-- such alarmism was probably at least partly a sincere reaction to
dramatic changes in the regional balance of power, although these
developments did not immediately pose serious security t hreats.
Similarly, the June 1980 Vietnamese incursion was a violation of Thai
t e r r i t o r y which was unprecedented in modern times: i t was not s u r p r i s i n g tha t some commentators were genuinely shocked by t h i s f o r c e f u l remainder that Thailand could no longer r e l y on a b u ff e r zone to p ro te ct i t from Vietnam.
But in general - - and to some extent even at the time of the 1975, 1978-79 and June 1980 c ris es - - much of the alarmism which p o l i t i c i a n s , o f f i c i a l s and senior m i l i t a r y men in the ASEAN region expressed over the d i r e c t m i l i t a r y th re at from Indochina ( p a r t i c u l a r l y Vietnam) was not inspired by s tra ig ht fo rw ar d concern f o r national or regional s e c u r i ty . Although i t was necessary to reassure both the populace and for ei gn investors th a t the external challenge was not so severe and immediate th a t the government could not cope with i t , the "Vietnamese th r e a t " was f r e q u e n t l y used both to enhance the domestic legitimacy of the regime in power ( p a r t i c u l a r l y in the face of p o l i t i c a l dissent and economic problems) and to secure p o l i t i c a l , economic and m i l i t a r y support from the West, e s p e ci a ll y the United
States. A stress on the linkage between Vietnam's ro le in Southeast
Asia and the Soviet Union's supposed global ambitions was often used
16? to help achieve the l a t t e r o b j e c ti v e .
162 There is also evidence th a t armed forces' leaders in the ASEAN region exaggerated the th r e a t to j u s t i f y increased m i l i t a r y
THE ASEAN STATES 1 9 7 5 - 1 9 8 1
A f t e r t he c o l l a p s e i n 1975 o f the a n t i - c o m m u n i s t regimes i n I n d o c h i n a , t h e governments o f t he ASEAN c o u n t r i e s - - p a r t i c u l a r l y T h a i l a n d - - f r e q u e n t l y expressed concern over t h e d i r e c t m i l i t a r y t h r e a t posed by t h e i r communist neighbour s i n t h e r e g i o n . But e q u a l , i f not g r e a t e r , a t t e n t i o n was pai d by t he governments o f Southeast A s i a ' s non-communist s t a t e s t o t he i n d i r e c t t h r e a t t h a t t h e y saw ( o r p u r p o r t e d t o see) f r om t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between communist I ndoc hi na and r e v o l u t i o n a r y movements i n t he ASEAN c o u n t r i e s .
T h a i l a n d , M a l a y s i a and the P h i l i p p i n e s were i n 1975 a l r e a d y copi ng w i t h communist i n s u r g e n c i e s , and t h e r e were r e s i d u a l underground communist movements i n I ndone si a and S i nga por e. D e s pi t e t h e ASEAN s t a t e s ' economic success r e l a t i v e t o most o t h e r T h i r d World c o u n t r i e s , l a r g e segments o f t h e i r p o p u l a t i o n s remained i mpoveri shed by any s t a n d a r d . Widespread soci oeconomi c i n e q u a l i t y , o f t e n compounded by m a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and o f f i c i a l c o r r u p t i o n , i m p l i e d t h a t communism had an i n h e r e n t appeal t o many people i n t h e ASEAN r e g i o n .
There were s e v e r a l aspects t o the ASEAN governments' concern r e g a r d i n g communist i n s u r g e n c y i n r e l a t i o n t o e v en t s i n I n d o c h i n a . In t h e f i r s t p l a c e t h e r e was a wi despread f e a r t h a t t h e v i c t o r i e s of t he V i e t Cong, Khmer Rouge and Pa the t Lao would encourage communism i n t he r e s t o f Southeast A s i a : t h e f a l l of I n d o c h i n a ' s r i g h t - w i n g r egimes, c l o s e t o home, m ig ht be i n t e r p r e t e d by l o c a l r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s as d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t t h e e s t a b l i s h e d or der c o u l d be overcome. I t was
also feared tha t North Vietnam and the new communist regimes in Indochina would give d i r e c t assistance to regional r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s , in the form of arms,^ t r a i n i n g and, in Thailand's case, sanctuaries across the cou ntry's long eastern borders with Laos and Cambodia.
