As part of the young generation, university students throughout the New Order were also subject to these policies. However, from the mid to late 1970s they also became the objects of a number of additional policies which aimed to define their roles in intellectual rather than political terms and so limit their involvement in political life. The demonstrations of 1965-1966 in which university students, acting in their role as
mahasiswa, had been a central force, had demonstrated to the new regime that a
mahasiswa identity which legitimated such demonstrations was potentially destabilising (see also Ryter 1998, 57-8). The continued outspokenness of some students during the late 1960s and early 1970s was further evidence that a politically-engaged mahasiswa
identity was undesirable in a regime that valued consensus (mufakat) above all. As a result, in addition to their pemuda identity, New Order mahasiswa became the objects of a separate set of policies which aimed to control representations of their roles and identities as mahasiswa, particularly as it related to their involvement in ‘practical politics’.
The mahasiswa who were the objects of these policies were students in one of the largest higher education systems in Southeast Asia. There are 78 state institutions of higher education, including universities, institutes, colleges (sekolah tinggi), academies and polytechnics (Priyono 1999, 178). Most of these institutions are the responsibility of the Department of Education and Culture (renamed in 1998 as the Department of National Education), although a number come under the Department of Religious Affairs. For the 1998/1999 academic year, the Department of National Education was responsible for 1634 public and private tertiary institutions with a total enrolment of over 3 million students. For the same period, 298 public and private universities, institutes, including the fourteen IAIN, and colleges came under the Department of Religious Affairs (Departemen Pendidikan Nasional n.d).
With over 1500 institutions in total, private higher education institutions for the 1998/1999 academic year accounted for around 95 per cent of institutions of higher education in Indonesia but only 53 per cent of total student enrolments (Departemen Pendidikan Nasional n.d).37 Yet while private higher education is numerically
37
All private higher education institutions are subject to a national accreditation system (Toisuta 1991, 98; Soemardjan 1973, 51; Atmakusuma 1974, 9).
predominant, public institutions in general surpass most private institutions in terms of quality and prestige.38 The growth of private universities under the New Order provided additional opportunities for higher education. Like state universities, private universities vary in terms of the quality of education and the fee structure. The course fees at the largest and most prestigious of the private universities, and even those which are less so, mean they are available only to the upper middle class (Oey-Gardiner 1991, 86; Prijono 1999, 163, 165 and 173).
Student numbers grew exponentially during the New Order period. A 1997 publication of the Department of Education and Culture reported that in 1969, there were 176 900 students enrolled at universities and colleges throughout the archipelago.39 Six years later, in 1975, there were over 250 000. By the 1984/1985 academic year, however, this number had increased almost four-fold to 977 302 students and by 1994/1995 had doubled again to over two million students (Office of Educational and Cultural Research and Development 1997, 50, table 2.12; see also Heneveld 1979, 148-9). This growth in student numbers was a result of the expansion of primary and secondary education during the 1950s and 1960s, as students graduating from secondary schools increasingly sought higher education. Recognising the importance of having trained professionals, the New Order made a concerted effort to improve the quality of education at all levels. Strong economic development under the New Order also meant that higher education was increasingly available to those who desired it. As elsewhere, it was Indonesia’s expanding middle class which took advantage of these educational opportunities.
The largest universities are concentrated in and around the major urban centers. This is largely a legacy of the colonial period when Dutch high schools and, later, colleges and faculties, were located in centres such as Batavia (Jakarta), Bandung, Malang, Yogyakarta, Semarang, Medan and Solo (Fischer 1965, 95 and 106; see also above). With the exception of Medan, all of these cities are located in Java. The expansion which took place as a result of the Sukarno government’s policy of giving every province a state university to some extent addressed this imbalance. At the beginning
38
There are some notable exceptions to this, particularly among the universities located in the capital. Private institutions tend to focus on the less expensive social science and the humanities programs rather than programs requiring costly facilities and staff such as technical and applied science programs (Toisuta 1991, 98).
39
Estimates of student numbers, particularly in the 1960s, vary considerably. Bachtiar (1968, 185-6 and fn 20), for example, suggests that in 1965, student numbers may have been as high as 279 624.
of the New Order, however, Universitas Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta and Universitas Indonesia in Jakarta remained by far the largest universities in Indonesia, enrolling over half of all students (Fischer 1965, 95). As the oldest and largest universities in Indonesia, Universitas Gadjah Mada and Universitas Indonesia are also the most prestigious. Together with three other state universities, Institut Teknologi Bandung, Institut Pertanian Bogor (Bogor Agricultural Institute), and Universitas Airlangga in Suraybaya, as well as the oldest Islamic university, Universitas Islam Indonesia in Yogyakarta, these universities are the most highly sought after by prospective students.
