The analogy of ‘nusu mkate’ (Kiswahili for half a loaf)260 in Kenya’s politics remains alive even after the term of the coalition government in Kenya came to an end. The phrase has become the popular political reference point for the intricacies in the politics of power-sharing in Kenya. It justifies close proximity to power by the opposition elite and the ceding of some ground by the ruling party for the sake of stability. Of interest in this section is the interrelationship between power-sharing politics under the grand coalition government and the police reform process. How did the
260 The phrase was promoted by Kenya’s former Prime Minister Raila Odinga apparently to explain the sharing of power under the grand-coalition government.
politics of power-sharing shape, facilitate or constrain the police reform process under Kenya’s grand coalition? We argue that under the nusu-mkate phenomenon, Kenya’s grand-coalition was indeed instrumental in shaping Kenya’s post 2007 police reform process though vested political interests threatened to derail the process and were largely to blame for the slow pace of the process.
The grand coalition facilitated the setting up of reform agenda and policy for reform. This support is not however only unique to the Kenyan situation but applies in most cases to the discussions on merits of a grand coalition as a consociational solution to deeply divided societies. First, the grand coalition provided mechanisms, for example, the Waki Commission, the Ransley Committee and the 2010 constitution that provided the framework for undertaking police reforms. These mechanisms sought to investigate the 2007 post-election violence and isolated police culpability in the violence and recommended reforms. The political players driving the process were unanimous on the need to get these processes move forward.261 The formation of the grand coalition therefore formed a crucial entry point for police reform. It helped revitalise the police reform that had earlier stalled, due to little or no political-will from Kenya’s leadership. In fact, beginning the police reform process was one of the legacies of the grand coalition as observed by this interviewee; ‘I think they tried because they started of course with the implementation of the new constitution and they started this whole reform process, I mean the police reform process.’262
Apart from initiating the process, the grand-coalition provided the platform for citizen participation in the reform process. The grand-coalition is credited with ‘creating the environment where members of the public for example would give their views to the National Taskforce on Police Reform.’263 This was the first major engagement with the public in the history of the republic on the kind of police service they needed. However,
261 Interview with MP1
262 Interview with MP1
263 Interview with K-Int1
this was only exercised to the extent that the National Task Force on Police reform moved around the country soliciting views from various stakeholders. Subsequent initiatives however remained under complete control of the state with very little or no input in the police reform by the non-state domestic constituencies.
Additionally, the grand-coalition created the environment for the institutionalization of the reform process. The National Police Service Commission and the Independent Oversight Authority were created - the institutions under which police reform process depended even after the expiry of the grand-coalition government. Whilst politics of grand-coalition threatened to derail the reform process, the institutions provided guarantees to the process. The politics of grand-coalition occasionally filtered into the institutions and delayed the police process; the institutions to a large extent cushioned the process from stalling even after the lifespan of the coalition government.
Whilst the constitutional review process had been contentious for over two decades, divergent interests that had been the stumbling block found convergence on the need to reform Kenya’s constitution under the grand-coalition politics.264 This is not to say that the process was not adversely affected by the politics of grand-coalition. The PNU side appeared hesitant to support the draft constitution, with PNU-allied political elite insisting on the presidential system for fear of losing power. Post-independence Kenya had used the presidency to perpetuate patron-client networks through which state resources would benefit individuals with direct links to the presidency.265 ODM side insisted on a parliamentary and devolved system that would guarantee equitable distribution of resources and ensure enough safeguards against imperial presidency. In the end, the parties agreed to adopt a presidential system with devolved structures in the form of counties.266 Overall, power-sharing was closely
264 One of the primary achievements of the grand coalition government was the promulgation of the 2010 constitution on the August 27, 2010.
265 For further discussions on patron–client relationship in post-independence Kenya, see; Tamarkin (1978)
266 See Section 5.3 for further discussion.
associated with agenda setting and policy making of post-2007 police reform, but the implementation of the police reform was a different issue and which we now proceed to analyze.
Under the power-sharing arrangement, both parties wanted to control the implementation of police reform process. Critical to this claim is the desire by both parties to control key ministries through which power and resources could be distributed to various elites representing different ethnic cleavages that supported the political parties in the 2007 elections.
With the PNU controlling the Finance and Security dockets, there was the perception that the party had the control of the police reform process. This perception is illustrated by a statement of a key informant involved in the implementation of the police reform process; ‘they shared the ministries and Raila did not have the police. There were ministries under ODM, there were ministries under PNU and the police were under the Office of the President, not the Prime Minister. So he did not have a say (sic).267 And indeed, the ministries were in a number of times accused of interfering with the reform process. Treasury was accused of withholding funds meant for reform while the Interior Ministry was accused of frustrating the work of the National Police Service Commission.268
Since the prime minister was responsible for coordination of government, the delays relating to implementing police reform process were all blamed on the PM’s Office as the coordinator of government business. This is despite the fact that line ministries responsible for police reform process were directly under the presidency. In the wider political scheme, the idea of the PNU elite was to prove that the prime minister’s office was anti-reform contrary to what the ODM claimed to be the champion of anti-reform.
And this scheme filtered into the population with Odinga supporters expressing doubt on the power-sharing agreement.269
The tensions witnessed during the establishment of the grand-coalition government were construed by some respondents, particularly those
267 Interview with K-Int3
268 Interview with CSO7
269 Interview with CSO3
allied to ODM to imply that president Kibaki was unwilling to share power.
This perception reinforced arguments that Kibaki was a stumbling block at the initial stages of negotiations for power-sharing arrangement (Miguna, 2012, Annan, 2012). For this reason, these respondents argued that the grand-coalition was forced on the Kenyan political elite.270 Under this circumstance, undercurrents and tensions were a common phenomenon in the power-sharing arrangement. Kibaki purportedly appointed Raila to the position of Prime Minister and outlined the duties assigned to him.
This was later followed by a statement from the Head of the Public Service which put Odinga third in the pecking order after the President and his the Vice President (Odinga, 2013). Raila consistently complained of a deliberate scheme by the PNU allied civil servants to undermine his authority. In particular, there emerged even a stronger provincial administration that consolidated power in the presidency contrary to the proposals to disband the provincial administration in constitutional review debates.
Whilst power-sharing sought to promote accountability to the citizenry by dispersing powers previously exercised by the President in the oversight of the security forces to the independent commissions, appointments to such commissions remained contested. Political and tribal elites from both sides of the coalition primarily defined the compositions of these commissions.271 In the process, the independence and calibre of some of the commissions were watered down, with the view to having individuals loyal to each side of the coalition in the commissions. This jostling for control of police reform commissions under the grand-coalition though a problem, was however better compared to the context of single party government. The institutionalisation of separation of power among different government organs, or power-dividing institutions,272 reduced the chances of a single majority making decisions regarding police reform.
Though the PNU had its way in key appointments, a different majority in parliament including both PNU and ODM parties would have a final say
270 Interview with CSO6 and CSO3
271 Interview with MP2
272 For further debates on power-dividing institutions see; Roeder (2005)