Vietnam: A Revolutionary Mainspring?
On one level i t seemed tha t the Vietnamese communists, at the time of t h e i r v i c t o r y in 1975, were doing a great deal to encourage communist in s u rr e c t io n in the ASEAN region. Hanoi c e r t a i n l y took a grand view of Vietnam's new in te rn a ti o n a l r o l e , with Party Secretary
Le Duan asserting th a t "our nation was joined the ranks of the
vanguard nations of the world" with the po te n ti a l to become "an i n v i o l a b l e bastion of national independence, democracy and socialism
2
in Indochina and Southeast Asia". At the Fourth Non-Aligned
Conference in Lima in la te August 1975, the North Vietnamese avowed, in what was int er pr ete d in some ASEAN c a p i t a l s as a clear encourage-
3 ment to regional insurgents:
1 Although there was concern w i t h i n the ASEAN administrations tha t the f a l l of Phnom Penh and Saigon would r e s u l t in the tr a n s fe r of large q u a n t it ie s of arms ( o r i g i n a l l y supplied by the United
States) to local insurgents, t h i s anxiety centred on the
a c t i v i t i e s of commercial gun-runners rathe r than the Indochinese
regimes. New S t r a i t s Times, 9 May and 22 November 1975;
Economist, 6 December 1975.
2 Speech by Le Duan, Vietnamese News Agency (c i te d hereafter as
VNA) in English, 0812 gmt, 15 May 1975 (SWB FE/4906/A3/7, 17 May 1975).
3 See, f o r example, Lau Teik Soon, "ASEAN, North Vietnam and the Communist Challenge", Southeast Asian A f f a i r s 1976 (Singapore: I n s t i t u t e of Southeast Asian Studies, 1976), pp. 72-79.
We, the Vietnamese people, always consider our struggle and v i c t o r y as part of the struggle and v i c t o r y of the re v o l u t i o n a r y movement of the wor ld 's people in general and of the national l i b e r a t i o n movement in p a r t i c u l a r . . . We have always persisted in our s o l i d a r i t y with the s o c i a l i s t cou ntrie s, the non-aligned cou ntries, with a l l forces s tru gg li n g f o r independence, democracy,
peace and social pr og re ss .. .4
In February 1976 a rather more s p e c i f i c declaration by Le Duan cl aimed:
The Vietnamese people f u l l y support the j u s t sure-to- win cause of the peoples of the countries of Southeast Asia f o r peace, national independence, democracy and
social progress and contribute actively to helping the
nations in Southeast Asia r e a lly become independent, peaceful and n e u t r a l. .. The Vietnamese people f u l l support the Thai people's struggle f o r a r e a l l y
independent and democratic Thailand without the US
forces and m i l i t a r y b a s e s .. .5 [Emphasis added]
But although Vietnamese leaders issued broad declarations in support of re v o l u ti o n a r y change throughout Southeast Asia, these were e s s e n t i a l l y de rigueur f o r a regime wishing to maintain a r e v o l u ti o n a r y image domestically and in i n te rn a ti o n a l communist c i r c l e s . While Hanoi c e r t a i n l y saw the emergence of a s o c i a l i s t Indochina as having very important impl ic at ion s f o r the f u t u r e of non communist Southeast Asia, the evidence suggests that the Vietnamese leadership was not r e a l l y c a l l i n g f o r r e v o l u ti o n a r y warfare throughout the region or attempting to become the main sponsor of Southeast Asian communist insurgency.
4 VNA in English, 0734 gmt, 1 September 1975 (SWB FE/4997/A1/1,
3 September 1975).
5 Speech by Le Duan, 7 February 1976, quoted by VNA in English,