Método de combinación

Context

The Alliance was formed in 1991 as a merger of a number of small parties wanting to achieve greater political influence as a bloc. Those parties were NewLabour, the Green, Democratic (the remnants of the Social Credit party), Liberal and Mana Motuhake parties. The Alliance was led by Jim Anderton, the leader of NewLabour, a party that had formed in 1989 as a breakaway from Labour in protest at Labour’s swing to “new right” policies and values in the 1984-90 period.

In the 1993 general election the Alliance as third highest polling party gained 18.2 per cent of the vote, which was a high third party vote by New Zealand historical standards. Under the rules of FPP, however, the large percentage could not be translated into seats in the House. Had it done so the party may have been looking at around 20 seats in an 120 seat House (Trotter, 2001). Instead, the 1993 election saw the Alliance win only two electorates: Jim Anderton’s Wigram seat and Sandra Lee’s Auckland Central seat. Although the 1993 results gave the party optimism for a good result in the first MMP election in 1996, the Alliance lost significant ground in the 1996 election, gaining 10.1 per cent of the party vote, and dropping to fourth highest polling party after National, Labour, and New Zealand First. In 1997 the Green Party, unhappy with the Alliance’s leadership, announced they would be leaving the Alliance in 1999 to contest that election under their own Green Party banner. With it the Greens took an unknown but not insignificant proportion of Alliance voters.

Market research conducted by the Alliance following the 1996 election identified two major factors contributing to its loss of support. The Alliance’s public rejection of a coalition arrangement with any party prior to that election had resulted in the perception that it had not resolved its ideological differences with Labour sufficiently for voters to be sure it could enter into a workable coalition arrangement should Labour have been electorally successful in 1996. In addition, the party’s heavily tiered tax policy was not at all popular, perceived by Alliance and non-Alliance voters alike to affect many low income as well as high income voters (McCarten, 2000).

The Alliance concluded that the only way it would be able to affect change in New Zealand was to be seen cooperating rather than competing with Labour in 1999 (McCarten, 2000; Trotter, 2001). It decided to position itself in the public mind as the obvious coalition party on the left of Labour, with a coalition arrangement worked

out well in advance of the election and an agreement to openly support the Labour Party in the run-up to and during the 1999 campaign. This included bringing its tax policy in line with Labour’s. The Alliance would try to differentiate itself sufficiently from Labour to not appear a Labour clone, while at the same time not challenging Labour’s wider policy agenda (McCarten, 2000).

Campaign Objectives

According to the Alliance’s campaign director Matt McCarten (2000), the Alliance’s campaign objectives in 1999 were:

• to ensure that the Alliance was part of a Labour-Alliance government; and

• to increase the Alliance party vote from an average of seven per cent in the public opinion polls to 10 per cent, which was the level of support it won in the 1996 election.

Voter Orientation

The Alliance’s raison d’etre had been to provide an alternative political choice for voters disillusioned with the “Fourth Labour government’s rejection of traditional social democracy in favour of a neo-liberal economic programe” according to political commentator Chris Trotter (2001, p. 252). Up to and including the 1996 campaign the Alliance had been in direct competition with Labour for the Left’s vote, challenging it for the support of low income traditional Labour voters who had been adversely affected by the right-leaning economic policies of the period 1984-90 (Jesson, 1997; Roper, 2000e; Trotter, 2001).

The verbal and visual evidence contained in the party’s advertising messages indicates that the Alliance’s target audience in 1999 still included low income voters; that is, working class, the unemployed, students and superannuitants, but it also extended to families and people on hospital waiting lists. These groups were mentioned (but not pictured) in the party’s opening night address. For example, this from MP Phillida Bunkle:

There are 190,000 New Zealanders waiting for hospital treatment, for glue ear, heart surgery, hip replacements. Fewer nurses, closed wards and theatres mean even longer waits. You can cross your fingers or you can vote Alliance.

Stereotyped images of these groups featured on party billboards (Image 3.4.1). A moustached man in a yellow coat and hard hat represented hard working New Zealanders that deserved a break; a smiling female teenager represented a future that should not be shackled with debt; a bored-looking male youth represented potential that should not be wasted; and a warmly dressed silver haired couple represented all older people deserving to live in comfort, not hardship, in retirement. The wider message was that the Alliance now had the interests of a range of (primarily European) New Zealanders at heart, not just those disaffected by the policies of the fourth Labour government.

Image 3.4.1: Alliance billboards, 1999.

Evidence that the Alliance was trying to spread its net beyond disaffected Labour voters came in the closing night address, in which party leader Jim Anderton was seen walking around a rugby stadium (Image 3.4.2). A sports stadium is not a symbol automatically associated with the image of a grass-roots left wing social democrat political organisation. Symbolically, sports stadiums have an almost sacred place in New Zealand culture: sites of historic conquests or defeats in our main national sports, rugby and cricket. They are considered places where all New Zealanders can come together as equals and share in the love of the game. The sports ground setting enabled Anderton to contextualise the problems facing New Zealand in a way that rugby fans could understand. Colour was used to indicate how many times over the

poignantly empty stadium would need to be filled to equal the number of jobless, or on hospital waiting lists (Image 3.4.3).

