Método descriptivo Para tener en cuenta en la ejecución de este trabajo se utilizó el método descriptivo (Colás, 1998) tiene como principar objetivo describir

This section outlines both realist accounts and liberal critiques of Australian- Indonesian relations, and then suggests how insights offered by both can be more satisfactorily accounted for by a theory of Australian imperialism. Australian attitudes towards both East Timor and Indonesia are considered simultaneously, as policy towards Timor has been dominated by wider geo-strategic considerations over the Indonesian archipelago as a whole.

Indonesia, the crucible of Australian realism

Formulating Australia’s policy towards Indonesia has taxed realism’s ‘problem solving’ abilities to the full. In Renouf’s words, ‘The crucible of Australian foreign policy is Indonesia.’212 Despite Woolcott’s appeal that policy towards Indonesia should simply be ‘pragmatic’, exactly what that entails has frequently been controversial. Moreover, hindsight has at times revealed eminently ‘pragmatic’ policies, in particular supporting the invasion of East Timor, as deeply flawed, even from a realist viewpoint.213

Several elements have kept Indonesia at the forefront of foreign policy debate in Australia since World War Two. The Indonesian archipelago has an inherent immediacy and weight in Australia’s strategic outlook, due to the seemingly

inescapable logic of geography.214 In addition, Australia has not been able to rely on

212

Renouf, The frightened country, p. 349.

213

For example, see Ball and McDonald, Death in Balibo, pp. 159-160; Cotton, East Timor, Australia and Regional Order, pp. 39-40; Cotton, ‘Lessons in East Timor policy-making,’ p. 127; Paul Monk, ‘East Timor: Truth and consequences,’ Quadrant 44, no. 1-2 (2000), pp. 35-37; Monk, ‘Secret intelligence and escape clauses,’ pp. 196-206. For a critical but more generous view, see Mackie, ‘Australia and Indonesia,’ pp. 138-142.

214

The importance of geographic imperatives over cultural or historic loyalties has been a recurring theme. See ‘Document 116, Notes by Burton, 20 January 1949,’ in Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49: Volume XV: Indonesia 1949, ed. David Lee, Canberra, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1998; Desmond Ball, ‘Preface,’ in Strange neighbours: The Australia-Indonesia

relationship, North Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1991, pp. xv-xvi; Catley and Dugis, Australian

Indonesian relations, p. 1; Evans and Grant, Australia’s foreign relations in the world of the 1990s, p. 1.

the United States to supply a lead in relations with Indonesia.215 But most

importantly, even before its independence was won, Indonesia has appeared as both a potential ally and potential threat to Australia. These geo-strategic elements have dominated realist thinking on Indonesia, with economics a far lesser consideration.216 The repeatedly expressed hopes that the two countries might become major trading partners have never been fully realised, largely due to fact that both have

traditionally relied heavily on exports of primary commodities.217 This situation may gradually be changing, in line with the general increase in Australia’s economic engagement with Southeast Asia. As Catley and Dugis argue, from the mid 1980s trade between the countries increased significantly, both in value and diversity, and in the 1990s Australia became one of Indonesia’s top 10 sources of investment.218 Nonetheless, to date Indonesia still rates as a relatively unimportant economic partner for Australia. Table 1.1 shows Indonesia’s limited importance as a

destination for Australian exports compared to other major trading partners. In 2004- 05, Indonesia accounted for 2.6% of Australian exports, putting it outside Australia’s top 10 export destinations. Nor, from the Australian perspective, had Indonesia become a vital destination for capital, still accounting for less than half of one percent of total Australian foreign investments by 2004.219

In contrast to the relative weakness of economic ties, Canberra has built a substantial and ongoing defence relationship with Jakarta from the late 1960s. Australia has trained Indonesian officers, sold military equipment to Indonesia, and provided financial aid. The two countries have also conducted joint exercises and shared intelligence.220 During the 1999 East Timor deployment, the odd situation arose that Australia was confronting a military it had helped equip and train.221 But it is

215

Leaver, ‘Introduction: Australia, East Timor and Indonesia,’ p. 3; Renouf, The frightened country, p. 399.

216

See Andrew MacIntyre, ‘Australia-Indonesia relations,’ in Strange neighbours: The Australia- Indonesia relationship, North Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1991, pp. 146-148; Mackie, ‘Australia’s relations with Indonesia: Principles and polices, I,’ p. 5.

217

Arndt and Wie, ‘Great differences, surprising similarities,’ pp. 9-11.

218

Catley and Dugis, Australian Indonesian relations, pp. 239-261.

219

Calculated from 5352.0 - International investment position, Australia: Supplementary statistics, 2007, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 30.07.2008 (accessed 06.02.2009,

http://abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/[email protected]/DetailsPage/5352.02007?OpenDocument).

220

Catley and Dugis, Australian Indonesian relations, pp. 15-154, 280-289.

221

Although commanding officer General Cosgrove argued that it was in fact an advantage that Indonesian troops understood Australia’s superior capabilities. See David Dickens, ‘The United Nations in East Timor: Intervention at the military operational level,’ Contemporary Southeast Asia

precisely because Indonesia is a potential threat that Australia engages in the defence relationship.

