Los medios impugnatorios en nuestro Código Procesal Civil (1993)

The previous chapter applied genealogical inquiry to (narco)terrorism to illustrate how these dangers are not static or fixed threats, but rather contemporary discourses that have been constructed and deployed by hegemonic actors. The focus on Anglocentric representations of (narco)terrorism was deliberate as discursive actors from the United States and the United Kingdom have had a profound impact on global understanding of these dangers. However, that is not to say that these dangers do not function elsewhere and indeed the empirical contribution of this thesis is to critically analyse how these discourses operate in contemporary Afghanistan. Indeed, far from being universal, (narco)terror has been constructed, transmitted, and redeployed around the world (Der Derian 2009a; Seib & Janbek 2011; Ditrych 2013; Herschinger 2015), and, more significantly, has been redesigned by various actors70 to fit the needs of particular social and political contexts. It is the interplay between global and local discourses of (narco)terror that forms the basis of this chapter. Indeed, it is this interplay that has defined the Afghan political context, revealing a continuity between representations of (narco)terrorism outlined above and local representations of danger discussed in this chapter.

This chapter sets out to illustrate the operationalisation of discourses of (narco)terrorism by the GIRoA in their attempts to establish a collective Afghan identity. This identity is constituted through representations of both an evil (narco)terrorist other (associated with the Taliban) and an endangered victimised self. Thus, this chapter utilises Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to illustrate how hegemonic representations of (narco)terror have been constructed and deployed in post-2001 Afghanistan, and through this analysis the motivations of the GIRoA will be revealed.71

70 _{The identities of these actors will be discussed at length throughout this chapter. Generally, key actors} are understood to be those that hold discursive authority in the realm of security and produce narratives of danger (e.g. security experts, government officials, academics within relevant fields, members of the established media, etc.).

71 _{While narcotics and terrorism had been firmly established as global dangers before 2001, for the sake of} clarity and space this study will be largely confined to the post-Taliban era (i.e. late-2001 to the time of writing).

134

Data and Methods

At the centre of this discussion are three main research questions. The first question, and indeed the most important, is the primary research question of the thesis: what are the motivations behind hegemonic (and counterhegemonic) representations of danger in Afghanistan? This will be addressed through an application of CDA to the texts selected for the thesis. An extensive summary of CDA can be found in Chapter I and is therefore not necessary to repeat here; however, for the sake of continuity the framework will be outlined as discourse analysis that investigates how discourses emerge and are shaped by relations of powers with the hope of revealing the use of discourse in securing power and hegemony (Fairclough 1992: 135). As such the goal here is to situate GIRoA representations of danger as part of a hegemonic strategy aimed at maintaining power over the social sphere. While discourse is the method, the main argument is that the GIRoA’s hegemonic strategy is premised on establishing a collective Afghan identity. Therefore, there is a secondary focus in critically analysing the GIRoA’s representations in order to reveal the development of hegemonic identity narratives. This focus will centre on the deployment of language, metaphors, and cultural tropes in dominant representations of danger. The use of these linguistic techniques will be referenced with the summary of Afghanistan’s political and social context discussed in Section I. Indeed, this focus is reflective of the second research question of the thesis: how are representations of danger deployed in Afghanistan? The claim here is that discourses of danger are deployed by the GIRoA via speech acts and other public statements which interpret the ongoing violence and insecurity as endangering the Afghan collective identity.

Lastly, this chapter holds an additional sub-question pertaining to the influence of global hegemonic discourses of (narco)terrorism on domestic representations in Afghanistan. While this should not be taken as the main area of study, the interplay between international and national in the Afghan political context presents an interesting area of analysis. Moreover, the imposition of largely Western narratives of (in)security on non- Western countries has been the subject of much scholarship in postcolonial circles (see Ayoob 1997; Barkawi and Laffey 2006; Bilgin 2010). Thus, in seeking to establish a

135 connection between global discourses of (narco)terrorism and local representations, this chapter hopes to reveal that representations of danger are not just a hegemonic strategy confined to the domestic sphere, but rather exist similarly in the international. Having established the objectives of the chapter, attention must now turn to the data sets consulted.

