Service
Integrity of
Data
Service
Transparency
Changing
Technology
Data Storage
& Retrieval
Figure 11 GEMSD model Security AOS ● Stability of service
GEMSD introduces new modes of service delivery and requires a stable infrastructure otherwise little benefit is to be gained by the public. Literature elaborated the need further suggesting that governments should not be in the communications business but should use the private sector specialists to deliver government’s services thereby giving a stable communication and service platform. Other authors re-enforced this position by claiming that the lack of consumer trust in the security of the new service mediums, electronic or mobile, could be its undoing. The consensus being: there are known limitations with traditional methods in avoiding malicious or fraudulent damage to data, however stable communications platforms and consistent data integrity should abate many known threats and promote success. Therefore the question to be tested is ‘does communications stability and data integrity promote successful GEMSD?’
● Integrity of data
Data integrity and privacy were outlined succinctly by Curtis (2006) in the literature and were very clear suggesting information privacy required rules for the handling of information as compliance under the Australian Privacy Act (1988). The same themes of a rule-based approach to privacy and data integrity were amplified by other authors, and concentrated on fraud through identity theft. The question rising from this success factor to be tested relates to ‘What steps or rules are necessary to minimize identity theft and does this ensure successful GEMSD?’ The inclusion of integrity of data in the model under the security AOS was considered mandatory.
● Service transparency
Likewise the question: ‘are routine transaction audit and transparency in securing GEMSD services a considerable success factor in the success of GEMSD projects?’ This was included as multiple authors subscribed to the belief that governments should clearly explain information practices to their constituents before collecting personal information. Also regular transaction audit should occur as part of a
standard regulatory framework to instil confidence in the process and support for the initiative or project. This success factor was seen as a necessary ‘check and balance’ for security and public confidence thereby ensuring success and the lack of this being present would inhibit the likely success.
● Changing technology syndrome
Curtis (2006) said: ‘All businesses selling products or services to the public are subject to consumer protection regulations.’ This applies to government as well. In supporting Curtis’ view on regulation, there is a need to ensure GEMSD compliance irrespective of systems utilised therein, or as part of, the delivery mechanism. Other authors further suggested it should be possible for legacy systems to meet the
regulatory requirements particularly in relation to security of service and data. In this sense legacy systems can be defined as obsolete or near obsolete government
computer system that may still be in use because their data cannot be changed to newer or standard formats, or their application programs cannot be upgraded easily, generally without considerable additional cost.
The inclusion of this success factor in the model is pivotal on the ability of legacy systems not to impede GEMSD security and being capable of adaptation to future technological changes. The question being, do legacy systems impede security and are there any future proof enhancements that can facilitate successful GEMSD projects?
● Data storage and retrieval
Similarly it has been a historical evolution that individual departments or agencies have been responsible for data storage and security. With the whole-of-government approach outlined in business engineering this becomes an impediment to continuity of service with multiple records being held on the one individual or organization across several databases, often with peculiar idiosyncrasies to be observed. The success factor in question is, ‘what benefits can be delivered from central data warehousing for whole-of-government GEMSD?’
The literature is explicit is this area with many authors supporting this view with others going further contending highly evolved GEMSD systems will force
standardisation of data management systems to facilitate the whole-of-government systems required for successful GEMSD and that a failure to achieve this will impede progress or promote failure.
The next AOS within the model deals with the success factors attributed to the cost of government policy.
3.3.5 The Cost of good government policy
As stated in the literature it is necessary to incorporate broader consideration for cost than that of fiscal return or auditability. To develop a complete GEMSD model it is necessary to go beyond the technological and geographical issues and incorporate broader consideration for the jurisdictional policy, government re-organisation and cost. To provide a whole-of-government viewpoint it is necessary to stand back from individual stakeholder perspectives evident in the literature, and assess the model from a public policy perspective. A broader public policy perspective would balance all of the costs and benefits across society as a whole. With this view, the literature reviewed provided a richness of information and supported this view highlighting five
success factors under the general area of cost. This is reflected in the model as an AOS broken down into individual and exclusive factors seen in Figure 12 below: