MÉTODO DE DISCO DIFUSIÓN (KIRBY – BAUER)

In order to escape the fate of death, to live truly, our relationships must be reconstituted so that we become newpersons.28 _{Zizioulas understands baptism as this}

reconstitution, simultaneously the death of our old, idolatrous way of being and the birth of our new, Christ-ian way of being. In his words, “Baptism is essentially nothing other than the application to humanity of the very filial relationship which exists

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28. NB: new—“For thecreatedto escape this destiny, it needs a new birth, that is, a new way of being, a new hypostasis” (C&O, 263), cf. note 15 above. See below for Zizioulas’s understanding ofschesis(relation) andhypostasis(person).

between the Father and the Son” (C&O, 241).29 _{As Zizioulas understands persons in}

terms of relations, his statement, “Baptism gives ‘sonship’” (C&O, 109), leads to the radical conclusion that through baptism, “every baptized person becomes ‘Christ’” (BaC, 58, n. 54).30_{Through the newschesisreceived in baptism the baptized’s “identity is}

now rooted not in the relations provided by nature, but in the uncreated Father-Son relationship” (C&O, 109).31_{This, however, does not mean that baptized persons cease}

to be biological, but that they cease to be biologicallydetermined.32_{Again, Zizioulas does}

not conflate creation and fall, and he does not propound an immaterial or anti- biological soteriology—quite the opposite:

[In order] for the unsuccessful hypostasis to succeed, it is necessary that eros and the body, as expression [sic] of ecstasy and of the hypostasis of the person, should cease to be the bearers of death. Two things therefore appear to be indispensable: (a) that the two basic components of the biological hypostasis, eros and the body, should notbe destroyed...; and (b) that the constitutional make- up of the hypostasis should be changed—not that a moral change or improvement should be found but a kind of new birth for man (BaC, 52–53).

As the death involved in baptism means the cessation of thewayin which these natural

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29. Zizioulas refers the reader to the biblical narratives of Christ’s baptism and the early baptismal rites, citing Galatians 3:27; Tertullian, De Bapt. 7-8; Theophilus of Antioch,Ad Autol. 1.12; and Cyril of Jerusalem,Catech. 21.1.

30. Cf. Brown, who argues that Zizioulas, unlike Ratzinger, does not reducethe person to the relation, or schesis (65). Our ecclesial hypostasis is Christ’s (cf. the discussion of Christ’s catholicpersonhood below). Thus, “the Church becomes Christ Himself in human existence, but also every member of the Church becomes Christ and Church.... It is characteristic that according to the Fathers every baptized person becomes ‘Christ’” (BaC, 58 and n. 54, citing on 113, n. 115, Cyril of Jerusalem,Catech., 21.1; Tertullian, De Bapt., 7-8; andConst. Apost., 3.16—though all three treat post- baptismal chrismation and only the first explicitly names Christians “christs”). Elizabeth Groppe is on the right track, “In baptism, the human person is incorporated into the very hypostasis of Christ,” but shies away from acknowledging the full ontological implications with “the baptized share in a very profound sense in Christ’s personhood” (“CreationEx NihiloandEx Amore,” 479*).

31. Baptism “‘hypostasizes’ the person according to God’s way of being” (BaC, 19). As Brown notes, 1) “Zizioulas’ argument consists precisely in showing that

the λο'γος (meaning) of personhood is found in Jesus Christ and nowhere else,” and 2)

“this baptismal incorporation into Christ” whereby “one is hypostasized into [Jesus Christ’s] catholic mode of being constitutes the meaning and fulfillment of history” (71 and 64).

32. Even so well-disposed a reader as Skira interprets Zizioulas to mean that in baptism “the person ceases to bea biological being” (“The Ecological Bishop,” 209*); cf. Russell (180 and 184). Farrow strikes closer to the mark with, “the complete overcoming of nature” (92, n. 16), as Zizioulas actually tends to speak of “transcending” nature, which implies that the biological hypostasis will be caught up into this new ecclesial way of being, not abandoned (how else could humans eatthe bread of life and fulfill their vocations aspriests of creation?).

relationships constitute us as persons and not the abolition of the relationships themselves, there exists real continuity between the unbaptized, biological hypostasis and the baptized, ecclesial hypostasis.

In fact, Zizioulas uses the same word, hypostasis, to describe both the biological and ecclesial ways of being. This indicates, contra Volf (82–84), that Zizioulas understands non-ecclesial persons to be just that, persons.33 _{Zizioulas does not think}

that individuals become persons through baptism, but that through baptism dying persons receive a new schesis that will last into the age to come.34 _{Baptism does not}

create persons ex nihilo, but saves them from death and gives them life by re- constituting them.35_{Baptism is not simply a physical washing with water or a symbol of}

inner or spiritual purification, but the person’s death and burial—a negative judgment against his or her former idolatrous identity (“Symbolism Realism”).36 _{Yet, it is also}

resurrection to a new life of free participation in the Son’s communion with the Father in the Spirit. As this reconciliation with God, the uncreated Other, “is a necessary pre- condition for reconciliation with any ‘other’,” baptism also frees the baptized for communion with created others, because the baptized person is no longer determined, limited or threatened by biological, historical and sociological relationships (LCD, 3 and 33–34). For Zizioulas, then, this is the meaning of theosis: humanapo-stasisand dia-stasis

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33. That Volf fundamentally misunderstands Zizioulas’s ontology is indicated by his insistent labelling of Zizioulas’s ontology as an “ontology of person,” (note the singular) rather than an “ontology of communion” (i.e., persons in [right] relation). Douglas Knight also argues that Zizioulas understands the unbaptized as “individuals, without relation to anyone else” (“Introduction,” 8), but this neglects Zizioulas’s understanding of sin as the self-referential distortion of relationships (i.e., idolatry), which is radically different than the absence of all relationships.

34. Granted, however, that 1) “[a] ‘dying being’ is the greatest absurdity that can exist for ontology” (C&O, 228 n. 31); and 2) personhood is always a gift, even the idolatrous personhood of sinful humanity—cf. n. 103 below and Papnikolaou: “Humans... are not inherently persons, as if they can claim such a dignity for themselves or as a part of their essence” (“Is John Zizioulas an Existentialist in Disguise?” n. 10, 606–07).

35. The continuity, however, is eschatological and apparent only in retrospect, not prospect. For Zizioulas’s understanding of this eschatological retrospect in regard to salvation history and worship, see “Reflections Baptism,” 646; and “Symbolism and Realism in Orthodox Worship,” 8.

36. Baptism is death, burial and resurrection (symbolic of Christ’s), and is much more than a natural symbol of purification—though this death and new birth does involve purification.

(separateness and individuality) become ek-stasis (communion, relatedness) and hypo- stasis(particularity, uniqueness), and thereby our fear ofdia-phora(difference, otherness) becomes ana-phora (reference or movement towards outside creation), that is, we become “particular living beings.”37 _{As this eschatological life comes from the future}

(eschaton) and not from our beginning (arche), we mustturnto receive it. In fact, even with this conversion, this life will never bede natura, that is, the possession of creation. It must, therefore, be received in faith.