This section analyzes the results of PSI in three ways. Firstly, it displays aggregate values of PSI since the first multiparty elections per country. This will outline which countries are more or less institutionalized until 2011. Secondly, it reveals how PSI has evolved across time. The analysis provides aggregate averages for the sample observed in each electoral period. Thirdly, it conducts a cluster analysis to test Huntington’s (1965; 1968) and Ben-Dor's (1975) models about the different interplays between institutionalization, political mobilization and change in society.
Figure 3.9 features average values of PSI per country, since the first multiparty election; they vary between 23.2 (Benin) and 31.0 (Botswana). As suggested by the analysis of individual indicators, higher levels of institutionalization are found in party systems in which fewer political parties (one or two major parties) dominate the electoral, the legislative and the governmental arenas. This is the case of Botswana (31.0), Namibia (30.7), Cape Verde (30.1),
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Seychelles (29.9), Mozambique (29.6), South Africa (29.2), The Gambia (28.8), Tanzania (28.6) and Senegal (28.4). Aggregate differences between these countries are rather minimal given that they are characterized by stable and very well established political parties which have been successful competitors across the different arenas within which they operate, and that have been systematically able to create stable and closed patterns of competition, thus narrowing the chances of new competitors. Moreover, we find rootedness in society and organizational continuity in these party systems with merging and splitting political parties delivering minimal systemic impact.
At the opposite end, the lowest institutionalization levels in the sample are found in the party systems of Benin (23.1), Zambia (24.4), Malawi (24.5), Lesotho (25.3), Burkina Faso (25.5), Guinea-Bissau (25.8), Nigeria (26.7), Sao Tome and Principe (27.1), Ghana (27.1) and Mauritius (27.7). In these ten countries, party systems are more open to new challengers. Independent office seekers and smaller political parties have higher chances to gain parliamentary representation and political parties that eventually decide to merge with or to split from other political parties have more systemic relevance. Furthermore, there has been alternation in government in all these countries and, in some cases, changes in the governing formula.
Figure 3.9 – PSI average scores per country
Note: Cronbach's Alpha = 0,734
23,1 24,4 24,5 25,3 25,5 25,8 26,7 27,1 27,1 27,7 28,4 28,6 28,8 29,2 29,6 29,9 30,1 30,7 31,0 ,0 5,0 10,0 15,0 20,0 25,0 30,0 35,0 Mean = 27,8
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Figure 3.10 reveals that PSI scores have unfolded irregularly across time. Until year 3 (mid 1980s), PSI reaches its highest values but it should be noted that only three countries are observed at that stage: Botswana, The Gambia and Mauritius. From the 1990s (year 5) onwards, as new countries introduce competitive and regular elections, the levels of PSI follow a decreasing trend with slight oscillations. This superficial look at the data – at the aggregate level – seems to support what previous studies have suggested about the relationship between time and PSI in Africa: that there is no general trend towards party system stabilization (Lindberg 2007; Bogaards 2008). This finding raises an interesting hypothesis which we will take into account in the analysis of the sources of PSI.
Figure 3.10 – PSI average scores per year of observation
Apart from differences across country and time, it is also important to unpack the concept of institutionalization, in light of its relationship with other contemporary political phenomena, namely mass mobilization and democratization. Huntington (1965, 1968) and Ben-Dor (1975) foresaw four possible outcomes resulting from the relationship between these processes: no-institutionalization, inadequate institutionalization, adequate institutionalization and overinstitutionalization. To empirically test this typology we have conducted a HierarchicalCluster Analysis52 with three variables: PSI Index, percentage of turnout in lower house elections (as a measure of mass mobilization) and Freedom House (FH) scores (as a
52 This method is the most indicated one for small-N datasets. It allows the examination of various solutions (that is, the number of clusters that will be analyzed) and suits to both quantitative and qualitative data (the combination of both is not possible, however). Clustering was made with the furthest neighbor method, according to which the distance between two clusters is the distance between their two most distant members. Since we were testing an existing typology the number of clusters (N = 3) was theoretically defined, but it was also supported by the ward method. We also resorted to other clustering techniques to be sure whether the three clusters solution was consistent (one or two countries shifted between clusters, but the three-fold solution remained). The category no-institutionalization is not tested, as it is associated with traditional societies.
