The current study is set within the context of Catholic intellectual and spiritual tradition;
therefore, drawing from Catholic scholarship, various theories are employed to clarify those
aspects of the study that more directly involve the Catholic faith. This section aims to provide
a theoretical foundation for the exploration of pilgrimage in two distinct sections: Firstly, an
epistemology based on moderate and critical realism as the main lens through which the
philosophical and theological underpinnings of the formation of the Catholic educator and the
tradition of pilgrimage are explored. Secondarily, aspects of constructionist sociology are
also recognized and explored as informing an understanding of the activity of pilgrims as a
means for transmitting the faith.
Given the specific nature of Catholic educators as witnesses to the faith in a Catholic
system of schooling, this study adopts moderate philosophical realism as the main theoretical
perspective within which to explain the underlying principles of Catholicism with regard to
pilgrimage. Moderate realism, as initially taught by Aristotle and adopted by Saint Thomas
Aquinas, provides the foundation for the investigation of the unique nature of Catholicism,
not merely as a religion but as a foundational approach in coming to understand truth as it
applies to the purpose and experience of human life. As a perspective, it strives to investigate
and appreciate the reality of things, so as to see a thing objectively as it is, rather than through
any particular lens or paradigm. An objective view of reality acknowledges certainties that
might be provided by natural law, revelation from God or universalisable moral law (Nash,
2002).
Moderate realism is adopted especially in relation to the aspects of faith encountered
potential formative nature of a pilgrimage for Catholic educators, moderate realism presents
the view that there is an existing narrative into which educators from any time or place are
invited, a narrative based upon revelation. This narrative may challenge and inform the individual’s own narrative. Catholicism asserts that the aspects of the faith encountered upon pilgrimage are seen as objective realities knowable to the educator, but potentially
experienced and viewed from one’s own individual perspective.
Also informing aspects of this thesis, though to a far lesser degree, is social
constructionism. This provides one means to describe human and social activity as it pertains
to the educational practice of transmitting knowledge. Social constructionism recognises and
seeks to understand the social order. In this study, pilgrimage as a product of human activity
is explored in light of social constructionism (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).
Moderate Realism
Saint Thomas Aquinas, the 13th Century realist philosopher, theologian and doctor of the
Church adopted an Aristotelian view of ontology, metaphysics and epistemology, a
component of which acknowledges the existence of realities independent of the mind (Gracia,
2003). Thomistic realism is termed moderate because within the metaphysical debate on the
existence of universals it presents the middle ground, between conceptualist and nominalist
epistemological stances on the one hand, and Platonic forms on the other. Conceptualism
holds that an essence (what something is) exists only as a concept of the mind (e.g. the
concept of man) and nominalism asserts that essence exists merely as a word, e.g. man
(Gracia, 2003, p. 140). Kraut (2017) defines Plato’s approach:
The world that appears to our senses is in some way defective and filled with error, but there is a more real and perfect realm, populated by entities (called forms or ideas) that are eternal, changeless, and in some sense paradigmatic for the structure and character of the world presented to our senses. (p. 2)
In contrast, moderate realism, also referred to as immanent realism (Wright, 1992) sees
essences as universal concepts existing within particular things and as known accurately by the mind through the process of abstraction (Feser, 2014). For Aquinas there are “no such things as mind-independent abstract objects” (Feser, 2014, p. 227) and in this approach to the
nature of reality he is non-dualistic. Aquinas claims that an essence, (e.g. man) exists as one
outside of the mind, but as Gracia (2003) explains, for Aristotle an essence exists in the mind
as a concept (e.g. the universal idea of man) and as word (the denotion of the entity perceived
by the senses, e.g. “man”) (Gracia, 2003). Like Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas views
human beings as a body-soul composite and his commentary on Aristotle’s metaphysics
explains our understanding of reality as a relationship between ontology and epistemology. In
his commentary on Aristotle, Aquinas (1961) writes, “[I]t is not because we perceive or know
a thing that it is so in reality; but it is because it is so in reality that we have a true knowledge
or perception of it".
