International respect became one of many issues addressed during the May Fourth Movement. The fact that Japan had been given German rights in Shandong 山东, rather than fully returning the province to China was a painful reminder to May Fourth students and intellectuals that China was not seen as a full member of the international community en par with Europe, North America, and Japan, despite the promises made in Wilson’s Fourteen Points.170 Just like in the late 19th and at the turn of the 20th century, recognition of China by the international community, its “international status,” was important in the early 1920s. The idea of international status and of being accepted as a great civilization that is at least on equal footing with the Western countries are central to understanding China’s early conception of external propaganda that also persisted after the end of the First World War and subsequently became one of the many discussions surrounding the term xuanchuan.
An article from 1922 on the propagation of Chinese history written by Miao Fenglin 缪凤林 (1899-1959), who was later to become a renowned historian,
posited that having a reputation as a great ancient civilization was a precondition for being respected today, at least for China, arguing that because there were no systematic introductions of Chinese history in Western textbooks on world history, it should not come as a surprise that the West did not respect China.171 It was not that there were no texts on China’s history in the West at all, but the existing
169 Particularly under the term “big external propaganda” (da waixuan 大外宣), a coinage from the
1990s, which sums up the PRC policy to include many different actors and activities in its external propaganda. Cf. chapter 8.
170 Shandong was returned to China three years later in 1922 at the Washington Naval Conference
on disarmament in East Asia. See “The Washington Naval Conference, 1921-1922,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1921- 1936/NavalConference, accessed January 27, 2013.
171Miao Fenglin 缪凤林, “Zhongguo shi zhi xuanchuan” 中国史之宣传 [The propagation of
Chinese history], Shidi xuebao 史地学报 [The journal for history and geography]1, no. 2 (1922), 2 (1-7). The Journal for History and Geography was the organ of the Research Association for History and Geography of Nanjing Higher Normal School (南京高等师范学 校史地研究会).
83
studies, first, did not grasp the true value of Chinese civilization (wei neng
mingliao wuguo wenming zhi zhenjia 未能明了吾国文明之真价) and, second,
they contained grave mistakes.172 This was particularly bitter for China because histories of Ancient Egypt and Ancient Babylon were, as Miao pointed out, much more detailed. While Westerners were interested in understanding Chinese history, their language abilities and other limitations prevented them from doing so properly.173 Therefore, the Chinese people needed to speak up for themselves, propagate Chinese history and, in so doing, answer to the demands from other countries to learn about China and to prevent all sorts of misunderstandings.174 This type of rhetoric places the appeal somewhat within the discourse centred on rational public opinion and interaction between China and foreigners on equal footing.
At the same time, the author highlighted the superiority of Chinese civilization compared to the West. For North Americans and Europeans, whose own countries were too young to even remotely compare to China, argued Miao, it was difficult to imagine the glories of a country that had thousands of years of civilization. Currently, they therefore viewed China as a semi-carved up, semi- opened up country.175 Propagating the achievements of China’s civilization, for instance its contributions to governance and law,176 would help eliminate this lie and show people the contributions China had made as well as its potential for future contributions to world civilization.177 Propagating China’s history, Miao stated, was also important to let the world see the wrongs Europeans had committed on the Asian continent. All countries that the West has forced open and thus destroyed used to be part of the Chinese tributary system, with India as the only exception. They were part of Chinese history and hence it was China’s responsibility to let the world know of their fate at the hands of Western countries.178
172 Miao, “Zhongguo shi zhi xuanchuan,” 2. 173
Ibid., 3.
174 Ibid.. 175 Ibid., 6.
176 For instance, China had much more advanced discussions on law than Grotius’ On the Law of
War and Peace as early as during the Chunqiu period, said Miao. Ibid., 4-5.
177
Ibid., 5-6.
84
However, relatively abstract recognition of China’s greatness as well as demonstrating the West’s immoral behavior were not the only reason why China needed to propagate its history abroad; rather, history was also to serve present political needs: An incorrect understanding of Chinese history would cause other countries to take the wrong stance on current political issues. For instance, Westerners believed that Manchuria only became a part of China during the Qing Dynasty. If China let them know that it had been a part of China for thousands of years, they would not dare to openly support Japan’s bids to control the land.179 Moreover, China needed to eliminate the misperception that the North and South of the country had been ruled by different governments for significant parts of Chinese history. If Westerners understood that the North and the South had always been unified, that would influence them psychologically and make them support a unified China.180
The article contained themes that had been present in earlier debates why it was necessary to establish media in foreign languages and that were to remain important in the coming decades. It is representative of later (to some extent including today’s) discussions in its ambivalence towards the role of the Western countries, expressing disdain on the one hand and a desire of being recognized as a great civilization by the West on the other. Likewise, it shows that culture and history, which are considered important carriers for communicating China’s message today, have had a place in the Chinese discussion on external propaganda since the earliest days. The theme of a rival faction doing its own international propaganda, by contrast, was only implicit in this early article. It was spelled out more explicitly later, after the conflict with Japan worsened over the course of the 1920s: Foreigners (or, alternatively, illegitimate Chinese governments) kept getting away with misrepresenting events because China did not have any international propaganda.181 179 Ibid., 4. 180 Ibid. 181
Wu Tianfang 吳天放, “Zhongguo dangqian zuiyao de guoji xuanchuan wenti” 中国当前最要 的 国 际 宣 传 问 题 [The most pressing isue in China’s current international propaganda],
85