Lineamiento Seleccionados para la Buena Práctica

on a visit to New York in 1989 and which had had raised in Parliament on his return. Peacock, Andrew, interview, 14 November 1991.

A similar policy debate raged in the United States at this time. It was in this context that Congressman Stephen Solarz, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, and sponsor of the proposal that lethal aid to be given to the NCR, came up with an alternative. Solarz had become doubtful that such aid would be effective, and suggested instead that the US should seek a major role for the United Nations in ending the conflict9 1 . Evans discussed the possibility of creating a form of UN transitional administration within the framework of a comprehensive solution with Solarz, before trying the idea out on Kong Som Ol, Deputy Prime Minister of the SOC, and ASEAN representatives9 2 . These consultations were important because it was not just a shift in Australia's position that was being contemplated, but a proposal which required the backing of other parties. Other elements of the plan, such as a UN peace-keeping role and supervision of elections, had been the subject of discussion for some time. The Evans initiative was thus a timely and well put together package, rather than an original idea. The vigor with which it was pursued, both by the Evans and DFAT staffer Michael Costello, was crucial in getting the proposal tabled for discussion at the Jakarta meeting in February and having it adopted by the P5, and accepted by other parties, as a framework for negotiation.

The Evans initiative provoked considerable public and media interest. The Australian press gave the idea wide coverage, with external and domestic factors variously emphasised in the story of its genesis. In The Australian, Allan Boyd93 claimed the proposal had come from Hun Sen, and had been secretly worked out between envoys from Canberra and Phnom Penh over previous months. This view fails to recognise that no international initiative could be seriously considered without prior consultation. Other accounts put more emphasis on domestic political factors; either the mounting public criticism of Australia's support for an

91 Booker, "A sustained campaign of disinformation".

A more convincing explanation for Solarz' "doubts" was strong public opposition in the US to government funding for the NCR, following reports that it was assisting the Khmer Rouge. In 1990, Solarz was successful in obtaining funds for the NCR from the US foreign aid allocation, arguing that this was the best way to bring the peace talks to fruition. Madison, Christopher, 'Cambodia divisions', National Journal, 5 April 1991, pp 1051-2.

92 Evans, Gareth, CPD, The Senate, 24 November 1989, pg 3299. 93 Boyd, Allan, The Australian, 16 December 1989.

interim government which included the Khmer Rouge9 4 , or the political events leading to Evans November 24th statement9®.

Paul Grigson gave an account of these events in the Sydney Morning Herald. Before November 23, according to Grigson, "no serious consideration" had been given to changing the governments policy, and only the previous week senior officials were assuring reporters and diplomats that "no change was imminent". During the week of the 24th, ACFOA, the ALP back bench led by Senator Schacht and trade union groups lobbied the Foreign Minister. Evans had considered the alternatives, but was cautious about ASEAN. During a meeting on the 23rd, "it became clear that Evans had decided the policy was politically unsupportable", especially with a Federal election looming It was then "a matter of putting the pieces together in a way that would assuage the sensitivities of the myriad of countries, and ego's involved", until in the end, the Solarz plan was adopted. ASEAN ambassadors were then briefed and the announcement of a change made in question time.

From this account, Grigson9 ® argued that the "policy change flowed from domestic pressure rather than international concern about the failure to solve the Cambodian problem". Although it explains how the change came about as well as its timing, Grigson ignores the fact that Australia's policy towards Cambodia had to be framed within the context of the attitudes of the international community, particularly ASEAN and China, as well as the United States. Furthermore, he ignored the crucial role played by the Paris Conference which, to a large extent, defined the boundaries of Australia's policy on the issue. Cockburn's97 description of the shift as "a bid to break the international deadlock" which would "also assuage growing domestic concern", is more accurate because it takes the external context into account. While the policy shift flowed from domestic pressure, it did not go far enough for those who were pushing for recognition of the SOC regime and action on Cambodia's seat in the UNGA. The Evans

94 For example, Eccleston, Roy, "Canberra ditches Khmer Rouge plan".

95 For example, Grigson, Paul, The Sydney Morning Herald, 4 January 1990. 96 Grigson, Paul, The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 November 1989.

97 Cockburn, Milton, The Sydney Morning Herald, 25 November 1989.