UNIDAD V: TERMINACIÓN DE RELACIONES LABORALES
LOS NUEVOS SENDEROS DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN DE PERSONAL
Even the classification of values comes with a range of terminology and interpretations. Values can be normative or aspirational (Pattison, 2004), relative, or universal and absolute (Gasper, 2004; Dunning, 2003); instrumental or intrinsic,
Chapter 3 – The Architecture of Values -31- or terminal (Padaki, 2000; Das Gupta, 2004)22
Ends
. Here is a mine-field requiring careful negotiation. Table 3.2 presents a summary and a conceptual aid to illustrate how the words might be clustered. The discussion which follows refers mainly to the intrinsic/instrumental distinction, with some elaboration on cultural relativism and universal values. The appearance of ‘normative’ in both ends and means columns of the table reflects the potential conflation of ends with means inherent in the ‘intentional’ development model of the economic paradigm (Cowen & Shenton, 1995).
Table 3.2: Values Terminology
Means Contingent
Intrinsic Aspirational
Universal & absolute Terminal
Normative
Instrumental
Normative Relative
Source: Author
Das Gupta (2004) defines instrumental values as the means to something else, and Padaki (2000:425) illustrates such means with a list of individual qualities like ambition, honesty, imagination, obedience and responsibility. The ends of these values, their ‘terminal’ objective, might be peace, equality, freedom, happiness, salvation or wisdom (ibid). These words represent ‘intrinsic’ or ‘aspirational’ values, to be valued for themselves and defying substantive definition. They can also be termed ‘universal’ or ‘absolute’. Sen (1989) introduces an interesting analysis of intrinsic and instrumental values, identifying both positive and negative conditions for each category, which is reproduced in summary form in Table 3.3.23
22 The terminology of intrinsic and terminal values is derived from the seminal work of
Rokeach (1973) on the nature of values.
23 Sen draws on examples in the literature as identified in (brackets), and also points out
that some writers (Rawls, for example) may have a foot in both positive and negative camps.
Chapter 3 – The Architecture of Values -32-
Table 3.3: Four Concepts of Freedom Freedom as a
Value What a person is able to do Positive or be – choice Negative Independence from interference of others Intrinsic Freedom as a value in itself – what constitutes the ‘good life’.
• Conditions for free development and activity of individuals under their own control. (Marx) • Primary goods: rights,
liberties, opportunities, income, and social bases of self-respect – social justice based on
efficiency and equity in
distribution (Rawls). • Freedom from hunger
and escapable morbidity; fulfilment of ‘basic needs’.
• Liberty, democratic rights – means to other ends.
• The right to enjoy the fruits of one’s labour (Bauer). Instrumental Freedom as a means to ends; being able to choose without interference. • Utilitarianism: freedom conducive to more happiness (Bentham). • Non-interference of the state, or anyone else (Milton Friedman). • Freedom to earn profits
(World Bank).
Adapted from Sen’s text, 1989
Here Sen is linking the value of freedom with different interpretations of ‘development’. Positive freedoms represent the humanist paradigm and negative freedoms the economic approach.
‘Relative’ values raise some complex issues. A relative value is bound by context, and in any situation there can be a myriad of conditions to impel action or behaviour – which appear to relate to a scale or hierarchy of values (or a central- periphery continuum (Padaki, 2000). In development practice, should an aid organisation forsake an anti-corruption principle by offering some payment or guangxi in order to smooth the way to a greater goal for community development? Here is where value contradictions and ethical dilemmas begin.
But the notion of relative values raises the bogey of cultural relativism. Cultural relativists perceive socio-cultural beliefs and practices as sacrosanct, and outsiders therefore have no business in offering criticism against genital mutilation, child labour, imprisonment without trial, or events like the treatment of students in Tiananmen Square. Clark describes the purpose of cultural relativism as granting
Chapter 3 – The Architecture of Values -33-
each ethnic group immunity from external critique and to protect their continuing existence as valuable entities in their own right (2006:170)24
A corollary of this position is that trans-national aid programmes have no place in assisting development in the South, which is but one theme of ‘anti-development’ arguments expressed by Bauer (1976) and Hughes (2003). Cultural relativism brooks no interference, is a doctrine in which “no one can judge what is good for another person, or compare one person’s wants and satisfactions with another’s” (Gasper, 2004:194)
.
25. Indeed, cultural relativism begins to look like a defence
against external criticism and Western market forces (Gasper, 2004:211). In rebutting such views Etzioni (2005) argues for a cross-cultural ‘moral voice’ which enables and articulates a core of globally shared values. At the same time, Etzioni deplores the use of ‘moral values’ as justification for military or economic enforcement of one state’s values over another’s26
The question of universal values is just as fraught. There is much argument about what might constitute a universal value, and what to include on a list of such values (Gasper, 2004; Etzioni, 2005), and on their validity (Dower, 2005). There is extensive debate on the compatibility of Western and Eastern philosophies: if the former represents economic individualism and democracy, how can it be reconciled with oriental communitarianism or autocratic government? Lal denies the possibility of a universal morality by reducing all human nature and culture to economic rationalism and self-seeking behaviours: relationships are simply ‘transactional costs’, and cultural norms are a form of ‘equilibrium’ (2003:42). Dunning (2003) and Küng (2003) on the other hand, find there is common ground in all major world religions in the credo ‘do as you would be done by’. The UN Human Development Report (HDR) of 2004 identifies a list of ‘global ethics’
.
