I☂ve argued in the previous chapter that Ricoeur☂s refusal to admit that faith impinges on philosophical reflection is vulnerable to the criticism that some of his assumptions are underpinned by precepts which owe as much to conviction as to critique. Ricoeur☂s insistence that both the autonomy of selves and the requirement for solicitude are governed by a voice heard in the conscience ♠ the source of which he is unwilling to identify ♠ can appear at best overly cautious and at worst disingenuous. In particular, as I have argued, his argument with Lévinas over the character of the injunction to solicitude; whether heard as command or invitation, may be directly related to the nature of the Divine Other.
Despite all this, Ricoeur insists that faith does not contribute to philosophical questions of morality, and equally that the moral call on summoned selves is governed by a meta-ethical paradigm. In a much cited observation, Ricoeur reflects:
Even on the ethical and moral plane biblical faith adds nothing to the predicates ☁good☂ and ☁obligatory☂ as these are applied to action. Biblical agapL belongs to an economy of the gift, possessing a metaethical character, which makes me say that there is no such thing as a Christian morality, except perhaps on the level of mentalities, but a common morality (one that I attempted to articulate in the three studies devoted to ethics, morality and practical wisdom) that biblical faith places in a new perspective in which love is tied to the ☁naming of God.☂1
This paragraph, in the introduction to Oneself as Another, has prompted considerable attention together with speculation on ways in which the ☜little ethic☝ could be related to biblical faith. Such attempts will be subject to critical examination. We will also consider the behaviour of summoned selves: asking how the person who sees himself or herself reflected in the mirror of
1 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 25.
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scripture should behave once they have turned away from the mirror. These accounts are set in the context of a brief examination of contemporary Christian ethics.
Ricoeur☂s insistence that biblical faith adds nothing to the ethical or moral planes is sometimes understood in reverse: as if he is arguing that his philosophical or anthropological insights add nothing to our understanding of biblical ethics. This is clearly not the case, and I will begin by showing how his mediation between Kantian morality and Aristotelian virtue is mirrored in scripture by the dialectic between justice and love. We have seen how, in Oneself as Another, Ricoeur demonstrates that the Kantian categorical imperative, which he ties to the Golden Rule, is insufficient in making decisions that will lead to a ☜good life for and with others in just institutions☝, without due attention being given to the role of affection, solicitude or care. Equally, we have observed how the desire for a good life, attested as ☜the conviction of judging well and acting well in a momentary and provisional approximation of living well☝ tends to instrumentalise others, and is seduced into doing so by the violence of the state unless mediated by duty. 2 Ricoeur introduces a third category, that of practical wisdom ♠ phronLsis ♠ to explore how mediation between the desire for good and the rule of duty might be fruitful. However, he offers no equivalent resolution to the biblical dialectic between love and justice. In this chapter we consider two attempts to fill this lacuna; David Hall☂s work on the ☜poetic imperative☝ and John Wall☂s proposal for ☜moral creativity.☝ 3 I will argue, to some extent in contradistinction to both these writers, that it is not possible to arrive at a mediation of Ricoeur☂s categories into a specific Christian morality or biblical ethic. Biblical metaethics remains, in my opinion, one pole in the dialectic maintaining the tension in Christian experience between present reality and eschatological possibility.
I will concede that Ricoeur☂s decision to separate his ☜little ethic☝ from ☜biblical metaethics☝ can be read to support the movement towards a distinctive Christian ethic, such as those suggested from two very different perspectives by Stanley Hauerwas or John Milbank. But, I
2 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 180. 3
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will indicate why I do not think that this is a helpful reading of Ricoeur☂s stance and offer some reasons to support his more mediating approach.
In considering Ricoeur☂s contribution to Christian ethics, or biblical metaethics, we are helped by his biblical hermeneutics which offers a model of polysemic, analogical thinking,
encouraging us to see how differing perspectives moderate one another and mediate against monolithic approaches. Exploring these differing perspectives, I want first to consider how biblical justice relates to Kantian morality and the biblical agape relates to Aristotelian virtue.