29,3 28,1 29,7 27,8 28,5 26,9 27,7 27,8 ,0 5,0 10,0 15,0 20,0 25,0 30,0 35,0 year 1 (N=3) year 2 (N=3) year 3 (N=3) year 4 (N=6) year 5 (N=11) year 6 (N=19) year 7 (N=19) year 8 (N=19)
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measure of overall status of democracy). We have calculated averages for each of these three variables basically resuming our dataset to 19 observations. The results display three different clusters (Tables 3.3 and 3.4).
The first cluster assembles cases that record the lowest degrees of PSI (mean = 24.6) along with intermediate levels of both turnout (mean = 68,8%) and democratic performance (mean = 3.3). Five countries are grouped here: Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia. They exemplify cases of inadequate institutionalization, as the party system is not able to sustain and promote change in society while encouraging mass mobilization. In other words, since political participation is not accompanied by concomitant expansion in the strength of political institutions, there is political decay and, in some cases, political disorder. In Guinea-Bissau, for example, the weakness of formal political institutions may have contributed to the capture of the political arena by nonpolitical institutions, namely the army. Since 1994, several attempted or successful coups have occurred, endangering the stability of state agents and the lives of hundreds of civilians. In 1999 and 2002, two coups were led by General Asumane Mane. In 2001, many former military officers and paramilitary officers were detained in connection with the reported coup plot (namely deputy chief of army staff Almane Alam Camara and ex-navy chief Mohamed Lamine) and in 2003 another coup – led by General Verissimo Correira Seabra – took place. More recently (2004, 2005 and 2012), several armed actions have threatened the stability of the regime leading, among others to the ousting of the Head of State, as for example President Kumba Yalá in 2005 (Sangreman et al. 2006; Azevedo 2009).
The second cluster is composed of eight countries four of which have experienced alternation in government at least once (Cape Verde, Ghana, Mauritius and Sao Tome and Principe) and four, which have been ruled by the same political party since the first lower house election (Botswana, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa). This latter group challenges Pridham's (1990) premise that democratic consolidation implies transfer of power between parties in government and opposition, while at the same time raising issues about vertical accountability (Doorenspleet 2003; Diamond and Morlino 2004; Bogaards and Boucek 2010). Nevertheless, these four cases differ substantially from other dominant party systems here analyzed – e.g. Nigeria, Mozambique, or Burkina Faso – in the extent to which, Botswana Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa have a better combination of levels of institutionalization, political freedom and mobilization. These countries can be categorized as of adequate institutionalization since the highest levels of institutionalization are coupled with
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the highest levels of mass mobilization and the best FH ratings, vis-à-vis the other two clusters.
Table 3.3 – Results of the Hierarchical Cluster Analysis: PSI, Electoral Participation and Democratization
Cluster N PSI Index Turnout (%) FH scores
Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation
1 5 24,6 1,0 68,8 6,6 3,3 0,7
2 8 29,1 1,6 73,8 7,5 2,2 0,5
3 6 27,9 1,5 55,8 6,9 3,8 0,3
Total 19 27,6 2,3 66,8 10,4 3,0 0,9
Table 3.4 – Qualities of institutionalization
Countries Inadequate institutionalization Adequate institutionalization Overinstitutionalization Benin X Botswana X Burkina Faso X Cape Verde X Gambia, The X Ghana X Guinea-Bissau X Lesotho X Malawi X Mauritius X Mozambique X Namibia X Nigeria X
Sao Tome and Principe X
Senegal X Seychelles X South Africa X Tanzania X Zambia X Total 5 8 6
Finally, the third cluster assembles those countries, which are also highly institutionalized (27.9), but that at the same time exhibit the lowest rates of turnout (57,2%) and the highest FH scores (means less free) (3.7): Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania. These six countries face the critical problem of creating stable party systems while increasing their scope and promoting change in society. These are overinstitutionalized party systems, in which institutionalization outstrips mobilization and political change, thus bringing about a problem of inertia as political institutions are
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autonomous and strong, but not sufficiently adaptable (Ben-Dor 1975). Apart from Senegal, which is probably less well represented in this cluster, all other countries have dominant party systems headed by an asymmetrically strong political party that has proved unable to further the process of democratization in its several arenas, particularly in what regards political participation.