However, this raises the question, beyond the scope of this chapter but briefly touched
upon here: how do we come to know things? Feser (2014) describes the process of intellectual abstraction from Aquinas’ perspective, noting that firstly we come to know a thing through the senses, and then by the process of abstraction we come to know universals.
The world is knowable and the senses are able to be trusted, but a commitment to the truth of
objective reality calls forth an eternal perspective and this requires the commitment of faith.
Moderate realism recognises the eternal perspective and asserts that the truth of God,
independent of human musings, is knowable by both reason and faith (John Paul II, 1998). In
addition to acquiring knowledge of God, many other aspects of the faith are discernable. The
problem that asserts itself in the process of acquiring human knowledge of divine things,
requires the acknowledgement of human limitation, and at times impairment, with regard to
any one individual may be limited or increased according to the background, circumstances
or socio-cultural context of the individual. Nonetheless, Aquinas upholds the dignity and the
capacity of the intellect is upheld in this approach to viewing reality, while also
acknowledging that a different kind of knowing is essential, a knowing that requires faith.
Pope John Paul II (1998) describes the workings of faith and reason as “two wings by which
the human spirit rises in the contemplation of truth” (para. 1). Pope John Paul II affirms the
enduring originality of thought proposed by Saint Thomas Aquinas:
Thomas recognised that nature, philosophy's proper concern, could contribute to the
understanding of divine Revelation. Faith therefore has no fear of reason, but seeks it
out and has trust in it. Just as grace builds on nature and brings it to fulfilment, so
faith builds upon and perfects reason. Illumined by faith, reason is set free from the
fragility and limitations deriving from the disobedience of sin and finds the strength
required to rise to the knowledge of the Triune God. (para. 43)
The writings of Moore (2003) are helpful in explaining and consonant with Aquinas’ stance
on moderate realism and the union of faith and reason in the search for truth. Moore (2003)
describes a Christocentric Christian realism as one in which God exists independently of our
awareness of him. This knowledge of God is acquired by reason and by faith. We can know
Him, and our language is not completely inadequate to speak of Him. Hella (2007) asserts
that even though our judgments (about God) are partial and contested, nevertheless we can
make judgments between varying accounts of reality. She describes this knowledge of God as
faith. Hella (2007) writes, “[faith] is not to be seen as an arbitrary and irrational act of
imagination, but a necessary basis of understanding the world” (p. 33). Douglas (2001)
sythesises the relationship between metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology which
underpins moderate realism, claiming that; “the world is real…truth is achievable, knowledge
As noted above, moderate realism establishes the foundations of its recognition of
objective reality, via appeal to Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy, however there is need
to acknowledge the subjective aspect of viewing and interacting with reality. Similar in some
respects to moderate realism, critical realism rejects entirely the dichotomy between
rationalist, empiricist and positivist accounts of knowing on the one hand, and constructivist
and relativistic approach to knowing on the other (Maritain, 1953; Sweet, 2013; Wright,
2004). Critical realism works from the presumption that rational judgments are made from
within and in relation to the world (Wright, 2003). According to Hella (2007) and Wright
(2009), are helpful in acknowledging the critical relationship that exists between ontology
and epistemology in coming to understanding of the world:
Our knowledge of the world is not based on absolute proof or arbitrary construction,
but rather on informed judgment. This means that the basic paradigm of our relationship
to the world is one of faith seeking understanding. This is so both for secularists and
religious believers. (p. 61)
Critical realism serves as a useful theoretical support to moderate realism in that it posits that there exists “an objectively knowable, mind-independent reality, while acknowledging the roles of perception and cognition” (Wright, 1992). Wright (1992) acknowledges the “provisionality” of our knowing (p. 35), so that we recognise that realities themselves are independent of the knower; while also recognising that the knowledge is never independent
of the knower and is in that sense, provisional and to some degree tenative. Wright (1992) states, “…any realism which is to survive has to take fully on board the provisionality of its own statements” (p. 35).