Image 3.4.2: Stills from Alliance closing night address, 1999.

Those resident in Jim Anderton’s own Wigram electorate in Christchurch would have recognised it as the city’s Jade Stadium. In this regard, Anderton was using the vehicle for the party’s core message as a pitch for the support of voters in his own local electorate. In general, however, acknowledgement of the symbolism of that particular stadium signified that the party wanted to reach mainstream New Zealand with its message. It was now sharing the same target audience as Labour.

Despite the party’s targeting of its images towards a more mainstream audience, there was not much evidence in those images of the party’s desire to sense and respond to those voters. There were no images of any Alliance candidates meeting with or consulting with voters in Alliance advertising in 1999. Nor was there much evidence of the party’s concern with identifying with voters in the party’s verbal dialogue. The Alliance had the second lowest mean use of inclusive pronouns we and our in its opening night address (the lowest was ACT) (see Table 3.1, p. 47); it had the highest mean use of I-statements (see Table 3.2, p. 54), and the second highest (again next to ACT) mean use of the party name in the opening night address (see Table 3.4 below). What this strongly suggests is that the Alliance was primarily focused on promoting its own product over demonstrating its concern for satisfying the needs of voters.

Table 3.4: Party name mentioned per minute in 1999 opening night address.

Party Total

minutes Total party name Mean, ranked highest to lowest

ACT 8 22 2.75

Alliance 8 17 2.125

United NZ 4 8 2

National 12 20 1.666

Greens 4 6 1.5

New Zealand First 8 6 .75

Labour 12 4 .333

Alliance Offer

The party’s campaign slogan was the offer of a promise to care, to be “the heart of a new government”. This campaign slogan was first signaled 50 seconds into the Alliance’s opening night address by party leader Jim Anderton:

That’s why I’m determined to lead the Alliance into a government that brings meaningful change to New Zealanders and it’s why I’m making a personal appeal to you to make the Alliance the heart of a new government.

It was stated five times in the opening night address and twice in the closing night address. It was also the end statement in all the party’s television commercials, and it featured on the party billboards. As a slogan it announced the party’s objective to

be part of the solution to the problems facing New Zealand, and a reason why the Alliance should be part of the solution.

In mythology the heart, as signifier for human qualities of loving or caring for others is expected to lead the head in any quest for self-fulfillment (Campbell, 1988). Using the metaphor of the heart implied that the Alliance would become the central engine room of the new government driving policies that were motivated by a fundamental sense of concern for all New Zealanders, and that the Labour Party in government on its own would simply not be kind and caring without the Alliance. In the party’s television advertising the meaning was visually communicated by a symbol of a red heart morphed out of an image of people holding signs with the names of different New Zealand cities (Image 3.4.4), which turned into a tick symbol. Morphing is a digital image processing technique, often found in product advertising and movies, used to demonstrate the metamorphosis from one image to another. It tends to be used to demonstrate that two visually different objects are interconnected in some unexpected but meaningful way. In the case of the Alliance’s television commercials, the morphing communicated that the party’s policies had been approved by and were in the interests of New Zealanders from all over the country.

Image 3.4.4: Stills from Alliance television commercial, 1999.

The party’s other main offering was its leader, Jim Anderton, whose presence dominated the party’s advertising. He opened and closed the opening night address. He was the only candidate to feature in the closing night address. He had his own television commercial. An A3 sized poster and envelope containing personal letters sent out to homes featured the campaign image of Anderton. The main “The heart of a new government” party billboard featured his backlit head and shoulders photographic image on a black background. The combination of image and slogan communicated the message that Anderton would personally be the heart of the new government (Image 3.4.5)

A “dear voter” letter sent to homes was a personal message from Anderton to voters and was full of I-statements. For example, “I am asking”, “I believe”, “I would like you”, and “I look forward to”. On the back of the envelope is written “Can I take just one minute of your time before you vote this Saturday?”. Alliance advertising presented the Alliance and Anderton as one. Vote the Alliance to get Anderton.

Image 3.4.5: Alliance party vote billboard, 1999.

In the A3 poster mailed out to homes (Image 3.4.6), the party used a slogan used frequently by Labour in its 1999 campaign material – “Its time for a change” – signifying a message in common to both parties. But while Labour’s messages went on to say “Only a vote for Labour can change the government” the Alliance’s went on to state “Only a party vote for Alliance makes a change of government worthwhile” [their underline]. Given the proximity of this message with Anderton’s dominant image, and direct eye contact with readers, the underlying message was that it would be worthwhile because Anderton would be there.

At the commencement of the campaign journalist Anthony Hubbard (1999) had predicted:

In this campaign the viewers will see a kinder, gentler Anderton. Gone is the furious prophet of woe, treachery and ruin, the Jehovah figure whose television advertisements reminded one political scientist of “a lunatic ranting in a carpet factory”. This time the voters will see a sleek statesman in a grey

This was certainly Anderton in 1999. In his campaign image Anderton wore the uniform of the establishment: a grey wool suit, thin blue pin stripe shirt and navy and white tie with thick horizontal stripes. The message signified by his clothing and pose was one of competence and maturity. Selecting the image Alliance campaign manager Matt McCarten said he was looking for an image that would make Anderton “look solid and dependable, firm but fair” (quoted in Catherall, 1999, p. A5). The photographer was going for a “positive look, confident, business-like and managerial” (Catherall, 1999, p. A5).