Despite the growth of the past few decades, Indonesian university students remain an elite within their society. As Fischer notes, the limited opportunities for high school and tertiary education for Indonesians during the colonial period meant that for the children of civil servants (Javanese priyayi) and professionals, education was the key to social mobility. The shortage of trained professionals at the beginning of independence, a situation which also faced the New Order, meant that educated individuals were highly valued (Fischer 1965, 94-5 and 103-4). By 1986, only 7 per cent of those in the 20-24 age group were enrolled in tertiary education, a figure which fell well below that of other Southeast Asian nations (Jones 1994, 165). However, the additional educational opportunities provided by the continued growth in private universities and colleges have increased this figure to around 10 per cent (Visi 2020 1997, 24; Office of Educational and Cultural Research and Development 1997, 50, table 2.12).
Tritura to reformasi: student activism, 1966-1998
In the 1960s, student political activism in South and Southeast Asia, Europe and the Americas generated a wealth of academic interest. Much of this literature sought to explain the factors underlying university students’ involvement in national and campus politics (see for example Coleman 1965; Emmerson 1968; Lipset 1964; Altbach 1968, van Wolferen 1970; Feuer 1969). One of the most important factors appeared to be students’ delayed entry into the ‘adult’ world of work and family responsibilities. This transitory period, in which students enjoy relative freedom from parental and familial control and financial responsibilities, means that they are able to take risks which others can not (Altbach 1968, 3). In addition, the university environment, it was argued, provides students with an awareness of social and political issues, which their idealism
encouraged them to seek to redress (Altbach 1968, 4; Lipset 1964, 31). In many cases, students also see themselves as the leaders of the working class and the bearers of knowledge (Feuer 1969, 4; Altbach 1968, 3). More practically, the pressures of academic life, and in particular, the threat of unemployment after graduation, often manifests itself in political and social activism (Altbach 1968, 7-8). Many authors also attribute student activism to a ‘conflict of generations’ (Feuer 1969; Lipset 1964, 30-35) or to the cultural alienation which students experience when attempting to reconcile their modern Western education and values with the traditional values of their societies (Altbach 1968, 6-7; Lipset 1964, 17). Finally, the privileged status of students in many developing societies, coupled with a perception that they are largely without interests in the status quo, and as such have greater ideological ‘purity’ (Altbach 1968, 3), means that students are often expected to play an active role in social and political life (Altbach 1968, 5; van Wolferen 1970, 6).
Until the mid 1960s, research on Indonesia tended to seek explanations for the lack of political activism amongst Indonesian university students in the post independence period, given that many of the same conditions which had led to student activism in other developing nations were also present in Indonesia (see for example Fischer 1965; Douglas 1970). After the events of 1965-1966, however, student politics in Indonesia took on a markedly different character.
Since the 1950s the student organisations which were associated with the major political parties had been divided along ideological lines. In the early months of 1965 a bitter conflict had been developing between the powerful communist-affiliated CGMI and the modernist Islamic HMI (Bachtiar 1968, 189-90; Mohammad and Kats 1969, 30-33; Saidi 1989, 84). The Communist Party’s alleged masterminding of the murder of the 6 generals on 30 September, led to a significant change in their fortunes. HMI took advantage of the new political mood, organising the first anti-PKI rally on 5 October and later establishing itself as one of the dominant members of KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia), the staunchly anti-communist organisation formed with the ‘advice and encouragement’ of Minister of Higher Education and Science General Sjarif Thajeb on 25 October 1965 (Douglas 1970, 154-6; Bachtiar 1968, 191-2; Pemuda pembangunan 1987, 38-9).40
40
KAMI’s initial actions focused on practical issues such as the rising price of basic goods and petrol. These were the issues which had most affected ordinary people, as well as students themselves. By the beginning of 1966, however, the focus had shifted to political and economic issues (Douglas 1970, 157; Mohammad and Kats 1969, 38). This new concern found clear expression in the announcement in January 1966 of the ‘Threefold People’s Demands’ (Tri Tuntutan Rakyat, Tritura): dissolve the PKI (bubarkan PKI), replace the Dwikora Cabinet (rombak Kabinet Dwikora) and reduce the price of basic goods (turunkan harga) (Anwar 1980, 11). The movement was largely Jakarta-based, although students in Bandung also played an important role. The largest protests were organised by university students. After KAMI was banned, youth and high school students in KAPPI (Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia) continued to pressure the Sukarno government.
KAMI enjoyed considerable support from the Indonesian military, in particular the army (Saidi 1989, 77; Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 179-80). Official accounts of the events describe this relationship as a ‘partnership’ between students and the military (see for example Wibisono 1980; Anwar 1980; Imawan 1966; Orde Baru: Koreksi total
1995; Dipodisastro 1997). The concept of a partnership was criticised by later generations of student activists, who felt that the 1966 students had been exploited by the army for its own purposes (Aspinall 1993, 31; also Mangiang 1981; Simandjuntak 1973; Simbolon 1977).