Common Morality and Christian Morality: Kant and the Golden Rule
Ricoeur considers the biblical laws for the treatment of others not only equivalent to the Kantian imperatives but superior to them. The moral law, or the summary of the law, is expressed in the Talmud, ☜Do not do unto your neighbour what you would hate him to do to you☝ and in the gospels, ☜Love your neighbour as yourself.☝4
The golden rule can be considered equivalent to the Kantian categorical imperative because it deals with the equal distribution of ☜goods☝, but is preferable because it recognises the power of affect in reflecting on what those ☜goods☝ might be. The golden rule challenges the individual to consider the asymmetry of power relationships in the interaction between ☜actors☝ and ☜patients☝ in specific empirical situations, not only in an a priori formulation. For Ricoeur, ☜The golden rule takes into account the whole of action and interaction, of acting and suffering. It is addressed to acting and suffering human beings, with all the fragility and vulnerability included in this fundamental condition of action.☝5
Up to this point, nothing that Ricoeur has written imposes a theological reasoning on a philosophical argument. The reasons that he has given for preferring the golden rule are argued according to philosophical principles. When he turns to consider how the golden rule is set in its religious, biblical, framework, Ricoeur☂s principle problem is not the nature of moral action,
4
Matthew 22:39
5Paul Ricoeur, ☜Ethical and Theological Considerations on the Golden Rule☝ in Ricoeur,
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but the very possibility of humans undertaking good actions. He frequently states that, like Kant, his exploration of the will began with the problem of evil. Kant asks how the radically evil, enslaved or incapacitated will becomes capable of exercising freedom; and responds by suggesting that humans can exercise good will because the concept of a ☜good man☝ - a human acceptable to God, namely Jesus - exists. As a result, we can work towards improving
ourselves under the tutelage of this idea. For Kant the origin of religious symbols remains inscrutable, but their interpretation is possible within the limits of pure reason. Kant assumes that moral sense must have divine origins and concedes that this moral argument supports the existence of God. 6
Kant☂s premise has not survived the scrutiny of the post-Enlightenment world. While it was possible for Kant to wonder at both the pattern of the stars and the pattern of moral reasoning and to see their origins in the same divine source, the transcendental origin of moral thought has long since been split away from the scientific explanations of the natural world, and confidence in human capacity for rational moral determination has itself been undermined by biology, sociology and psychology. 7 This has led to an apologetic for Christian distinctiveness that appeals to something other than pure reason. Whether opponents appeal to scripture like Barth and Hauerwas or to tradition like John Milbank and Jean Luc Marion, they stress the need for Christian ethics to compete with other world views in the contested public space.
One might observe that it is in this contested space that Kant☂s appeal to reason has reasserted itself so that, alongside those appealing for distinctive Christian ethics, another stream of
6
Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred, p. 297. 7
William Schweiker, ☜Starry Heavens and Moral Worth: Hope and Responsibility in the Structure of Theological Ethics☝ in Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought, ed. by Wall, Schweiker and Hall, p. 117. The quotation from Kant☂s Critique of Practical Reason reads "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. I do not seek or conjecture either of them as if they were veiled obscurities or
extravagances beyond the horizon of my vision; I see them before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence. The first starts at the place that I occupy in the external world of the senses, and extends the connection in which I stand into the limitless magnitude of worlds upon worlds, systems upon systems, as well as into the boundless times of their periodic motion, their beginning and continuation. The second begins with my invisible self, my personality, and displays to me a world that has true infinity, but which can only be detected through the understanding, and with which . . . I know myself to be in not, as in the first case, merely contingent, but universal and necessary connection☝
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☜liberal☝ theologians has emerged, seeking an overarching rational paradigm partly in distinction to the perceived ☜irrationality☝ of fundamentalist religion. This debate is reflected in the writing of Elaine Graham and John Atherton in the work of the Centre for Public Theology in Manchester, and in Jonathan Chaplin☂s writing for Theos. 8
These writers do not primarily assert the Christian distinctiveness of their ethical stance, but draw on the rational and universal appeal of Christian ethical perspectives. The impact of faith on morality is treated as a phenomenon that exists, while God is bracketed out as a hidden cause beyond the limits of critical thinking.
