Quantitative studies provide compelling evidence that marriage has a significantly negative effect on the economic activity of Muslim women (Holdsworth and Dale 1997;
Salway 2007; Dale 2008; Khattab et al. 2017). The statistical evidence for the effect of marriage on economic activity before 2001 is limited to analysis by ethnic group, Pakistani and Bangladeshi women are the focus of these studies. Findings on the effects of marriage on women from these South Asian ethnic groups are often generalised to all British Muslim women. There are a small number of quantitative studies that have since looked at the effects of marriage on economic activity by religious belonging (Khattab et al. 2017).
Muslim women, or P&B women, are most likely to of all the main ethno-religious groups in Britain to experience significant drops in economic activity upon marriage and a further drop upon motherhood (Khattab et al. 2017). Qualitative research has added valuable insights into the socio-cultural factors that play out in marriage and the ways in which marriage might constrain the economic activity of Muslim women
Arranged Marriage
In Britain, most Muslims marry within their own ethnic groups, and have done since the onset of migration, this is often marriage to a cousin or member of the kinship group (Peach 2006; Shaw 2009; Charsley 2016). Arranged marriage was strongly related to maintaining the integrity of hierarchical and patriarchal family structures and kinship
27 networks (Werbner 1988; Fischer 1991). Endogamous marriage reinforced cultural norms and values from Pakistan that favoured and valued gendered divisions of
exclusively male-breadwinner and female-homemaker roles in families and households (Afshar 1994; Shaw 1988; 2009).
Pakistani and Bangladeshi second-generation young women expected that they would have to negotiate work with their husbands and mothers-in-law (Dale 2002a; 2002b;
Ahmad et al 2003). Mothers-in-law were influential and powerful in the decisions young women made about work (Dale et al 2002; Afshar 1994; Dale et al. 2002a). Women with university degrees and ‘worthy careers’ (in the traditional professions) were most successful in these negotiations with their husbands and in-laws (Dale et al. 2002a;
2002b; Ahmad et al. 2003; Dale 2008). The accounts of women from working class families and households with no higher education qualifications, who are in fact the largest proportion of Muslim women are missing from contemporary qualitative narratives around the labour market experiences of Muslim women.
Transnational Marriage
The reinforcement of gendered norms around male breadwinner and female
homemaker roles is considered to be strongest where one partner in a marriage is a first-generation migrant (Dale 2008; Charsley 2006; 2016). Transnational marriage was prevalent in Pakistani communities throughout the 1990s (Shaw 2000; 2009). Arranged marriages of the second-generation to cousins or kin in Pakistan protected
transnational family interests and cultural ideals, and strengthened ties with Pakistan (Dwyer 2000; Charsley 2006). Pakistani kin in Pakistan could exert significant pressure and refusals of marriage proposals were disruptive to relationships and material
interests (Shaw 1988; 2000). By arranging transnational marriages for their children, first-generation parents were able to share educational and employment opportunities with their family in Pakistan. Restrictive immigration policies meant that Pakistani families were limited in the ways in which they could support labour migration to Britain (Shaw 2000; Werbner 1990). The sending of remittance to Pakistan remains important to more recently arrived first-generation Pakistani men (Kalra 2000; Charsley 2006).
First-generation partners were seen as better able to maintain ethno-religious values and to impart these to their children (Shaw 2000; Charsley 2006; 2007). Younger first-generation women were thought to be: more dutiful and modest; less independent, assertive and argumentative; and more committed to marriage than second-generation Pakistani young women (Shaw 2009). These attributes were regarded as conducive to the maintenance of family and community networks and ties (Shaw 1988; 2000). In Pakistan, girls receive early socialisation to adapt to their husband’s family, to respect elders, and to behave and dress modestly (Afshar 1994). The greater likelihood of a
28 wife from Pakistan to be, and to remain, economically inactive and unable to contribute to household finances indicates that socio-cultural stability was preferred over
improved socio-economic circumstances in some families.
The expectations of married women within Pakistani households and communities were set by older first-generation women. The arrival of wives in the 1970s exerted a
“moral pressure” on Pakistan men (Shaw 1988, p.47). First-generation female migrants experienced greater direct practical and moral control over their households sooner than they would have in Pakistan (Shaw 1988; Werbner 1988; Akhtar 2014).
This authority was asserted in the form of maintaining Pakistani norms and values rather than integration with majority British values. “Some women see their role in Britain quite explicitly in terms of maintaining and transmitting cultural and religious values and protecting their families from Western influences…it is largely women who are responsible for the distinctive structure and social life of the community today; it is in this that their power lies.” (Shaw 1988, p5).
The maintenance and transmission of cultural and religious norms was key to the migration of Pakistani women. Economic activity or social integration was not a strong expectation, in fact, it was discouraged. In older age, first-generation women continue to see themselves as ‘guardians of kin’ who are central to the moral and economic wellbeing of their families in their transmission of cultural and religious traditions, practices and beliefs and the reproduction of norms (Maynard et al. 2008). Qualitative researchers have found that first-generation P&B women give priority to their domestic roles over economic activity. They see their roles within homes as legitimate and fruitful (Salway 2007; Maynard et al. 2008). The lack of contemporary research on
economically inactive second-generation and more recently arrived first-generation women means that it not possible to draw the same conclusions about the value they place on their roles within the domestic sphere. This is an area that would benefit from more systematic differentiation by generation or cohort.