The combination of moderate realism and critical realism provides a nuanced
treatment of ontology and epistemology in the context of attempts to come to an
realism. In writing about critical realism, Hella (2008), acknowledges that “we are part of
reality in an internal relationship with it, but reality transcends our ability to achieve
knowledge about it.” (p. 35) Therefore, as moderate realism asserts the objectivity of
realities, critical realism provides “an interpretive framework for the relationship between
ontology and epistemology” (Hella, 2008, p. 35). Critical realism places greater emphasis
than moderate realism on the evaluation and modification of one’s understanding of reality.
The combination of critical and moderate realism is essential to this phenomenographic study
that seeks to investigate the relationship between the realities experienced upon pilgrimage and the educators’ interaction and appropriation of these realities.
Wright (2003) draws together the objective and subjective interaction between an
individual and his/her experience of the world. He acknowledges that as the individual dwells
within the world in a unity of mind and body; his/her understanding of the world comes from
a particular givenness in time and space. There is an inextricable link between the human
being and the world around us. Likewise, our desire and ability to comprehend the world
around us comes from the fact that we inhabit a specific location in the “ultimate order of things” (Wright, 2003, p. 61). Wright (2003) concludes,
It follows that any description of reality we produce must include an account of
our place within it: subjective experience needs to be brought into a synergetic
and sympathetic relationship with objective reality. (p. 47)
Dupré (1972) sheds light on the relationship between the objective and subjective in coming
understand reality from the perspective of the religious believer; such understanding is an
important element of this study of pilgrimage. For Dupré (1972), a religious attitude
constitutes all objects and events as “symbols of the transcendent” (p. 13); in other words,
occur in her life (objective) can be viewed as moments of grace (impacting the subject).
Dupré (1972), continues,
[T]o conclude that religion is subjective is unwarranted for religion is always
directed toward an ‘object’. Religious man does not create his ‘object’, it is revealed
to him in a disposition to perceive a deeper reality under the appearance of objects
and events. (p. 13)
Within Catholicism, this “deeper reality under the appearance of objects” could also be
understood as sacramentality, which was explored in the previous chapter (Literature
Review). The notion of sacramentality is most pertinent to the study of the impact of
pilgrimage on the faith of the Catholic educator given that it brings to the fore the intensity of
the believers’ engagement with the eternal via his/her everyday life. The interaction between
the perspectives of moderate and critical realism provides theoretical support for coming to a
coherent understanding of religious attitudes to life, and for investigating the possibilities that
pilgrimage might facilitate for pilgrims.
Social Constructionism
To assist the investigation into the relationship between pilgrimage and the educators’ faith
and practice, a brief explanation of social constructionism is helpful as it has contributed to
some of the background thinking of this thesis. 1By contrast, constructionism differs from
constructivism in that constructionism is a sociological approach, which asserts that social
activity is a form of human activity that gives direction and stability to human conduct
1 It is important to distinguish between constructivism and constructionism, as constructivism
has not been adopted within this thesis. Constructivism is a philosophical viewpoint about how one comes to know reality. Constructivism is a philosophical stance which holds that reality is based upon the individual’s interpretation of reality, and asserts that reality is relative from one knower to the next (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). This stance towards reality contravenes moderate realism, which has been adopted as a theoretical framework for this
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Social constructionism draws attention to one way of
understanding human activity, as such, constructionism potentially supports moderate realism
as a sociological tool to aid in understanding social behavior, and providing a useful
perspective for considering pilgrimage’s impact on faith and faith-based practice.
Berger and Luckmann (1966) provide a framework for describing the social activity
of pilgrimage. They assert that objective social reality is mediated through socialisation, and
especially through conversation. Next, that this human activity of socialisation and
conversation, done over a period of time, becomes habitualised and eventually
instititutionalised. For instance, (and applicable to this study) is the following scenario: when
a holy person dies, local devotees may continue to visit the residence or burial site of the one
they loved and admired. Actions are then performed at the gravesite, such as lighting candles,
singing songs and reciting particular prayers. In time, a cult (formal religious veneration) may
develop in remembrance of this holy person’s life and actions. “Institutionalisation occurs
when there is a reciprocal typification of habitualised actions by types of actors” (Berger &
Luckmann, 1966, p. 54). That is, when an action is performed again and again over time,
there is the potential that this action can become institutionalised. In the case of a holy
person, recognised as such by the Catholic Church through a process of canonisation, there is
an institutional recognition of the life of the Saint.
