LOS RESULTADOS MÁS DESTACABLES

As Bonaparte’s Armée d'Orient invaded Egypt during the summer of 1798, the assault represented the first western occupation of the Porte’s Mediterranean domain since the sixteenth century. It is not surprising then that a great deal of study has since focused on Egypt immediately before, during and after the invasion. However, as we shall see, 1798 was also an important year in the histories of neighboring Tunis and Tripoli, and placed a spotlight on the regional ties underlying socio-political systems in the southern Mediterranean. As Bonaparte turned to Tunis and Tripoli for logistical aid, his behaviors and strategies highlighted the interconnectedness of the provinces to one another as well as to the Ottoman Porte.

This chapter focuses on several aspects of the provinces’ relationship with Constantinople. Throughout, it explores the adaptable and oftentimes paradoxical relationship that the provinces of Tunis and Tripoli maintained with the Sublime Porte as well as the relationship that the two privateering provinces maintained with their eastern neighbor, Egypt. This chapter emphasizes that during a time of political crisis, as imperial paradigms of governance were shifting, it was the needs of the provinces that dictated the policies of the Porte, as well as other imperial centers. Temporally, this chapter traces the lead up to the French invasion of Egypt in the late-1790s, and examines the history of the region through the middle of 1801.

Tripoli under New Governorship

After seizing power on June 11, 1795, Yusuf Karamanlı became the ruler of a weakened, impoverished territory that lagged behind neighboring Algiers and Tunis in commercial status, regional power and in its official recognition by the Ottoman

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Porte.153 _{The prominent merchant class, which had provided Tripolitania with critical}

economic revenues through commercial ties with Livorno, Malta and the broader region, had largely fled due to the administrative tempestuousness that came to define the rule of Ali Karamanlı, Yusuf’s predecessor, as well as a short-lived coup by the Porte-supported corsair, Ali Gurgi— Ali the Georgian, or as he was commonly known, Ali Burghol. Burghol’s “reign of terror” and specifically, his maltreatment of the Jewish mercantile community of the province was well chronicled in the North African memories of Rabbi Abraham Khalfon, an important figure in the province.154

Many merchants relocated to various coastal cities across the Ottoman Mediterranean and, most notably, to Alexandria. In fact, a review of Alexandrine court records from the late eighteenth century shows a substantial increase in the number of Tripolitans buying and selling urban property in the coastal city and engaging in day-to-day legal activities within the city’s courts since 1750.155

Moreover, this number increased over time. It was likely that a great number of these merchants had fled to Egypt to avoid the disorder in Tripoli in the years prior to Yusuf

153 _{Ali Karamanlı ruled Tripolitania since 1754. However, he had gradually succumbed to his vices and} majority of his days in his harem, often drunk, and increasingly negligent of the province. Time and age took a toll on Ali and by the 1780s conditions were such that Tripoli was continuously afflicted with frequent bouts of plague, famine, and endemic poverty. By 1778, the Porte was explicitly

concerned that Tripoli could be an easy target for occupation. In response to the reports, Abdul Hamid I sent the Tripolitan bey an official warning that highlighted Istanbul’s concern over the general

administrative negligence and ordered the Pasha to put the affairs of the province into immediate order. The bey did not. The second warning came in 1786, when diplomatic channels warned Tripoli of the imminent arrival of the Grand Admiral Gazi Hasan, en route to Egypt and his interest in overthrowing Ali Pasha. While the threat never manifested in 1786, it was under the patronage of Gazi Hasan that Ali Burghol overthrew the Karamanlı family in 1793. After Burghol was ousted in 1794, Yusuf overthrew his brother Ahmed in 1795, and became the governor of Tripoli.

154 _{Ali Burghol, or Ali Gurgi was the Georgian mentee of the formidable former Kapudan Pasha, or} Ottoman Grand Admiral, Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha. Burghol rule over Tripoli lasted for eighteen months, from 1793-1794. He was recorded as “an ungodly and bloody…deceitful man” in an acrostic

piyyut, or liturgical poem, by the Tripolitan Rabbi Abraham Khalfon after the gruesome immolation of his son David, and the mistreatment and painful shackling of the Great Esther, Ali Karamanlı’s favorite

harim. While all the subjects of Tripoli were exposed to the corsair’s greed, the non-Muslim mercantile community was a particularly easy target for Burghol’s avarice.

