In the previous chapter, we presented our analysis of the interviews we conducted. We determined that there were four major themes in the responses of each interviewee; these fell into the following categories: organizational, technological, budgetary, and environmental. The significance of the themes is that each interviewee felt compelled to respond to each question within these themes in a distinct and centralized manner—without prompting. Although some individual responses could be considered considerably stronger than others (some might even be considered abrasive), this natural thematic categorization of responses seemed to us to fall directly out of the data.
Based on the data we gathered, we have come to the conclusion that there are four significant barriers to successful passive RFID implementation:
1) A lack of Service support for implementing passive RFID. Passive RFID is advocated solely by the OSD, which is driving the technology to resolve the DoD’s supply-chain operation tracking and inventory identification issues.
2) No quantifiable BCA or perceived combat requirement for passive RFID from the Service departments.
3) Lack of funding for implementing passive RFID due to the budgetary cycle and competing requirements.
4) Issues with automated information and communications systems integration throughout every system in the DoD. There are questions as to why the legacy systems should absorb funding to adapt to RFID when ERP implementation is anticipated to be complete before the end of 2009.
In our view, the first three issues are consequences of the fourth issue. The root cause for the issues challenging the implementation of passive RFID in the DoD is a lack
of synchronization. Three key elements must be pursued and synchronized to ensure the successful implementation of passive RFID in the DoD:
• Automated information and communication systems integration
• Passive RFID technological maturity
• DoD/Service business processes
For a successful passive RFID implementation, each of the three elements listed above must be synchronized. The introduction of an immature and emerging technology into an outdated and soon-to-be-replaced legacy system that utilizes an obsolete business process is not a prudent business decision for any organization. We believe that the poor BCA, service reluctance, and funding issues each stem from this common root.
The implementation of ERP throughout the DoD has initiated change in organization and business management procedures. Passive RFID technology will mature until the ERP completion date of 2009. In the next four years, immaturity and integration issues will be mostly resolved. The maturity of passive RFID and its potential insertion into the ERP process may result in the visibility of a quantifiable service requirement; the addition of the technology will satisfy the stereotypical product implementation process and will hopefully have item-level capability.
If the DoD attempts to fit an immature technology into disparate legacy systems with middleware and software, only to later conduct backend integration into ERP, confidence in, funding for, and benefit of the technology will be lost. Neither the business process nor the technology will be complete until after ERP integration. The immaturity of passive RFID technology does not give it the capacity to process single line-item material to the extent that level of accountability is deemed necessary/desirable.
The data analysis conducted in this document reveals that ERP and the necessary changes in business practices are expected to be complete in 4 years. Passive RFID is anticipated to mature to single line-item level in 5 years. The OSD’s argument is that the Services are hesitating to implement passive RFID. The Services’ argument is that the OSD is forcing them to spend money on a technology that will not be mature for another 5 years, cannot be easily and
inexpensively integrated into legacy systems, and requires significant business process change.
Both arguments are completely justifiable, and both the OSD and the Services are accurate in their perceptions. The OSD is marketing a product with a forward-looking plan that will result in many benefits for the DoD. The Services—consumers who are not ready to purchase the technology—are resisting its purchase until they feel they have the infrastructure and business processes in place to receive the benefit they know will be available when they are ready to purchase the product.
In research on the evolutionary process of an emerging technology, it is well known that coordination mismatches occur and must be resolved before technologies can be widely adopted (Rosenberg, 1982). A synchronicity mismatch resembling what is occurring with passive RFID implementation causes stakeholders to hesitate before adopting such technology. In the case of passive RFID, the primary focus of the “forward looking” OSD was on the tags. The resistance occurred when the primary focus of the “present looking” Services moved towards the data, infrastructure, and business process. In the passive RFID industry, this pattern is being repeated more broadly; the general consensus in 2005 is that there are a lot of pilot projects but, with the exception of Wal-Mart, not a lot of significant implementations. Even Wal-Mart’s implementation progress is regarded as “over-hyped” by many who are aware of the details of their progress. As a result, tag makers like Alien Technology have required more and more funding from venture capitalists because the forecast explosion in passive RFID tag volumes is taking longer than originally expected, with neither government nor commercial sectors coming forward to purchase large quantities of passive RFID tags.
Every business case for implementing passive RFID is a microcosm of this larger industry-wide picture; problems such as a weak financial case and significant implementation risk are a microcosm of macro-level problems. This should be of no surprise when the big picture is considered. Inserting passive RFID into the 700 separate legacy systems throughout the DoD can reasonably be forecast to be problematic. Likewise, achieving significant changes in organizational business practices are, as practitioners and researchers know well, quite difficult. And effectively implementing an immature and still-evolving technology, where global standards are still emerging, is also obviously risky. When the combination of all three of these
problems is assessed, researchers cannot wonder that it is difficult to implementation passive technology within the DoD.
Yet, given our assessment, one conclusion we draw is that DoD passive RFID implementation is, in fact, progressing precisely as it should. This is in contrast to the GAO report entitled, Defense Logistics—Better Strategic Planning Can Help Ensure DoD’s Successful Implementation of Passive Radio Frequency Identification (published in September 2005) which states that passive RFID needs better management to work.
Both this study and the GAO report focused on the status of RFID implementation and required the interview of area experts from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military Services, the DLA, and members of the Joint Staff directorates. The GAO made the following recommendations to the Secretary of Defense:
1) direct that the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) develop a DoD-wide comprehensive plan strategic management approach to efficiently and effectively implement passive RFID through the DoD supply chain, 2) direct the secretaries of each service and other components to develop comprehensive strategic management approaches that support this DoD approach to fully implement passive RFID, 3) direct the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), the service secretaries, and other military components to develop an implementation plan that identifies the specific challenges and actions needed to mitigate the challenges. (p.
34)
Based on our analysis of the available data, the GAO is recommending something that offers little assistance in the implementation of passive RFID technology. The conclusion we have come to is that passive RFID implementation is proceeding precisely on schedule; i.e., the pace of implementation is appropriate, considering all of the factors involved. Instead of recommending, as the GAO does, that better management of passive RFID implementation can be used to speed the implementation process up, our view is that the DoD should slow the implementation process down. Passive RFID implementation should not continue without the coordination of the three elements we have outlined above: automated information and communication systems integration, passive RFID technological maturity, and DoD/Service business processes. The implementation of a technology like passive RFID should make logical
financial sense. If it does not make good business sense yet, that’s because the key elements are not yet synchronized.