One could read Ricoeur☂s appeal to Rawls distributive justice guaranteed by
communitarianism as a form of public theology. However, as we have seen, his ☜little ethic☝ goes beyond a mere analysis of the duties of citizens. Ricoeur☂s critique of both Rawls☂ theory and Kantian principles when applied to institutions is that they depend on the ☜fiction☝ of a social contract which, in reality, is simply a form of utilitarianism subjugating the desires of the weak to the decisions of the strong.9 He insists that, even in the realm of public morality, there must be a teleological goal ♠ an idea of the ☜perfect state☝ which informs our justice system and ethical choices. He argues that human will is driven by more than duty. The existence of violence in the world drives us to demand the good and prohibit evil. The desire for good has its origin in the limit experience of evil ♠ as such ☜doing good☝ is a teleological goal not a deontological obligation.10
Despite Ricoeur☂s debt to Kant, he does not follow Kant☂s arguments for the existence of God and will not stray beyond Kantian limits. We should not make the mistake of thinking that Ricoeur espouses a foundationalist account of ☜common morality☝. However, in his biblical hermeneutics Ricoeur finds moral and ethical dimensions in the ☜naming of God☝ ♠ the
8
See for example, R Audi and N Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997). John Atherton, Public Theology for Changing Times (London: SPCK, 2000). Nigel Biggar, 'God in Public Debate', Studies in Christian Ethics, 19, no. 1 (2006). Jonathan Chapin, Talking God : The Legitimacy of Religious Public Reasoning (London, Theos, 2008), p.^pp.
9
Ricoeur draws on the work of Jean-Pierre Dupuy, a disciple of René Girard, see Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, p. 230.
10 Peter Kemp, ☜Narrative ethics and Moral Law in Ricoeur☝ in Paul Ricoeur and
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interpretation of symbols. Interpreting the names of God is both an exercise in systematic theology and an exercise in practical theology: if God is called this, then God is like that; if this is what God is like, how should we respond? Ricoeur asserts, following Geertz, that ☜all religious symbolism aims at joining the two ideas of a cosmic order and an ethical order.☝11
While God is named as legislator and judge: the giver of the Torah and the one who demands satisfaction for sin, the one who repays and punishes, the one who demands obedience: these are not the only forms by which God is named. God is also merciful and compassionate, God frees the people from slavery, God forgives those who disobey and stray, God draws them on to realise new purpose. God is polynomial, both present and hidden, source of judgement and love. ☜God☝ says Ricoeur is the referent around which scriptural discourses circulate or the point at which they all converge. However, this referent is not just the index of their mutual belonging but of their incompleteness: the common goal which escapes them all. The divine name is precisely unnameable.12
The referent ☁God☂ is thus intended by the convergence of all these partial discourses. It expresses the circulation of meaning among all the forms of discourse wherein God is named [▁] The referent ☁God☂ is not just the index of mutual belonging together (appartenance) of the originary forms of the discourse of faith, It is their common goal, which escapes each of them. 13
Ricoeur suggests that the various biblical genres; Narrative, Prophecy and Law, are schema, procedures or methods which generate images of the Name. However, these are not so much static images as ☜figures of God☂s accompanying God☂s people☝ which ensure that we focus on the action of God rather than make propositional claims about God. These schema are diverse and incapable of forming a system. The schema present dangers because as anthropomorphic representations they may become idols: however they include their own corrective as the Name works on the schema by inverting them: God is father, mother, husband, brother and
11
Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred, p. 299.