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Karamanlı’s 1795 assumption to power. In fact, sources from 1805 Alexandria specifically point to the exhaustion that Tripolitans felt at the continuous political crises of their province.156

In an effort to consolidate power, strengthen Tripoli’s position in the region, and prevent another mercenary like Burghol from taking the city, Yusuf Pasha implemented a new set of reforms focused on sea power and economic growth. Among his first objectives was the re-fortification of the city walls and the

construction of new sailing fleet. Within the year, the Tripolitan navy had effectively grown from three rickety corvettes to six armed vessels.157 His reforms, which were a breath of fresh air after the dereliction of responsibilities by his father and the looting of the town by Ali Burghol, where fully supported by the members of the broader Tripolitan community, both the merchants and traders, as well as the powerful Bedouin leaders from across the province.

This approach served a dual purpose. It strengthened Yusuf’s position within Tripoli among the regency’s subjects and was a preliminary step in announcing the return of Tripolitania as a maritime force within broader North African and Ottoman worlds and was also an effective and rapid means of improving the territory’s long neglected economy. Yusuf’s strategy proved effective and the governor’s efforts as drew a great deal of attention. In his 26 July 1796 dispatch, the acting British Consul to Tripoli, Simon Lucas wrote:

… [O]ur present Bashaw, Youseph Caramanli who is about the age of 24 or 25, is daily increasing in power, and strength, particularly by sea…Being now peaceably fixed on his throne, and in the full enjoyment of the love and

confidence of his subjects, his first thought was to collect some cruisers and to

156 _{Eaton, The Life of the Late Gen. William Eaton... Principally Collected from His Correspondence}

and Other Manuscripts, Letter to Smith, Secretary of the Navy, 290.

157 _{Ibid. For further information on the importance of the navy in Yusuf’s policies see Folayan, Tripoli}

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repair his fortifications towards the sea, which are mounted with about 70 pieces of cannons.... about the beginning of this last spring, he began his claims on all the Christian powers at peace with Tripoli…158

Rebuilding Tripoli’s navy allowed the governor to strengthen the province’s economic position in two ways: first, a strong naval fleet allowed Tripoli to demand tribute—effectively protection money—from western governments. The practice of paying individual tribute to each of the North African provinces had been in effect since the sixteenth century. In return for the payment, a peace was established between the two parties. European governments effectively bought the security of their maritime commercial fleet, while North African corsairs targeted their cruisers towards less generous targets. As the Napoleonic Wars engulfed Europe however, and especially with Bonaparte’s Italian invasion, tribute payments were disrupted by the quick turnover of governments. For North Africa, this meant a substantial drop in incoming revenues. This coupled with the increased maritime activity, motivated North African fleets to revive the corso. Specifically, for Tripoli, Yusuf’s maritime upgrades allowed his corsairs to resume campaigns along the shores of Sicily, in Catania and Messina, as well as in the Aegean.159

Tripolitan ships would routinely attack and capture non-Ottoman vessels very close to the Porte’s territory. Historically, orsairs traditionally operated as ocaks, a rank of military corps traditionally reserved for janissaries. The use of the term corsair or sometimes, ocak in this chapter echoes the Ottoman turn of the nineteenth century understanding of the term. In effect, a corsair was the operator of an armed ship, owned by an Ottoman governor or province, holding a state-sponsored

158 _{FO 76/5 Lucas to Portland 26 July 1796.}

159 _{Panzac, Barbary Corsairs, 86. The rulers of the North African eyalēts had struck an agreement} giving each the exclusive plundering rights to a particular territory. Thus, the Karamanlıs were the only North African province with the right to launch raids upon the towns mentioned above.

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commission that was sanctioned by the Porte, which authorized the capture of all rival countries’ mercantile and naval vessels.