Berger and Luckmann (1966) posit that it is impossible to understand an institution
without understanding its history. Thus, to properly understand the institutionalisation of
devotions and activities surrounding a Saint’s tomb, one must understand the history, life and
death of the Saint, as well as the development of the cult surrounding the tomb or place of
residence. This process of institutionalisation of a Saint’s cause is understandable through the
development of meaning passed on from one generation to the next. This is pertinent for the
Catholic educator, who is entrusted with the task of educating the next generation in the faith.
Applying Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) framework to pilgrimage, one can see how
the practice over years and sometimes centuries of visiting the tombs of Saints has led to the
development of a cult. The geographical place of the Saint, in many instances, is a point upon
the pilgrim’s itinerary, and serves as an opportunity for catechesis or teaching about many
aspects of the faith. The life of the Saint serves as a witness to and an inspiration for pilgrims
who may visit from all parts of the world.
Human experience, such as pilgrimage and the visiting of the Saint’s tomb, requires
interpretation to assist those participating (or observing) to reach an understanding of the
meaning and significance of the events experienced or observed. Building upon Berger and
Luckmann (1966), Holstein and Gubrium (2011) provide a framework which analyses how
people “methodically construct their experiences and their worlds and the contextual
configurations of meaning and institutional life that inform and shape reality-constituting activity” (p. 342). They provide a perspective on social activity through what they term constructionist analytics of interpretive practice. This “interpretation” results in
“transmission” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966. p. 51), whereby one generation passes on
knowledge of the institutional practice to the next. This can be applied to the cult surrounding
the life of a Saint, or to any religious practice that has social implications. It is also applicable
to the role of the educator passing on knowledge and practice of the faith. In the transmission
of knowledge, both an objective reality of the history, life, and beliefs of the holy person is
passed on, as well as the subjective realities of what that person, experience, phenomenon
may mean to the individual and/or the group.
Turner (1969) contributes a sense of sanctity to the discussion on the transmission of
The occasions on which transmission occurs are hallowed occasions; the messages
wrapped up in the ritual…are messages from or about the gods, and are charged with
mystical efficacy… In other words, we are dealing with information that is regarded as
authoritative, even as ultimately valid, axiomatic. We are not dealing with information
about new agricultural technique or a better judicial procedure: we are concerned here
with the crucial values of the believing community, whether it is a religious
community, a nation, a tribe, a secret society, or any other type of group whose ultimate
unity resides in its orientation towards transcendental and invisible powers. (p. 2)
Here, Turner captures the formational character incumbent upon transmitting information. He
describes the information accrued through ritual as “authoritative” and self-evident; it has the
power to communicate the deeper meanings of the group. Implicit in Turner’s quote is the
acknowledgement of both objectivity and subjectivity; specific “knowledge” and “values”
(an example of moderate realism) are handed down via ritual, while acknowledging the social
construct of a “religious community, a nation, a tribe…”. This presumes a character of
subjectivity, as the knowledge and values are socially defined within and suited to the
particular group.
Before proceeding, it is important to set clear parameters of what is hoped for in this
study. While it is possible to speak of God and the things of God, it is not possible to
quantify, measure or, at times, put words to a person’s experience of God. This we leave to
mystical theology to discuss. Throughout this thesis I hope to maintain a healthy reverence
and modesty for the spiritual experiences of intimacy with God that pilgrim-educators may
enjoy upon pilgrimage. Sarah (2017) cautions about the necessity of silence in the face of
mystery. He writes,
Words often bring with them the illusion of transparency, as though they
order…Never before has the world spoken so much about God, about theology,