The Order of March Eleven (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, Supersemar) effectively fulfilled KAMI’s first demand, the dissolution of the PKI, and with steps to fulfill the second and third demands already being taken, the students’ service to the nation was, at least in the eyes of the new regime, effectively completed and students were urged to ‘return to the campus’. Yet between 1966 and 1974 students were far from disengaged from politics. As Raillon’s (1985) study of the Bandung-based student newspaper
Mahasiswa Indonesia shows, students continued to engage actively in social and political life and in the debates surrounding the formation and consolidation of the ‘new order’. Moreover, as disappointment with the regime’s failure to fulfill its initial promises grew towards the end of the 1960s, students once again took to the streets, albeit in much smaller numbers than had rallied in 1966. The students’ growing disillusionment with the new regime found expression in various movements protesting against corruption and economic mismanagement, the restrictions placed on the 1971
elections, including the ‘simplification’ of the parties, and the building of the Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature (Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, TMII) project (see Budiman 1973; Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 180-1; Sanit 1999).41 Yet while these students were critical of aspects of the state’s political and economic practices they remained committed to the underlying aims of the New Order, leading Southwood and Flanagan to describe the students of the 1970s as ‘critical collaborators’ (1983, 175).
By 1973, in addition to these issues, students were also arguing that the state’s entire development strategy was misguided. Protest regarding these and other issues gathered pace during 1973 and in January 1974 this unrest culminated with a demonstration against foreign, in particular Japanese, investment in Indonesia, subsequently dubbed the ‘Fifteenth of January Disaster’ (Malapetaka Limabelas Januari, Malari) (see van Dijk 1975, 2-3).42 The protest sparked several days of mass riots (see Crouch 1974; Gunawan 1975; Bourchier 1996, 217-8).43 As a result, universities in the capital were closed and a number of student leaders were arrested. Three people were tried, including Hariman Siregar, the chairperson of Universitas Indonesia’s student council.44 Official accounts of the incident emphasise the role of rogue PSI/Masyumi elements (Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 185; Gunawan 1975, 65; Crouch 1974, 5).45 Underlying the unrest, however, was an elite level power struggle between General Sumitro, the deputy commander of the armed forces and commander of Kopkamtib (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), and the head of the Special Operations Command (Operasi Khusus, Opsus) and one of the president’s personal assistants (asisten pribadi, aspri) Major General Ali Moertopo (Crouch 1974, 2).
41
In January 1970, students acting as the ‘Action Movement for Student Demands’ (Gerakan Aksi Mahasiswa Menggugat) demonstrated against corruption and economic mismanagement. Later that year, they formed the White Group (Golongan Putih, Golput) in response to the restrictions placed on the 1971 elections. The Austerity Movement (Gerakan Penghematan) was formed in December 1971 to protest against the building of Taman MiniIndonesia Indah (see Budiman 1973; Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 180-1; Mangiang 1981).
42
The protesters pronounced the Tritura ’74: abolish aspri, reduce prices, and end corruption (Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 184; Gunawan 1975, 69; Crouch 1974, 4). The president’s personal assistants had been the target of students’ corruption allegations in 1970.
43
Bourchier notes that the acronym Malari ‘conjur[es] up associations with fever and disease (1996, 217).
44
See van Dijk 1975, 2000 for an account of Hariman Siregar’s trial. Syahrir and Mohammad Ani Chalid were also tried (Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 185; van Dijk 1975, fn 1).
45
See Peristiwa 14-15-16 January 1974 for a detailed ‘official’ account of the developments of 1973, the riots themselves and the steps put in place by the government. The PSI and Masyumi had been disbanded by Sukarno in 1960.