24 Clark is writing in the context of multi-cultural societies and the politics of ethnicity. He
goes on to identify three objections to cultural relativism: (1) a philosophic contradiction between linguistic expression and semantic meaning; (2) ethical commitment to human existence, an end in itself, is not a means to other people’s ends; and (3) in a practical sense there is no justification for preferring one’s own position if all other positions (world views, value systems, social practices) are equally valid. (2006:172)
25 Cultural relativism would thus cut across NGDO advocacy, and the importance of
speaking out on behalf of Southern peoples against oppression and inequity.
Chapter 3 – The Architecture of Values -34-
arguing these values represent the “basic moral equality of all human beings” (HDR, 2004:90). Gasper (2004:184) offers a composite list of Nussbaum’s criteria for universal human capabilities. The debate between the economic and humanist development paradigms begins all over again. Table 3.4 summarises a selection of humanist interpretations of ‘universal values’.
Clearly there are some common points across all columns in Table 3.4, yet the ordering of values and terminology are all dependent on their source and the orientation of the writer. For all the claims of universal values there is no universality on prioritisation or interpretation. We can see, for instance that columns 1 and 2 come out of same stable, reflecting the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Küng is a theologian; and Dunning is a professor of international business, promoting a means for ‘Responsible Global Capitalism’27. There are other
typologies (see Corbridge, 1993; Alkire, 200228
Table 3.4 does not distinguish between intrinsic and instrumental values, though Dunning goes part-way in identifying ‘virtues, lesser virtues and culture relative values’
; and Dower, 2005). Gasper (2004:45) for example, draws on ideas from Goulet (1995), Edwards (1996b), Finnis (a legal philosopher) (1987) and UNDP (1996), noting their congruence, though he concludes that “to understand and make better value choices we need some more clarity on values” (2004:46). A universality of values appeals to an understanding of ‘humankind’ that transcends geopolitics, nation-states and global economics, and lends credence to the mission of humanist development programmes. As Goulet claims, “only truly human values can be truly universal” (1973:xxi). Nussbaum (2000) attempts a more absolute expression of universal values related to human capabilities (see column 4 of Table 3.4), extending her earlier collaboration with Sen (1993).
29
27 Along the same lines as the current interest in ‘corporate social responsibility’.
28Rather than considering ‘values’, Alkire attempts to harness the ‘multiple dimensions’ of
development as expressed by a range of theorists into an epistemological framework, in order to provide “a non-paternalistic and useful tool in addressing … development problems … in a way that respects the insights and inspirations of women and men from all races, classes and political orientations” (2002:194).
29 Dunning’s cultural relative values are particularly relevant factors in cross-cultural
communication. Metge & Kinloch (1978), for example, highlight cultural behaviours that can be mis-interpreted.
Chapter 3 – The Architecture of Values -35-
might be termed ‘universal’. The importance of universal values is recognised in Minear & Walker’s argument:
If globalisation is the context, universality must be the distinguishing feature of the future. Humanitarianism is, first and foremost, a value- driven endeavour. … The challenge is to build a value set that is truly global. … The search of the future must be for global values, not just to globalise western values (2004:97).
This section has illustrated some of the different ways values can be interpreted. The meaning of value-words is dependent on the eye of the beholder, on ideology, beliefs and attitudes, and these will be influenced by socio-cultural context and a host of other factors, including translation from another language. This is not to argue for blanket relativism, nor to claim there is one best set of values for development. Rather, I am highlighting the importance of articulating values as a means to explain the how and why of development. The explicit expression of values is particularly relevant to NGDOs, as Chapter 4 indicates, and is further explored in Chapters 6 and 7 which cover the case-study of Oxfam New Zealand. In the next section I review the some of the primary philosophic sources of humanist values to show how these have been shaped in the context of development.
Chapter 3 – The Architecture of Values -36-
Table 3.4 : Summary of Universal Values
Source: Author UN Human
Development Report (HDR) (2004:90)
UN World Commission on Culture & Development
(Gasper, 2004:202) Küng (2003:152) Nussbaum (Gasper, 2004:184) Dunning (2003:23) Premise: All cultures share
a commonality of basic values that are the foundation of global ethics.
Principles of human rights, democratic legitimacy, public accountability.
Premise: Global ethic which underlie all other values are: humanity and
reciprocity.
Criteria for “the meaning of ‘human’ and the contents of ‘being’”: normatively central human capabilities.
Universal absolutes: respect for human dignity; respect for basic rights; good citizenship – a ‘pyramid’ of values.
• Equity
• Human rights and responsibilities
• Democracy
• Protection of minorities
• Peaceful conflict resolution and fair negotiation.
• Treat others as one would want to be treated oneself
• Universalism
• Basic necessities provided for individual security
• Alleviation and eradication of suffering
• Democracy and protection of minorities
• Respect for all cultures
• Commitment to peaceful resolution of conflicts and fair negotiation.
Basic Values:
• Respect for life
• Non-violence • Solidarity • Justice • Tolerance • Truthfulness • Equality • Partnership • Life • Bodily health • Bodily integrity • Senses, imagination and thought • Emotions • Practical reason • Affiliation • Other species • Play
• Control over one’s environment • Virtues: truthfulness, reciprocity, justice, honesty • Lesser virtues: trust, solidarity, reliability, loyalty • Culture relative: duty, prudence, forbearance, diligence, sense of guilt/shame
Chapter 3 – The Architecture of Development Values
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