There is some evidence that recently arrived male migrants, the husbands of second-generation Pakistani women, are less ‘traditional’ in their attitudes to gendered domestic roles and attitudes to women working than might be expected (Charsley 2007; Dale 2008). Men who migrate to the UK for marriage are in the unusual situation of joining their wife’s family and leaving behind their own family, social networks, and employment. Charsley (2006) suggests that marriage migration may result in the loss of much of men’s traditional power in the family and women may be in a more powerful position to renegotiate traditional gender roles. Second-generation women who marry transnationally, like older first-generation women, may have greater authority and decision-making power in their own households because their in-laws are in Pakistan.
29 Whether this has led to increased levels of economic activity has yet to be empirically proven.
Like first-generation women, first-generation men are also expected to uphold Pakistani norms and values when they migrate to Britain after marriage. In Dales’ (2008) mixed methods study of the effects of transnational marriage on economic activity, second-generation women viewed first-second-generation husbands as more ‘traditional’ and unaccepting of their wives working. Dale complemented the qualitative data with a statistical analysis of LFS data from the years 1998-2005 and found no additional negative effect on economic activity for those women in the data who had a first-generation husband. The factors that had the biggest impact on a woman’s likelihood of being economically active were whether she had recognised qualifications, whether she had young children, whether she was Pakistani or Bangladeshi and whether she has been born overseas. Dale went on to hypothesise that increases in HE
participation rates for P&B young women would reduce the likelihood of transnational or arranged marries and economic activity rates would increase (Dale 2008).
Dale’s hypothesis assumed that commitment to ‘traditional’ gender norms will reduce with marriage between UK-born spouses. This assumption may be too simplistic given the strong support for delineated male-female households roles in British Pakistani families and communities. Changes in attitudes to gender norms may require larger scale shifts than at the level of the individual or couple. There is limited qualitative evidence of intergenerational change to gender norms. There is some quantitative evidence for generational shift in attitudes to gender norms (Heath and Demireva 2014). Continued high rates of economic activity among second-generation women would suggest though that these are not playing out in everyday lives, yet. Further, responses to this question may be influenced by desire to provide socially acceptable norms in the British context rather than an accurate reflection of lived experiences.
Changes to immigration law that meant that British nationals had to prove that they were able to provide financial support to an overseas partner without recourse to public funds may have forced some British Pakistani women into the labour market
(Mohammad 2010). This point is hard to substantiate statistically and if indeed this was the case it may have meant short-term labour market participation to meet the
requirements of the immigration process. It is difficult to assess the impacts that such short-term ‘bursts’ of economic activity might have on the aspirations and orientations of Muslim women towards work in the formal economy and one which might be interesting to explore.
Marital Status
30 Marriage is a consistent and significant factor in explanations of economic inactivity among Muslim women. Single Pakistani and Bangladeshi women are as likely to work as women of other ethno-religious groups, differences arise after marriage (Dale 2008;
Khattab et al. 2017). Second-generation women therefore are likely to have undertaken formal paid employment before marriage or family formation. Most recently arrived first-generation migrants who arrive as spouses of second-first-generation men are less likely to have experience of formal economic activity. However, historical patterns of informal work among first-generation P&B women suggest that more recently arrived female migrants may have some experience of work in secondary labour markets (Anwar 1970; Werbner 1990; Phizacklea 1990).
There is little information available about the experiences currently inactive women have had of work, and the reasons behind their economic subsequent economic inactivity and their future work aspirations. A longitudinal or life-story approach might be helpful to develop better understandings of the factors that lead to economic inactivity. Furthermore, such an approach may provide useful indications for the
assistance and support Muslim women need to return to the labour market should they wish to do so.
The effects of socio-cultural factors, or traditions, vary by marital status. Traditional practices limit the educational opportunities and the type of work that single women do in terms of profession, location and timing of work (Ahmad et al. 2003; Mohammad 2010). For married Muslim women with children, traditional practices constrain overall economic activity. In the literature is assumed that the effects of marriage and
motherhood apply equally across all generations and cohorts of Muslim women, this implies a lack of agency and an inherent inability to change and adapt to the British context. There is a lack of information about how these traditions play out in in the contemporary context, how they impact on the economic activity of women, and any evidence of generational change or difference.
There is a need for contemporary empirical qualitative evidence for the ways in gender roles and responsibilities within marriage affect the economic activity of Muslim women.
This contemporary work should examine the effects on migrant generation to capture nuance and differentiation. It may indeed be the case that marriage has a consistent and common effect on the economic activity of all British Muslim women. This universal effect may be a result of commonly held religious beliefs, regardless of ethnicity or migrant generation, however, this claim has not been substantiated in the existing body of literature.
Family responsibilities and marriage can explain some of the differences in economic activity between ethnic groups but not all; religious and ethnic discrimination against
31 Muslims, which has increased since 9/11, remains an important source of labour
market disadvantage for Muslim women (Dale 2008). Any negative impacts of marriage and family formation then act alongside, and in addition to, structural discrimination based on race, ethnicity and religion.