12 Paul Ricoeur, ☜Naming God☝ Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred, pp. 217-235. 13
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☜Son of Man☝ ♠ all of them. Our horizons are expanded as we find God named as Creator, compassionate, merciful, and as the sacrificial lamb who lays down his life for his friends. The schema demands ☜think more☝ while ☜the Name subverts every model, but only through them.☝ 14
The Name both overturns and intensifies each of the models which scripture offers. The Name alone would paralyse our thinking and our actions, whereas the positive task of analogical models (while precarious and provisory) is to offer an invitation to ethical action.15
Christian Virtue and the Command to Love
As we☂ve seen, the unifying feature of the biblical texts is the theme of call and response. The call is twofold, to love God and to love our neighbour. We ought briefly to recall here the debate between Ricoeur and his friend Lévinas on God☂s primal command. Lévinas insists that this command is the imperative ☜Do not kill!☝, but Ricoeur replaces it with an originary invitation, ☜Love me!☝. Ricoeur explores the nature of this call using the French phrase ☜le commandment de l☂amour☝ which can be translated as both ☜the command to love☝ and the ☜command of love.☝ As Fiasse points out, in this second reading, love is the subject of the sentence, it is love that takes the initiative and the response is not obedience, but a loving answer; ☜I act towards the other from love ☁because☂ love was given to me by God.☝16
We will explore later in this chapter the relationship between love as response and love as gift, but for the present, let us place the command to love alongside the command to act justly and look at the parallels between virtue and duty. To do this, we have to allow love to take its place among the theological virtues, faith and hope, which were added by Augustine to Plato☂s quartet of cardinal virtues: courage, temperance, justice and prudence.
14
Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred, p. 233. 15
Ricoeur☂s writing on the Name reflects his earlier exploration on the symbol of the Father. Psychoanalysis unmasks the illusions projected onto the symbol, the fantasy in which God is imagined as father and experienced as the figure of power and of loss. In returning to the symbol we can discover the new intention that animates it, the primal father, the ☜God who comes☝. The hermeneutic of suspicion uncovers illusion and destroys idols, in order that the symbol may speak afresh. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, p. 543.
16 Gaëlle Fiasse, ☜The Golden Rule and Forgiveness☝ in A Passion for the Possible, ed. by Treanor and Venema, p. 84.
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Ricoeur☂s discussion of virtue in Oneself as Another, is based primarily on the writings of Aristotle and takes little account of the history of virtue ethics within the Christian tradition, but we should not ignore them.17 The turn to narrative theology has resulted in a commensurate interest in virtue ethics focussing on patterns of practice which draw people to God and promote their flourishing.18 Although this has occurred within both protestant and catholic traditions, the catholic Thomist heritage offers a particularly useful critique as it acts as something of a corrective to the predominantly reformed American protestant commentary on Ricoeur☂s biblical ethics.
Alongside the recovery of Christian virtue ethics, the appropriation of the concept of narrative identity has been apparent across a variety of disciplines leading to a consequent interest in how narrative shapes experience and can influence behaviour. Although we noted in an earlier chapter that narrative identity can be limited by linguistic capacity or colonised by
inappropriate power relationships, it can also be positively formed by the acquisition of new linguistic forms. Neurolinguistic programming works therapeutically on this premise, describing how people are attracted by specific language patterns and can change their behaviour by consciously changing their language and metaphors.19
Studies have shown how narratives shape and change individual and corporate behaviour, both in homiletics and in business management.20 Attention is paid to the way stories engage our emotions and imaginations: how they allow us to try our ethical positions or to test proposals. Not only insight into past action but motivation for future actions can arise in the combination
17
There are passing references to Thomas Aquinas in Oneself as Another, (on the passions, p.97 and on fidelity, p. 266)
18
Samuel Wells, God's Companions: Reimagining Christian Ethics, Challenges in Contemporary Theology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), p. 2.
19
Stella Rose Charvet, Words that Change Minds: Mastering the Language of Influence (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendal/Hunt, 1995).
20
A range of approaches to narrative preaching is described in What's the Shape of Narrative Preaching? Essays in Honor of Eugene L. Lowry, ed. by David J. Shlafer Mike Graves, (St