In the aftermath of the affair, the Minister of Education and Culture Sjarif Thajeb issued a ministerial decision detailing guidelines for the ‘improvement’ (pembinaan) of university campuses, popularly known as SK028.46 The decision prohibited students from undertaking any political activities which would ‘lead to the disturbance of peace and order in the nation’ (Thajeb 1974, 7; Thomas 1981, 388; Siregar 1983, 131-5).47 This did not, he noted, include discussions and seminars as these represented the academic community’s contribution towards solving the nation’s problems. Since the opinions expressed were the result of ‘concrete and constructive thinking based on a scientific analysis of the situation’, they were therefore a legitimate channel for the much vaunted ‘academic freedom’ and ‘freedom of expression’ said to be in place on Indonesian university campuses (Thajeb 1974, 7-8).48
In 1977, students again took to the streets. Their criticisms of the regime went further than they had in earlier waves of protest, calling for the abolition of Kopkamtib and criticising the cukong (Chinese conglomerates) phenomena, foreign investment, unregulated state power and the state’s development strategy (van Dijk 1978a, 1978b; Bourchier 1996, 224; Aspinall 1993, 5). In Bandung, students at Institut Teknologi Bandung published the White book of students’ struggle (Buku putih perjuangan mahasiswa) detailing the regime’s failings (Buku putih 1978). Finally, in the lead-up to the General Session of the MPR in March 1978, student demonstrators called for Suharto to withdraw as a presidential candidate.49 The anti-Suharto character of student protest at the time of the 1977 elections and in the lead-up to the 1978 General Session of the MPR invited a harsh response from the state (van Dijk 1978a, 1978b; Supriyanto 1998, 78). On 21 January 1978 a Kopkamtib decision froze the activities of all student
46
Ministerial Decision No. 028 1974 on Policy Guidelines for the Improvement of University Campus Life (issued on 3 February) [Surat Keputusan No. 028 1974 tentang petunjuk-petunjuk kebijaksanaan dalam rangka pembinaan kehidupan kampus perguruan tinggi]. See also Instruction No. 2 1974 on the Reopening of Institutions of Higher Education in Greater Jakarta (issued on 28 January) [Instruksi No. 2 1974 tentang Pembukaan Kembali Perguruan Tinggi di Jakarta Raya] and Joint Instruction No. 8 1974 between the Minister of Education and Culture, the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Minister for Religion on the Implementation of the Improvement of the Young Generation (issued on 6 February) [Instruksi Bersama No. 8 Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Menteri Dalam Negeri dan Menteri Agama tentang Pelaksanaan Pembinaan Generasi Muda].
47
The decision was revoked by Sjarif Thajeb on 1 July 1977 following student protest. Sjarif Thajeb’s appointment as Minister of Education and Culture one week after the Malari riots was a judicious one. He was a strong educationalist with a military background. From 1962 to 1964 he served as rector of
Universitas Indonesia. Between 1964 and 1966 he was the Minister for Higher Education and Science. Following this, he served as the Deputy Chairperson of the DPR and Chairperson of the Armed Forces Faction before his posting to Washington as ambassador to the USA and Brazil (1971-74) (Apa dan siapa
1981, and Roeder and Mahmud 1980, 349).
48
Keputusan Menteri Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan tanggal 17 April 1975 No. 079/0.
49
See Budiyarso 2000; Hariyadhie 1994; Stamp [1979?] for detailed studies of the 1977-1978 student movement.
councils in universities and institutes of higher education throughout the archipelago.50 Troops occupied the campuses, and all student newspapers had their publication licenses revoked. A number of student leaders were also arrested. At their trials, most of which took place during 1979, these students produced lengthy defense speeches which systematically critiqued the New Order.51
The state’s response to this wave of student protest was a new policy orientation which aimed to curtail student activity on campuses and effectively stem the power of the student councils (dewan mahasiswa), which had been the prime organisational vehicles for the 1977-1978 protests (Aspinall 1993, 6). Over the course of 1978 and early 1979, the new Minister of Education and Culture Daud Yusuf, put in place a series of policies designed to return the campuses to their ‘proper’ state as apolitical scientific communities and students to their proper status as members of these scientific communities (see also Thomas 1981, 388-9).52 The Normalisation of Campus Life (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus, NKK) and Campus Coordination Body (Badan Koordinasi Kampus, BKK) policies, the Minister explained in an interview with the news magazine Tempo, aimed to ‘normalise’ the campuses:
The word normalisation was included because the NKK concept as a whole means ‘to normalise’ (‘menormalkan’) campus life, that is, to return the campus to the norms which should prevail and be developed on the campus. Until now, these norms have increasingly been forgotten, and have even been allowed to be destroyed slowly but surely. As a result, until the NKK concept was introduced, our campuses were in an abnormal condition (Majalah Mahasiswa 3 (15) 1980, 3).
On 24 February 1979 the Minister issued a follow-up policy on campus student organisations. This policy was known as the BKK policy, after the Student Coordination Body (Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan, BKK) which, under the new system, represented the key student organisation at the university level. At the same
50
Surat Keputusan Pangkopkamtib tanggal 21 January 1978 No SKEP 02/KOPKAM/I/1978.
51
Thirty four students were tried in 1979 (Southwood and Flanagan 1983, 190). Many of them published their defence speeches (see Akhmadi 1979, Hakim 1980, Tjahjono 1979, Hamid 1979, Zakir 1980, Yusuf 1979, Al Hilal 1979, Tarsono 1979, Silalahi 1979, Menggugat Pemerintahan 1979).