ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board pursuant to its authority under the Revised Administrative Code which pertains to the use of streets and public places, can be construed only to mean the power to regulate, which means and includes the power

to control, govern, and to restrain but cannot be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or

"prohibit."

The Court quoted with approval the decision in the American case Cox v. State of New Hampshire, " a statute requiring persons using public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license..."

But under the same ordinance, the SC, in Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970), upheld the mayor's refusal to grant permit to a group during weekdays, on a finding that everytime there was an announced rally, stores closed and business was gravely affected because of violent incidents. It found the policy of the mayor to allow rallies only during weekends to be reasonable.

Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970)

F: The petitioner, acting in behalf of the Movement for a Democratic Philippines (MDP), an association of students, workers and peasants, applied for a permit from the Mayor of Manila to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda.

Respondent Mayor denied the application to hold the rally on the date and time specified by petitioners in view of the events that transpired during the last demonstration held by them which ended in the destruction of public and private property, loss of a few lives, injuries to a score of other persons and the closing down of schools, offices and many stores. The Mayor suggested that the MDP utilize the Sunken Gardens near Intramuros for its rally and that the rally be held during weekends and earlier during the day so that it may end before dark.

Petitioner challenged the action of the Mayor on the ground that the same constitutes a violation of their right to freedom of assembly.

Petitioner contended that the right of the people to peaceful assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances may be exercised without the prior necessity of securing a permit from the government and that such right cannot be fully enjoyed without the corresponding right to use public places for that purpose.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor`s denial to issue a permit amounted to a violation of petitioner`s right to freedom of assembly.

HELD: NO.

The respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely refused the permit sought by petitioner. He has expressed willingness to grant the permit for the peaceful assembly during certain days and time, and at a place when they would not disrupt the normal activities of the community.

The respondent mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order.

Petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of respondent Mayor to grant their application for a permit unconditionally. Experience in connection with present assemblies and demonstrations have shown that they pose a clear and imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies, which, petitioner has manifested, it has no means of preventing.

Charo.

In Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956), the majority upheld the mayor's denial of permit to members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect for the use of a klosk within the town plaza in order to avoid any untoward incident with members of the Roman Catholic Church, whose tenets are opposed to those of the petitioners, and whose church is very near the klosk.

Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956)

F: The Mayor denied a permit to the members of the Jehovah's Witnesses to use the kiosk in the town plaza for the purpose of holding a public lecture on the ground that the permit, if granted, may give rise to disturbance of the religious ceremonies being performed by the Catholic Church which was said to be within hearing distance from the kiosk and which might lead to any untoward incident with members of the rival denomination.

ISSUE: W/N the denial is valid.

In J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983), the SC found no basis for the denial of permit to the Anti-Bases Coalition to hold a march from Luneta to the street fronting the

U.S. Embassy. It affirmed the general rule that the use of streets is free to all. It found the fear entertained by city authorities that the rallyists might be agirated by provocateurs to be unfounded, given the report of the NPD that adequate security measures were provided by the police.

The Court did not rule on the validity of the ordinance of Manila prohibiting any rally within 200 meters from any foreign embassy as a means of complying with the Geneva Convention that requires the host country to protect the premises and personnel of the embassy.

Then it gave guidelines for the issuance of permits (now in BP 9801 (i) any group which applies must do so within a sufficient time so the authority can have time to act: (ii) if a disagreement arises over a denial of a permit, the applicant can question the denial in the lower court, which can try questions of fact and law, and (iii) appeal can be made to the SC on an expedited procedure.

J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983) F: Retired Justice JBL Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on Oct. 26, 1983 starting 2 p.m. from Luneta to the gates of the US Embassy. He filed this petition because as of Oct. 20, there was yet no action on his request to hold a rally.

HELD: Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be no previous retraint whether in the form of libel suits, prosecution for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there is a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent." There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to the holding of a peaceful rally at Luneta. Neither can there be objection to the use of the streets up to gates of the US Embassy. A statute requiring persons to secure a special license to use public streets for a procession is not unconstitutional. The licensing of authorities are strictly limited to the consideration of the time, place and manner and the authorities are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse a permit.