While recent surveys of the Afghan population have produced a body of information concerning society’s engagement with security narratives (see Asia Foundation 2016; ATR 2014), this study will focus largely on the ‘high data’ (Jackson 2005) of government speeches, statements, policies, and representations of (narco)terror. Indeed, while adopting a top-down focus restricts our ability to determine the success or failure of these representations and largely silences (re)representations emanating from society, it nonetheless reflects the framework adopted in this study which understands danger as a hegemonic (and counterhegemonic) discourse. In other words, the ‘high data’ of political representations shape the discourse, and it is through this discourse that subjects, like the Taliban, and objects, such as narcotics, attain meaning (Ditrych 2014: 10). Therefore, it is vital to critically analyse official statements emanating from the upper levels of the Afghan government in order to uncover how global and local processes of representing danger converge and to illustrate how these representations are deployed in attempts to construct Afghan society and identity.

Thus, the bulk of the data cited in this chapter consists of official statements by former President Hamid Karzai and the current President Ashraf Ghani. Other sources include statements by the Chief Operating Officer of Afghanistan, Abdullah Abdullah, Ministry of Information and Communication Spokesmen, Feroz Bashari, and statements by government officials quoted in Afghan national news outlets such as ToloNews, Khaama Press, and Pajwok News. These news outlets are all based in Kabul but form the mainstream national news media for the country. Interviews conducted by foreign media outlets such as CNN with presidents Karzai and Ghani have also been analysed to assess discrepancies between domestic communications and international statements. While the use of metaphor and cultural tropes differs depending on the audience of the representation, the analysis in this chapter reveals continuity in representations of (narco)terror. In terms of language, the sources consulted for this study were either English original or translations from Dari or Pashto into English. This reflects the language limitations of the researcher and the accessibility of the material.

136 As mentioned above, the rationale for focusing exclusively on government actors in this chapter is to illustrate how danger is being used to discursively constitute contemporary Afghan society. No doubt that there is an assemblage of state and non-state security actors operating in Afghanistan, such as analysts employed by think tanks, research units, and foreign governments; however, in maintaining consistency with the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter I, this chapter is focused on the operationalisation of representations of danger by state actors. Thus, the objective is not to silence other discursive actors, but is instead to illustrate how the GIRoA uses representations of danger in its attempts to construct and secure contemporary Afghan society.

The chapter will be structured as follows. Section I begins with a brief survey of Afghanistan’s history of violent politics and international influence. The political context of Afghanistan, characterised by ethnic and ideological plurality, is a vital factor shaping contemporary power dynamics and sociopolitical relations, more generally. Afghanistan’s history and experiences with imperialism is an important underlying theme that directly contributes to the interplay between global and local representations of danger as well as the formation of the Afghan identity.72 As Bartolucci and Gallo (2013: 19) point out, “a discourse can only be understood as located in a specific context,” therefore, a brief analysis of Afghanistan’s sociopolitical context is a necessary first step. Section II proceeds with a critical analysis of the global discourse surrounding the Taliban and (narco)terrorism. The roles and identities of key discursive actors shaping these representations, such as government officials, security experts, as well as academic experts both within and without Afghanistan, will be explored in order to highlight the effects these identities have global and local understandings of (narco)terror. Moving forward, Section III will critically analyse representations of (narco)terror in order to reveal why and how these dangers are used to create and secure Afghan society. This section is divided into two subsections: the first addresses the use of danger as a means of institutional control, paying particular attention to how security narratives are used to legitimize the hegemonic position of the GIRoA vis-à-vis society. The second subsection

72 _{This is a commonly held argument in contemporary literature on Afghanistan. Some particularly useful} examples include Barfield (2010); Rashid (2010); Dorronsoro (2005); Crews and Tarzi (2008); Jones (2009).

137 looks at the immaterial implications of these representations and reveals how (narco)terror has been used to create loyal identities.73 This chapter forms the foundation of the thesis’ empirical contribution and illustrates how representations of danger are used to discursively construct and secure the hegemonic vision of contemporary Afghan society.