Los nuevos espacios del santuario y su funcionalidad

Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of BP 22,otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing PNB Check No. 0077133 postdated August28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. He pleaded not guilty.- After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise.- (2/27/03) The MeTC of Makati, Branch 65 granted the demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecution‘s motion for reconsideration was denied.- Park appealed the civil aspect of the case to the RTC of Makati, contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect. The RTC held that while the evidence presented wasinsufficient to prove Choi‘s criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It accordingly granted Park‘s appeal and ordered Choi to pay himP1,875,000 with legal interest.- Upon Choi‘s motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC ―for further proceedings, so that Choi may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case.‖ Park‘s motion for reconsideration of the remand of the case having been denied, he elevated the case to the CA which dismissed his petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent has a right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case in view of his demurrer.

HELD:

Yes. In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.

On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceed.

dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue.- In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Choi did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand.

Park posits that Choi waived his right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case (1) when the grant of the demurrer was reversed on appeal, citing Section 1 of Rule 33, and (2) when respondent orally opposed petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration pleading that proceedings with respect to the civil aspect of the case continue.- Petitioner‘s citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect. Where a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires it to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit

G.R. No. 132081 November 26, 2002 JOEL M. SANVICENTE

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with homicide for the killing of Dennis Wong. At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.

Petitioner begged leave to file a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the trial court. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer to Evidence), based on the following grounds: (1) the lack of positive identification of the accused is a fatal omission warranting dismissal; (2) prosecution‘s evidence are totally hearsay/incompetent.

The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case together with the civil aspect for insufficiency of evidence. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.

The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but to no avail. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prosecution may appeal the trial court‘s resolution granting demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the charges against him without violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. HELD:

Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. In resolving accused‘s demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.

The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy.

G.R. No. 72670 September 12, 1986 SATURNINA GALMAN, et. al.

vs.

SANDIGAYNBAYAN, et. al. FACTS:

A number of members of the Philippine Military were charged for the assassination of Former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. The fact finding committee created to determine what really occurred during that faithful day rejected the military‘s version that Aquino was killed by a lone gunman, Galman. The investigation of the board revealed that only the soldiers in the staircase with Aquino could have shot him.

Criminal charges were filed before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan, allegedy operating under the control of President Marcos acquitted all the accused of the crime charged.

The private respondents is now questioning the charges against them arising from the same offense that were already decided by the Sandiganbayan alleging that the continuance of the proceedings would amount to a violation of their right against double jeopardy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause. HELD:

None, Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.

There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.

G.R. No. 128587 March 16, 2007 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Manila, and LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN FACTS:

Three separate informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang for Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, Violation of the COMELEC Gun Ban, and Illegal Possession of Firearms. During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the Informations and instead interposed a continuing objection to the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police operatives. Thus, the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered for him. Thereafter, joint trial of the three consolidated cases followed. On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion, accused Wang was granted 25 days from said date within which to file his intended Demurrer to Evidence. Then, the prosecution filed a Manifestation to the effect that it had rested its case only in so far as the charge for Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act is concerned, and not as regards the other two cases.

Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the three cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecution‘s evidence against him. Herein respondent judge granted Wang‘s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitted him of all charges for lack of evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits and will amount to an acquittal.

HELD:

An order granting an accused‘s demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy hence; the finality-of-acquittal rule is stressed. The exception to this rule is when the prosecution was denied due process of law. Such was not present in this case.

Petitioner also used the wrong remedy before the Supreme Court; hence this petition is outrightly dismissible. The Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal order of the trial court by appeal without violating private respondent‘s right against double jeopardy.

G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

RICHARD O. SARCIA