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EL CONTRATO MERCANTIL INTERNACIONAL

6. Ley Aplicable

Bonds/Interest 31 4.65

Stocks/Equities 46 6.13

In regard to company reports/announcements, the Tukey test confirms the significance of the higher rating for stocks/equities. Given that this media/source would provide critical information on the fundamentals influencing stocks/equities, the variance here needs no further explanation.

The following bar chart presents the overall data on the ratings for objectivity for the same set of media/information sources.

The overall objectivity ratings for media/ information courses indicated in the bar chart above indicate a narrower range of responses, with no mean rating above 6 (highly objective) or below 3 (mainly subjective). These mean scores may reflect more complex patterns of responses (indicated by high standard deviation) but some general observations can be made at this point. The fact that no medium was rated as ‘highly objective’ or higher suggests that no source is regarded uncritically as an accurate and impartial indicator of market conditions and that the potential for any medium/source to be influenced by subjective opinions, perceptions and interpretations is well recognised.

The five highest rated media (between ‘mainly objective’ and ‘highly objective’) are specialist financial wire services, specialist industry reports, academic journals, institutional systems/ algorithms, and (perhaps most interestingly) respondents’ own professional analyses. The media/sources rated lowest for objectivity (between ‘mainly subjective’ and ‘partly objective’) are general interest newspapers, general interest magazines, general interest broadcasts, general interest internet sites, informal discussion with external contacts, and intuition/feelings/hunches.

Fig. 15 Rankings of Media/ Source by Objectivity

Objectivity Rating Media/ Information Sources

Mean > 5 Highly Objective- Mainly Objective

• Specialist financial information/wire services (Reuters/ Bloomberg, etc.);

• Specialist Industry reports (official stock market/ central bank/ratings agencies reports);

• Specialist academic journals;

• Information derived from specialist systems/algorithms used in own institution;

• Information derived from one’s own professional analysis;

Mean > 4 Mainly Objective- Partly Objective

• Finance/ business newspapers; • Finance/business magazines;

• Finance/ business broadcasting news; • Specialist finance/business channels;

• Financial/business internet sites (including online versions of other financial news media);

• Subscriber finance/business Internet sites/ on-line market information services;

• Company reports/accounts/ publications/ announcements; • Public investment advice/ recommendations from market analysts; • Private (purchased) advice/ recommendations from external market

analysts;

• General (informal) discussion/consultation with own colleagues; • Specific (work-related) discussion/consultation with own colleagues; • Specific (work-related) instructions/advice from one’s own institution;; • Specific (work-related) discussion/consultation with external contacts

in financial markets; Mean > 3 Partly Objective- Mainly Subjective

• General interest newspapers;

• General Internet sites (including on-line versions of other general media);

• General interest magazines;

• General interest broadcasting news;.

• General (informal) discussion/consultation with external contacts in financial markets

At the higher end, the specialist financial wire services, specialist industry reports are both rated as mainly/highly objective. Given that these media/sources are likely to convey information such as prices/ask-bid spreads, credit ratings and interest rate announcements, the relatively high objectivity rating may stems from their presentation of information that is likely to move the market or directly constitute a shift in market conditions (explicit/transactional reflexivity). Although the reflexivity arguments presume that the ontology of markets is constructed, in an environment where market agents’ intersubjective codifications are sufficiently coherent to ascribe meaning consistently to data such as prices, interest rates and credit-ratings, changes in such data can be externally verified and reported ‘objectively’.

The relatively high objectivity rating ascribed to institutional systems/algorithms is understandable, since where trading is based on computer models or close reading of technical charts, there is little scope for interpretation or extraneous influence by vested interests. Indeed, as interview respondent #15 pointed out, the use of specific systems of calculation to determine investment decisions can help eliminate subjective emotions and idiosyncratic perceptions from the decision process. Meanwhile, the higher objectivity rating for respondents’ own professional analysis may seem unusual, insofar as this could be regarded as entirely subjective. The rating may reflect the self-confidence needed to work as an institutional investor but it will also reflect the perception that, like systems/algorithms, one’s own analysis of the markets is regarded as independent of extraneous influence/ motivation to distort information/interpretations.

The mean objectivity ratings indicate that general interest media are regarded the least reliable sources of information about financial markets, along with informal discussion with contacts external to one’s own institution and personal intuition. This is not particularly surprising, since non-specialist media are less likely to employ dedicated financial reporters or have the extensive network of expert contacts. These relatively low objectivity ratings for general news media may reflect their dependence on the definitions of primary financial definers. These are likely to be market analysts whose own work may at times be subject to institutional bias. Interestingly, advice/ recommendations from both public and private analysts are rated as more objective than general interest media, despite the well-recognised tendency for analysts to ‘talk their book’. The lower objectivity rating of hunches/feelings intuitions is perhaps self-explanatory, but it is interesting to note its relatively high importance rating and also the contrast with the higher objectivity rating of respondents’ own professional analyses (which are also individual and potentially idiosyncratic, but perhaps regarded as based on intersubjectively validated practices of calculation and thus rationally explicable to peers).

The table below provides a break-down of the overall Objectivity ratings by market types (top row) and indicates the standard deviation for each score (bottom row).

Fig. 16 Break-Down of Mean Importance for Media/Sources by Market Subsector