The consistency theory, in essence, suggests that each president was more than likely to continue with the programs, policies, and initiatives begun by his predecessor.
This seems a logical assumption, because, at that time, stemming the expansion of communism was a high priority within the government of the United States. President Eisenhower was adamant in his belief that if the U.S. failed to prevent communism from developing in politically fragile nation-states, it would have a domino effect on
neighboring countries and/or those in similar conditions of political instability. This strategic concept rendered U.S. military involvement an almost foregone conclusion. The
“domino theory articulated by President Eisenhower in 1954 set forth a worst-case scenario and guided strategic thinking thereafter,”43 Gary Hess observes. Eisenhower, like Truman before him, felt that Vietnam was a target of Soviet and Chinese aggression and therefore (in keeping with the domino theory) was of immense, strategic importance to the U.S.44 As such, Eisenhower expanded the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) initially begun by Truman and sent to Vietnam in 1954.45
Post WWII and fresh out of the Korean War, the United States held deep concerns regarding communist aggression. But preventing the spread of communism meant
positioning U.S. resources in global defense postures. This course of action was a policy of containment and the consequences of such a policy were not lost on those within the Executive Branch. The political intricacies of investing U.S. forces in far-reaching countries, compounded with the deeply held anti-communist sentiments, facilitate an understanding of why successive presidents chose, in large part, to continue the course of their respective predecessors.
43 Gary R. Hess, “South Vietnam Under Siege, 1961-1965: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Question of Escalation or Disengagement,” in David L. Anderson, ed., The Columbia History of the Vietnam War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 146.
44 David Anderson, Trapped by Success, The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1991), 18.
45 History of the MAAG, accessed through Richmond University,
https://facultystaff.richmond.edu/~ebolt/history398/MAAG.html. The MAAG, although comprised of military personnel would advise and assist in training the Vietnamese forces. The MAAG precedent would set the conditions for the rise of the PCMF, the Military Consultant Firm (MCF), See, MPRI, Chapter I.
Eisenhower pursued Truman’s goal, recognized at the end of the French
Indochina War in 1954—the preservation of an independent, pro-Western government in South Vietnam. This government would be an alternative to the communist model and would serve as a sentinel in the region, steadfast against communist aggression. Such a regime would divide the country, but this outcome was a plausible option for the
Eisenhower administration as similar precedents had already been set in West Germany and South Korea. “The Eisenhower years saw the development of a large and multi-faceted advisory role. Several U.S. government agencies became involved, including defense and state departments, and private international agencies engaged in
humanitarian assistance.”46 But Eisenhower’s methods were slow and methodical and offered few tangible examples of success. In fact, the Eisenhower administration seemed to drag its political feet in Vietnam, perhaps in hope that the issue would reach better resolution and thus, provide more viable options under the coming presidential watch of John F. Kennedy. Or maybe Eisenhower never fully grasped the situation in Vietnam and so chose the politically safest course of action—to invest the bare minimum of U.S.
support. Regardless of whether Eisenhower purposefully postponed decisions on Vietnam or if he was simply politically ignorant to the area’s regional turbulence, the onus of the problem was going to fall on Kennedy’s presidency. The irony of
Eisenhower’s lack of any substantial actions and/or decisions compounded with his administrations’ self-proclaimed success would make this responsibility even more daunting. David Anderson states this succinctly in the following:
By 1961 the goal of buying time had been achieved. The Saigon regime had stood for over six years, but South Vietnam was not a viable nation and was not
becoming one. The objective of an independent South Vietnam was proving increasingly unrealistic and unachievable without greater cost and risk to the United States. With its proclivity to perceive and proclaim success where, in fact, failure abounded, the
Eisenhower administration trapped itself and its successors into a commitment to the survival of its own counterfeit creation.47
46 See, History of the MAAG, https://facultystaff.richmond.edu/~ebolt/history398/MAAG.html.
47 Anderson, Trapped by Success, xiii–xiv.
In 1961, John F. Kennedy assumed the office of the president and with it, the residual obligations of his predecessor. The fear of communist aggression coming from Moscow and Beijing was still prevalent in main stream America, and yet there was substantial apprehension regarding the potential measures required to deter it. President Kennedy held similar personal concerns about communist expansion, so his desire to remain faithful to a containment policy seems reasonable.
Remaining relatively loyal to a predecessor’s policies has been a historically safe course of action. The abandonment of established norms and policies has seldom been seen as a way to preserve political office—unless these policies clearly demanded immediate change. So from a sheer professional point of view, it stands to reason that with regard to Vietnam, Kennedy would continue along a decisional path similar to Eisenhower’s. Accordingly, Kennedy was reluctant to make any decisively aggressive moves in the region, but yet he understood the consequences of inaction.
At the time of Kennedy’s inauguration, Viet Cong attacks in South Vietnam had become more frequent and of greater intensity. Compounding this threat was the almost immediate recognition that the southern forces were not adequately trained to repel (much less defeat) such aggression.48 President Kennedy supposedly understood the insurgency threat better than Eisenhower and realized that a true defeat of communist aggression in the area would require not only “a military victory, but socioeconomic, political, and psychological victories as well.”49 Kennedy’s response to the growing instability began to take a more robust military shape, but, still his approach was not that far removed from Eisenhower’s. By maintaining a posture of containment, Kennedy remained committed to the policy of the previous administration. His methods however, would be more direct.
Kennedy saw special operations forces (SOF) as an essential tool in achieving success in the area. Although not requiring as large a logistical support network as conventional forces, SOF still needed unique reach-back capabilities best supported by PCMFs. This course of action facilitated force projection while the utilization of PCMFs
48 “Vietnam and Its Wars: A Historical Overview of U.S. Involvement,” Looking Back on the Vietnam War, ed. William Head and Lawrence Grinter (London: Greenwood Press, 1993), 25.
49 Ibid.
in support provided discretion. By 1963, this vision would become strategy and perhaps more importantly, would frame many significant options and precedents for his
successors. Kennedy was now committed to Vietnam, inextricably tied to its outcome through moral obligations and professional courtesy. By 1963, he had seen the turmoil in the area increase with violence and unpredictability. Coup attempts and civil discord were confronting U.S. forces there, and the expected responses required to mitigate further escalation were increasingly becoming less and less desirable. It is unknown, however, how Kennedy would have ultimately responded to the changing dynamics had his presidency not been cut short by an assassin’s bullet.50
The assassination of President Kennedy did not change the fact that Vietnam remained an unanswered dilemma for the United States and that the instability in the South remained a strategic concern. Kennedy had reluctantly continued the policy of containment but had chosen rather unique methods—mainly the application of special operations forces. Lyndon Johnson also remained consistent with the previous
administration’s commitment to Vietnam, but he had bolder plans for a solution. His decisions, unlike his predecessors, seemed driven by events beyond strategic
assessments. Johnson’s sense of urgency leads to a second causal factor, and perhaps the strongest one, in explaining why PCMFs emerged in earnest in Vietnam—that
personalities, political favors, and informal business relationships strongly influenced presidential decisions.