LOS VALORES

According to Kant, a practical principle is called objective only if its determ- ining ground holds for the will of every rational being.9 In order to hold for every rational being such a ground must be subtracted from everything that distinguishes one rational being from another. In other words, every objective principle’s ground must be independent of the contingency of a particular be- ing. As a consequence, such a practical principle does not allow for exceptions and therefore puts forward an action as absolutely necessary.

In Kant’s philosophy terms like ‘objective’, ‘universal’ and ‘necessary’ are inevitably connected with ‘being a priori’. It might therefore seem trivial that the ground of an objective principle must be found in pure reason. In definition I of the Analytic though, Kant only defines the minimal difference between subjective and objective principles on the basis of the properties of their determining grounds. Which faculties provide which determining grounds is something that Kant still needs to prove. Consequently, that every objective principle’s determining ground must have its origin (a priori) in pure reason cannot simply be asserted: It needs to be proved. The above will be established by Kant’s first three theorems.

Definition 3.3. (Objective Principles) A practical principle (Defini-

tion 3.1) is an objective principle only if:

1I The principle’s determining ground holds for every rational being. 2I The principle’s determining ground is independent of the subjective con-

ditions of the rational being that entertains it. 3_I The principle expresses an absolute necessity.

Some of the concepts used in the above analysis need some clarification. Firstly, consider the following statement made by Kant onnecessity in relation to practical principles:

[O]therwise they are not laws because they lack the necessity which, if it is to be practical, must be independent of conditions that are pathological and therefore only contingently connected with the will. [Kan96a, 5:20]

Hence, the necessity of a practical principle implies the principle’s independ- ence of any contingent condition. A rational being’s pathological conditions depend on the being’s sensibility and can therefore never generate a necessity. According to Kant, “[i]t is an outright contradiction to want to extract neces- sity from an empirical proposition” [Kan96a, 5:12].10 This implies, accordingly,

9

For Kant objective principles and practical laws are the same. I shall therefore use these terms interchangeably.

10_{In the proof of Theorem 1 Kant calls this form of necessity ‘objective necessity’: A}

principle containing an object of desire as the determining ground of the will can never serve as a law “because it is lacking in objective necessity” [Kan96a, 5:22]. Kant uses the term

that such a principle does not allow for any exceptions (as is the case for sub- jective principles). Hence, the practical necessity of a principle implies the unavoidable determination of a will to an action put forward by that principle. (However, the dual nature of a human being turns this practical necessity into a mere practical necessitation, that is, obligation. This point will be treated in section 3.8.1.) The above elaboration provides the following definition:11

Definition3.4. (Necessity) A practical principle is necessaryif and only

if (i) it unavoidably determines a will to a particular action put forward by that principle and (ii) it is independent of all (empirical) conditions that are contingently connected with a rational being’s will.

The second clause of the above definition guarantees that the principle is an a priori principle. A cognition is either a priori or a posteriori:12

Definition 3.5. (A Posteriori Cognitions) A cognition is called a

posteriori, i.e. empirical, if and only if the cognition depends on experience, that is, sensibility (which is a rational being’s subjective constitution).

Definition 3.6. (A Priori Cognitions) A cognition is called (purely)

a priori if and only if the cognition is completely independent of anything empirical.

The concept of (strict) universality is defined by Kant as follows:

‘objective’ to distinguish between this form of necessity and a mere ‘subjective’ necessity. With respect to practical principles Kant makes a distinction between the absolute necessity of a practical law, that is objective necessity, and the necessity of a subjective principle that is only raised by some practical being(s) to the status of a law: “It would be better to maintain that there are no practical laws at all [...] than toraisemerely subjective principles to the rank of practical laws, which absolutely must have objective and not merely subjective necessity” [Kan96a, 5:26]. Thus, the addition of the term ‘objective’ only serves to distinguish ‘plain’ necessity from a pseudo necessity, namely, subjective necessity. I will therefore use the terms objective necessity and necessity interchangeably.

11_{Again, for Kant the necessity of a principle implies that this principle must be a priori.}

Both concepts express an independence of contingent conditions; that is, experience. Con- sider for example the following remark by Kant: “[M]athematical propositions are always a priori and not empirical judgments,becausethey carry necessity with them, which cannot be taken from experience.” [Kan02, 4:268 - bold emphasis my own]. Hence, if a practical principle is necessary, then it must be fully determinable a priori. In the corollary to the second theorem though, Kant proves that the origin of the determining ground of such a necessary practical principle must be pure reason. I will therefore leave the determination of this ‘pure’ character to Kant’s first corollary. With respect to the present argument Definition3.4will suffice.

12

Definition3.5and Definition3.6are mostly based on the following definition provided by Kant in the introduction to the B edition of the first Critique: “[W]e will understand bya priori cognitions not those that occur independently of this or that experience, but rather those that occur absolutely independently of all experience. Opposed to them are empirical cognitions, or those that are possible only a posteriori, i.e., through experience. Amonga priori cognitions, however, those are calledpurewith which nothing empirical is intermixed” [Kan00, B2-B3].

Thus if a judgment is thought in strict universality, i.e., in such a way that no exception at all is allowed to be possible, then it is not derived from experience, but is rather valid absolutely a priori. [Kan00, 5:4 - Introduction to the B edition]

Strict universality expresses a validity with respect to every possible case without exception. With respect to practical principles a universally valid principle would then be a principle that is valid for every being to which it can apply, that is, for every rational being.13

Definition3.7. (Universality) A practical principle is universally valid

if and only if the principle is valid for every rational being.