Within the world of the various North African fleets, this meant the provinces had a long established tradition of dividing up territories along the Mediterranean shores, with the lion’s share taken by the powerful Algiers. However, as Tripoli increased its maritime presence, it slowly began to sail in territories previously operated by only the better-equipped Algerian ocaks.160 Yusuf’s navy continued to grow and by 1797, Tripoli’s fleet had grown to eleven armed vessels.161 This relative boom in maritime influence continued through the years to come with the upheaval that followed the 1798 French invasion. By 1803, two years after the outbreak of the First Barbary War against the United States, Tripoli’s fleet had grown to nineteen vessels and even continued to grow throughout the end of the war. By 1805, boasting over twenty-four armed ships, Tripoli became “a new Algiers”162 in the world of Mediterranean maritime power.163 The years of chaos in Europe, the French invasion, the rise of English commercial interests in the region, as well as those of their former American colonies, served the young Tripolitan pasha’s efforts to rapidly expand his navy.

As Tripoli’s maritime power increased, the Porte began to pay more attention to the reforms in the province. In the spring of 1797, Selim III sent a gift of a two ships, equipped with twenty-four and thirty-six guns respectively, and a firman allowing Yusuf to use a standard, or tuğ, of two horse tails rather than Tripoli’s

160 _{Panzac, Barbary Corsairs, map, 86.}

161 _{Folayan, Tripoli during the reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli, 27.} 162 _ibid.

163 _{For additional information see Folayan, Tripoli during the reign of Yusuf Pasha Karamanlı, Chapter} 1.

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historical one: a symbolic gesture that elevated Tripoli’s status to that of Tunis and Algiers.164 This honor was of immense significance for the young leader – long considered the weakest of the North African provinces, Tripoli’s position in the Ottoman Empire had also been less influential than either that of Tunis, or the powerful Algiers, as evidenced by the less influential standard of the pasha.

Effectively, the change symbolized the Porte’s recognition of Tripoli’s new position in the political constellation of Mediterranean and explicitly acknowledged and legitimized the governor’s position in the province.165

The Ottoman Porte however, was not the only imperial power to recognize Tripoli’s increased geopolitical importance. Western powers also began consider Tripoli in their broader rivalries for control in the Mediterranean.166 _{In Paris, the}

Republican Directory was openly planning an invasion of Britain. However, as First Coalition troops landed on Welsh shores and panicked the Home Office in London, one of France’s top generals, Napoleon Bonaparte, was secretly mulling an invasion of another sort. Egypt—Bonaparte’s intended target—would be a handsome victory both economically and symbolically for the French Republic. Napoleon was

pragmatic in the planning: an invasion of Egypt would disrupt British maritime commerce and undermine their trade with India, which was the Directory’s ultimate

164 _{For additional information on the symbolic importance of horse tails, see H. Gibb and H. Bowen,}

Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the impact of Western civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 139-140. For a copy of the firman see doc. dated 12 Shawal/ mid-April 1797, Azis Samih Itler, Somali Afrikada Turkler, (Constantinople, 1939): 335-6. 165 _{It is important to note however, that while the three corsair regencies: Tunis, Tripoli and Algiers} used a two-horsetail standard, Egypt—long since one of the most important and lucrative provinces of the empire—used a tuğ of three horsetails. This is an important distinction to draw, because while Tunis and Tripoli played a compelling role in the operations and decision making of the Porte, the corsair provinces were not as critical as Egypt in the broader functioning of Ottoman Empire. After all, the Porte was much more dependent on Egypt for essential wheat, rice, and tax revenues than it had been on its neighbors to the west.

166 _{As seen above, British consuls kept a close eye on Yusuf’s efforts, and reported back to the Foreign} Office.

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aim, while remaining less costly and more likely to prove victorious than a direct invasion of England.167 To facilitate his objective, Bonaparte used a Maltese emissary, Saverio Naudi, or Xavier Naudi as he was called within the Directory, to recruit Yusuf Pasha’s alliance in Tripoli, to provide rations for troops after their departure from Toulon, as well as communication routes through the east of the province.

