Limitaciones

Highly skilled migration may have positive and negative effects on the economies of either the sending or receiving country. Though again, it is not possible to identify the clear-cut costs or benefits, and economic theory has stressed the ambivalence of migration issues. Shachar (2006: 193) highlights that the ‘modern approach’ to immigration in the UK, is designed ‘…to ensure that visitors, businessmen, students and others whose activities benefit the UK feel encouraged to come.’ However, here and in the broader literature, little indication of what economic contribution highly skilled migrants make to the UK is provided. In 2000 George Borjas (2000: 11) asked ‘…what is the economic impact of international migration on the host country?’ This has not been evaluated or disaggregated for each category of migrant, therefore this section will aim to shed light on the economics of (highly skilled) migration and embed this in a European and UK context (see Coleman and Rowthorn 2004; Cerna 2010). Ouaked documents the 2002 ‘Transatlantic roundtable on high- skilled migration and sending countries issues’, outlining three motives, to 1) identify impacts of highly skilled migration on source countries, 2) identify policies to maximise benefits to source countries and negate impacts such as ‘brain drain’ and, 3) frame and evaluate international agreements regulating the movement of highly skilled workers in order to identify measures to promote economic prosperity. These objectives encapsulate the rationale of national government and supra national regional policies, here the economic basis for these political manifestations will be illustrated and conceptually disaggregated from a ‘politics of highly skilled migration’. In this light, Borjas (2000: 15; Borjas et al. 1997) suggests that ‘Because local labour market conditions may not provide valuable information about the economic impact of immigration, some studies have attempted to measure the impact at the level of the national market.

To contextualise the economic contribution of highly skilled migrants, overarching figures will be first examined. For Spain and Germany estimated economic benefit is suggested, in Gott and Johnson’s pre-Euro currency study, figures from the RWI Economic Institute show that the collective

34

migrant population in Germany is contributing about seven per cent (DM250 billion) to annual GDP. It is estimated that ‘…foreigners are paying DM100 billion in taxes and contributions and receiving approximately two-thirds of these payments (DM60 billion) in monetary transfers from the state and public goods.’ (2002: 12). According to Gott and Johnson’s (2002: 12) estimates, migrants in Germany are making a net fiscal contribution of DM40 billion, or £12.3 billion. Figures for Spain show that ‘…in 1998 migrants made a net fiscal contribution of 187 million pesetas (£0.7 million), contributing 335 million pesetas in taxes and receiving the equivalent of 148 million pesetas in government expenditure.’ These figures are out of date; however they are useful for comparison. Teruel and Segarra (2009: 114) update information for Spain, in terms of numbers of migrants, suggesting that ‘…available data point out the intensity of the arrival of immigrants to Spain in recent years. Immigrants were forming only 1.6% of Spanish population in 1998, but then their fraction increased to 7.0% in 2004 and rose to 11.3% in 2008.’

In the UK economic migrants comprise over a third (38%) of all migrant inflows with significant numbers coming to the UK for formal study (32%), family reunification (16%) and, since the 1990s, large numbers of asylum seekers and refugees have sought refuge in the UK. These figures differ significantly by country of origin in 2008, just 24% of non-EU migrants came for work reasons compared to 54% of EU migrants (ONS Annual Migration Report 2008; Hopkins and Levy 2012). The geographical inequalities on a regional scale within the UK in highly skilled migrant make up are of interest for this study. Miller and Reid point out that there are variations in migrant qualifications, for example, over 30% of migrants in London, the South East, the North East, Wales and Scotland have a degree or equivalent qualification while less than 20% do in the East and West Midlands (Miller and Reid 2011). The 2007 Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) report to Harvey Nash details estimated economic impact of highly skilled migrants to the UK between 2007 and 2012. The total economic benefit of skilled migrant workers is estimated to be £77 billion to the UK economy, equivalent to 4.7 per cent of the United Kingdom’s GVA in 2004 prices. Furthermore, the study takes into account impacts upon education, health and government services

35

sectors, highlighting expectation that these will benefit more than any other sector from highly skilled migrant economic activity; ‘Highly skilled migrants will boost output in this sector by just over £17.8 billion in 2004 prices.’ (CEBR 2007: 7).

Looking at the impact of highly skilled migrants at the level of the company, Hopkins and Levy (2012) suggest that the profitability is in some cases increased, particularly in high tech industries. Conducting an event analysis of the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act (ACWIA) of 1998, which nearly doubled the number of available skilled migrant visas in 1999, Lin (2011) found that employers and shareholders in the industries (high tech) that were more likely to use highly skilled migrants gained an average of over 20% in cumulative excess returns following the passage of the Act.