This is part of a deep-set ambiguity in Australian strategic thinking about its neighbour. As an ally, Indonesia could provide a defensive bulwark against the advance of hostile forces from the north. But a hostile or chaotic Indonesia could pose a threat to Australia’s territorial security or, more likely, wreck havoc with Australia’s vital lines of communication and trade.222 Worse, if Indonesia allied with another major power, such as China, it could provide the base for an outright

invasion of Australia. Though based on a worst case scenario, this concern is not just a question of paranoia or racism. Renouf, former secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, insisted that Australia must cease being the ‘frightened country’ regarding Asia. But he still emphasised that ‘If there is to be a threat to security in the foreseeable future, it could only come from Indonesia.’223

Renouf has not been alone. Indonesia’s potential penetration by hostile powers has been a consistent concern for Australian policy makers. The fear that Russia might gain influence if Indonesia’s transition to independence was not handled correctly has already been cited, as have concerns about third party interference in an independent East Timor. More recently, some of the reasoning behind the 1995 security agreement with Indonesia was indicated when Keating stated shortly after its signing that Australia wanted to avoid being drawn into ‘the Chinese orbit’.224

Assertions that Indonesia had definitively become an ally, such as in the 1994 Defence White Paper or the security agreement itself, were attempts to cement a solution to the problem, rather than proof that it no longer existed. They did nothing to stop fears of conflict with Indonesia reemerging in 1999. Leading security analyst Paul Dibb warned in 2001 that in the context of great power competition Indonesia’s stability was vital to regional security, and that ‘it is advantageous to Australia that a

222

The idea of an actual Indonesian invasion of Australia retains popular appeal. It has, however, been dismissed by defence planners since the fall of Sukarno at the latest, because Indonesia lacks both the motivation and capability to launch such an undertaking. See Lowry, ‘Australia-Indonesia security cooperation: For better or worse?’ p. 7; MacIntyre, ‘Australia-Indonesia relations,’ pp. 146-17.

223

Renouf, The frightened country, p. 399.

224

Cited in Ann Kent, ‘Australia and China, 1991-95: Asymmetry and congruence in the post-Cold War era,’ in Seeking Asian engagement: Australia in world affairs, 1991-95, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 186. On concerns about China’s expanding power at this time, see also Paul Dibb, ‘Australia’s defence policies in the post-Cold War era,’ in

Seeking Asian engagement: Australia in world affairs, 1991-95, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 67-68; Lowry, ‘Australia-Indonesia security cooperation: For better or worse?’ pp. 12-13.

stable, democratic and unified Indonesia stands astride Australia’s vulnerable northern approaches.’225

Since Indonesia’s independence, its strategic importance has led Australia to emphasise both the need for domestic ‘stability’ within Indonesia, as well as the maintenance of the ‘relationship’ between the two countries. The two elements are related, in that domestic instability has been seen as making bilateral relations more difficult, not the least because of the perceived hostility to Australia of Left-wing political forces within Indonesia. Hence Australian support for the moderate wing of the independence movement, or for the anti-Communist Suharto, arose not simply from a need for stability as such, but also the desire for Indonesian regimes which were intrinsically more palatable to Australia.

The concept of the ‘relationship’ has born a particularly heavy burden in realist thought on Indonesia.226 It serves to obscure the element of strategic fear which largely motivates Australia’s efforts at friendship, as opposed to positive aspects such as goodwill or shared interests. At the same time ‘building the relationship’ is itself the strategy for overcoming Australia’s strategic dilemma. The contradictory basis for the relationship has not gone unnoted by writers in the realist vein. It was clearly exposed by Indonesia’s incorporation of West Papua, when Australia totally failed in its quest to maintain friendly relations while simultaneously restraining Indonesia’s military ambitions, as analysed by both Renouf and Catley and Dugis.227 As Viviani discusses, the same elements of fear and friendship were at work in Whitlam’s policy on East Timor, albeit with nearly the opposite policy response.228 A 1974 article by Mackie expresses the general dilemma well. He criticises the dominance of security concerns in relations with Indonesia, based on

the crude realpolitik argument (rarely made explicit, but perhaps it ought to be) that Australia cannot afford the luxury of antagonising Indonesia, or her government. If it ever comes to a showdown, Indonesia’s hostility could be

225

Paul Dibb, ‘Indonesia: The key to South-East Asia’s security,’ International Affairs 77, no. 4 (2001), pp. 832-841. See also Paul Dibb, ‘Alliances, alignments and the global order: The outlook for the Asia Pacific region in the next quarter-century,’ Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Working Paper no. 317, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, 1997

226

For differing analyses of why this is the case, see Leaver, ‘Introduction: Australia, East Timor and Indonesia,’ pp. 2-3; MacIntyre, ‘Australia-Indonesia relations,’ pp. 148-150.

227

Catley and Dugis, Australian Indonesian relations, p. 27; Renouf, The frightened country, pp. 405- 425.

228

seriously disadvantageous to Australia… so her goodwill should be maintained even at a considerable cost.229

But Mackie goes on to clearly enunciate the reasons why Indonesia has been central to Australian strategic thought since World War Two.230 These factors have

constantly haunted the policy discourse in Australia, threatening even the most pragmatic accommodation reached with Jakarta.