In return for Tripoli’s support, Bonaparte, by way of Naudi, promised financial reward, autonomy from the Porte, the imminent disbandment of the North African corsairs’ nemesis, the Knights Hospitallers of Malta, at times going so far as to promise independence for Tripoli.168 Bonaparte’s agent in this secret alliance is of particular interest. The son of a Maltese shoemaker, Naudi was forced to flee the island, first to Marseilles and later to Tripoli, where he continuously engaged in his daring and perilous behavior. Edward Blaquiere wrote of him in Tripoli:

Mr. Naudi’s history is simply as follows…while pursuing the trade of a watchmaker in Valetta, been concerned in the robbery of one of the churches, he was obliged to take refuge in Marseilles, from whence he was a second time driven away... Knowing [Tripoli] to be the receptacle of evil, he came and contrived to obtain the Bashaw's confidence… once ingratiated with his Highness, he soon became a principal actor in the civil and political atrocities of Tripoly [sic] and continues to play a most dangerous, as well as

distinguished part in them…Exiled from Malta he is the avowed enemy of the British interest…It is also positively asserted, that many of the piratical acts committed by the cruizers at sea, may be traced to Mr. Naudi’s advice; in fact, he is execrated by all the inhabitants and considered by everyone here as the most dangerous subject in the Regency.169

This intriguing character would prove so resourceful in his efforts, that he would later become the charge d’affaires for the Americans in Tripoli. After all,

167 _{Cole, Napoleon’s Egypt, 1-12.}

168_{Eugène Plantet, Correspondance des beys de Tunis et Consuls de France avec la cour (1577-1830),} Vol. 3 (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1893-1899).

169 _{FO 76/6, 124 and Edward Blaquiere, Letters from the Mediterranean; Containing a Civil and}

Political Account of Sicily, Tripoly, Tunis, and Malta: With Biographical Sketches, Anecdotes and Observations, Illustrative of the Present State of Those Countries, and Their Relative Situation with Respect to the British Empire (London: Colburn, 1813), 96.

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loyalty was as malleable for the political actors as it was for the provinces in the turn of the nineteenth century Mediterranean. In the meantime, however, Naudi himself wrote of the condition of his exile in a 1798 letter to the Directory. After falling out with the French consul, and bored of being underutilized in Tripoli, Naudi politely complained that if his help was no longer needed in city, requesting that some

measures be taken by Talleyrand, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in order that he may be granted a guarantee of good will [testomonianza della sua benevolezza] of which the most honorable prize would be to ‘obtain glorious French citizenship.’ Naudi claimed that such a request could only be made because of his devotion to the French nation, which he openly expressed in 1790, in his homeland of Malta, and had been unable to return since.170

He then traveled across North Africa, becoming a consular jack-of-all-trades, simultaneously serving as a middleman for numerous diplomats, merchants, and traders—all while working as a watchmaker on the side.171 While his allegiance to the French nation could be questioned, we nevertheless learn that he was forced out of Malta in 1790 and that his time in Marseilles was brief. In fact, by 1794, Naudi’s position as an unofficial agent of sorts became more lucrative and he was serving as the French Vice Consul’s First Interpreter in Tripoli. During this time, Naudi entrenched himself in the French consular office and by the summer of 1796 was working ‘not without risk to himself’ on behalf of the French Republic in the province.172 _{His efforts were rewarded in a letter of introduction from the Consul of}

170 _{Letter from 18 Pluviôse, Year 6/7 February 1798, La Courneuve Microfilm “Records from Tripoli} 1798”, 21-25.

171 _{Letter from 18 Pluviôse, Year 6/7 February 1798, La Courneuve Microfilm “Records from Tripoli} 1798”, 21-25.

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Tripoli’s office to the Directory in Paris. In it, the consul asked that Naudi be named Vice Consul of the French Republic in Benghazi, as the port city could be used as a strategic point for the French campaign in Italy, and for Venice in particular. Naudi received the post and was transferred to Benghazi.173 By 1798 however, he had returned to the city of Tripoli. It remains unclear if the consul wrote to Paris in the hope of finally ridding himself of Naudi, who had ingratiated himself with diplomatic circles, won the wrath of the English consular office and made several adversaries in the city or if it was for purely strategic support in the east of the province.174 It is entirely possible that the extent of Naudi’s ambitions had won him enemies within the French diplomatic community of Tripoli. However, what we do know, from western and North African sources alike, was that Naudi was the one chosen by the consul’s