In German v. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514 (1985), the SC upheld the power of the city authorities to close JP Laurel Street fronting Malacanang from all rallies as a form of "area restriction", in order to protect the President

and his family, based on the incident in the early 70s when the gates of the palace were almost stormed. The rallyists in this case purported to merely worship at St. Jude's.

In case a rally is held in a private place, no permit from the mayor is required.

However, the consent of the owner of the place must be acquired.

German v. Barangan 35 SCRA 514 (1985)

F: On Oct. 2, 1984 the petitioners who were businessmen, students and employees, met on JP Laurel Street in Manila for the ostensible purpose of hearing mass at the St.

Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang grounds. They wore yellow T-shirts and, with clenched fists, marched on the street and shouted anti-government invectives. They were stopped from proceeding to the chapel by the Presidential Security Command. They brought an action for mandamus.

HELD: The yellow T-shirts worn by some of the marchers, their fists clenched and chants of anti-government investives support the government's claim that the petitioners purpose was not really to worship at the chapel but to hold an anti-government demonstration close to the residence of the President. The restricted use of JP Laurel Street is justified. The need to secure the safety of heads of states cannot be overemphasized. The threat to their lives is constant and felt throughout the world. The petitioners were not restrained in their freedom of religion but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action.

In Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984) and Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 (1985), the SC upheld the right to expression of students who held a rally in a private university. But since they held it beyond the time granted in a place other than the one allowed by the administration, their suspension was condoned.

Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984) F: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. They were granted a permit to hold a meeting to protest the merger of two units of the university. On the scheduled date, the students continued their meeting beyond the scheduled time and held it in a different place from that indicated in the permit. They expressed in a vehement language their opposition to the merger and as a result, classes and office work was disturbed.

Petitioners were placed under preventive suspension. On appeal, they were found guilt of

holding an illegal assembly and oral defamation. They were suspended for one academic year. They filed a petition for certiorari in the SC.

HELD: The petititon may be considered moot and academic considering that the TRO issued by the SC allowed the students to enroll. But there is a need to pass squarely on the constitutional question. Respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for the setting aside of the order of suspension. Suspending them for one year is out of proportion considering that the vigorous presentation of views was expected.

The excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate and the exuberance of the youth should be taken into consideration.

Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 (1985)

F: Petitioners were officers and members of the Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. They were refused enrollment for having led a rally on Sept. 28, 1982.

HELD: As held in Malabanan v. Ramento: "If in the course of such demonstration, with an enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances, extremely critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. They would be ineffective if during the rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations.

They take into account the excitement of the occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. xxx" The refusal of the university to enroll the students is a highly disproportionate penalty.

Notes: Note that while the permit system is not allowed in the case of publication, it is allowed in the case of assembly. In publication, censorship is presumptively unconstitutional. There is very little possibility or justification for the regulation of news. The remedy in this case is prosecution or subsequent punishment.

But in assembly regulation is allowed because it is needed by the very nature of the expression, when people use streets, they may deprive other groups which want to use the streets too. So as long as only the incidents of speech are regulated, the measure is constitutionally acceptable.

Nestle Phils. Inc. v. Sanchez 154 SCRA 541 (1987)

F: While these cases were pending in the SC, the labor unions involved intensified the pickets they had been conducting in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Court and set up picket quarters, at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises. When required to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court, their lawyer apologized and assured that the above incident would not be repeated.

HELD: The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Grievances must be ventilated in the proper channels, i.e.

through appropriate petitions or pleadings in keeping with the respect due the courts as impartial administrators of justice. Moreover,

"parties have a constitutional right to have the causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor xxx" The acts of respondents are not only an affront to the dignity of this Court but equally a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.

3. Freedom of Association and the right to strike in the public sector

Art. III, Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

The inclusion of the right to unionize in this article is ill-advised because while the right to unionize is an economic and labor right, the right to association in general is a civil- political right.

Discussed elsewhere is the argument why public employees cannot engage in

Discussed elsewhere is the argument why public employees cannot engage in