Image 3.4.6: Alliance A3 brochure, 1999.

According to Matt McCarten (2000), the party’s advertising focus groups even “showed that Jim was seen as the sort of person they would like to have as their bank manager” (p. 39). Reinforcing this impression was a billboard image of Anderton in front of an image of a building with columns – symbols of sobriety, impersonality, masculinity and rationality (Jencks, 2002, p. 43) – carrying the symbol of a kiwi and the words Kiwi Bank (one of the party’s key policy offerings) and alongside the statement “our bank opening soon” (Image 3.4.7).

Consistent with the corporate image the party was trying to communicate, Alliance billboards were typeset in a serif typeface, the sort of typeface usually reserved for the communication of more traditional values (Spiekerman & Ginger, 1993). To signify that the party was still a little bit rebellious, the body type was set in lower case letters, capital letters were not used, the rules of “good” typography, which are that sentences should be opened with capital letters, flouted. This made an interesting contrast with Labour – which only used capital letters for its key messages.

Image 3.4.7: Alliance billboard promoting its Kiwi Bank policy, 1999.

This strong promotion of Anderton as the heart of the new government is somewhat paradoxical in the context of a party that was comprised of four smaller constituent parties that all wanted to maintain some kind of unique identity and leadership within the Alliance. Given this, and the Alliance’s social democrat political leanings, it might have been expected that it would be the Alliance, of all the parties contesting the 1999 election, that promoted the team orientation of the party and its connection with a wide constituency. Certainly the Alliance’s 1999 TV advertising featured the faces of candidates representing the other parties, except the Greens who had left by 1999, and some featured in their own television commercials. However, Anderton’s image was interspersed with images of other candidates, demonstrating his position of overall dominance within the team (Image 3.4.8).

Image 3.4.8: Stills from Alliance 1999 opening night address.

Competitor Orientation

The Alliance’s earlier decision to coalesce with Labour had the effect of shifting the party’s competitive position from the challenger it had been in 1993 and 1996 to behaving as a follower party in 1999. In theory, follower parties agree not to challenge the market leader, on the understanding that they may be rewarded through the political system by cabinet appointments or other rewards of office. Although Labour was technically still a challenger party in 1999, it was also the market leader in other respects. A non-aggression pact the Alliance had entered into with Labour earlier in the year curtailed any opportunities for the Alliance to attack Labour in its advertising messages. Instead Alliance messages were now openly supportive of the coalition. In addition to the messages justifying the party’s presence in the coalition on the grounds that it would bring some heart and a competent leader into the arrangement, it was the Alliance that advertised the tactical voting needed to achieve a workable coalition, as in the sign below asking people to give the Alliance their party vote and Labour the electorate vote.

In addition, the Alliance produced a half page newspaper advertisement the day before the election (Image 3.4.10) with an image of Anderton and Helen Clark smiling and holding raised hands in solidarity at the August 1998 Alliance party conference. The body language signified rapprochement between the two leaders and their ability to work together, a message reinforced by the banner “We can do it” in white sans serif type on green, to distinguish itself from the red background of a Labour message and to communicate that the parties could now work together. The slogan carried a secondary meaning – that the Alliance in 1996 was now mature enough to be considered a responsible coalition partner; the same message that was communicated in the mature dress and pose of Anderton in his campaign image.

Image 3.4.10: Alliance newspaper advertisement, published the day before the 1999 election.

Contradicting the Alliance’s messages of cooperation, however, were the Labour Party’s full-page newspaper advertisements and billboard stickers during the last week of the campaign informing voters that “A Party Vote for any other party is not a vote for Labour” [emphasis in the original] (Image 3.2.15). Labour’s lack of interest in advertising the idea or benefits of a coalition arrangement was a source of frustration for the Alliance according to McCarten (2000). From a political marketing perspective it is understandable, however. Market leaders and challengers need their strategic eye to be firmly directed at their competition. Looking after the support crew should not be a strategic focus. It made more strategic sense for a follower like the Alliance to be marketing the idea of a coalition with the party it stood to be rewarded by. However, the impression left was that the Alliance needed Labour more than Labour needed

the Alliance. This was a major turnaround from the days when key members of the party including Jim Anderton had eschewed the desire to be part of a government at any cost and left the Labour Party to form NewLabour, with the ambition of replacing Labour as the left-wing alternative to National (Jesson, 1997).

The Alliance did not fight back against the National Party’s strong attacks against the Alliance in its billboard, newspaper and last week television advertising. The Alliance had decided not to direct attacks at any other party, on the grounds that the party wanted to present a positive rather than negative image (McCarten, 2000). As for the Alliance’s relationship with the other competition on the left, the Green Party, the Alliance had not anticipated a need to develop a strategy before the election. According to McCarten the Alliance “took a position of neutrality towards the Greens. Our key local people in the Coromandel were hostile towards the Greens,