Método getEnviosAgrupados2()

In the wake of the horrible events that unfolded on the Virginia Tech campus on the morning of April 16, we are left with more questions than answers. The motivating factors which encouraged a disturbed student to indiscriminately kill 32 and injure 17 of his classmates and faculty members died with Cho. Although the VTPD and BPD responded quickly to Norris Hall, 11 minutes still remained from Cho’s first shot to his last. Unfortunately, these 11 minutes and the carnage that ensued during this timeframe validate our second hypothesis by demonstrating that Law Enforcement response to the Active Shooter is insufficient to reduce the Rate of Kill. Law Enforcement capability to reduce the Rate of Kill in Active Shooter scenarios will always be limited by the separation of time and space between the threat and First Responders at the outset of the incident. Cho’s attack on the Virginia Tech campus illustrates this claim.

With certainty, the increased presence of police at WAJ Hall, in response to the previous double homicide, contributed to a more timely response to the Norris Hall mass shooting. However, what is not certain is how the police response would have been affected if large numbers of officers were not already on campus. Given the initial

response time of 27 minutes to WAJ Hall, it is reasonable to assume that a significantly longer response time would have been experienced had the Norris Hall massacre been Cho’s initial attack. Additionally, the events of April 16 occurred so rapidly that the VTPD was unable to establish an EOC. As a result, the confusing scenario was further complicated with difficulties of communication. While establishment of an EOC would have improved communications, it remains unknown if the resulting improved communications could have reduced the Rate of Kill by communicating accurate information to hospitals and local treatment facilities. Additionally, although Virginia Tech had alerting procedures and resources in place, the fact remains that 2 hours and 11 minutes passed from when the WAJ Hall double homicide occurred to when the Virginia Tech administration issued its first message informing the students, staff, and faculty of the events. Had this first warning been published prior to the beginning of 0905 classes and contained clearer guidance for either closing the campus or operating under heightened alert; perhaps Cho could have been interdicted prior to the shooting or less students would have been present in Norris Hall at the time of the shooting. Indeed, the answers to all of these questions will remain speculative in nature. However, what is known as a result of the Virginia Tech mass shooting is that although the control measures and alerting procedures Virginia Tech had in place prior to the shooting sounded very impressive; in reality, none of them did anything to mitigate Cho’s attack. Instead, vigilance toward a solution capable of reducing the Rate of Kill of actions, such as the ones that occurred on April 16 is required.

As stated earlier, DHS reports that the average Active Shooter incident duration is 12.5 minutes, while the average First Responder response time is 18 minutes. Cho’s rampage in Norris Hall lasted 11 minutes; in that time he managed to fire 174 rounds, kill 30 and injure 17 people before finally killing himself. This means that on average 16 shots were fired, three people were killed and two people were injured every minute. Although the average duration of an Active Shooter incident is 12.5 minutes, a sub-12.5 minute response standard to this type of emergency cannot be the vanguard of any reasonable response. Every minute counts. In the two minutes that it took for Colin

six people died, and four people were injured. In the five minutes it took for first responders to arrive to Norris Hall, 80 shots were fired, 15 people were killed and 10 people were injured. Every minute truly counts.

Of course, the most preferred method of mitigating attacks, such as this is to prevent them from happening at all. However, Cho’s extensive and troubling mental health history prior to his attack validates our first hypothesis demonstrating that prevention and preemption of the Active Shooter alone is insufficient to reduce the rate

of kill. The Virginia Tech mass shooting incident was conducted by a disturbed young

man who, by all rights, did not receive adequate mental health care despite the efforts of his family and the Virginia Tech faculty members who made a concerted effort to ensure that he was cared for. Unfortunately, a mental health focused prevention and preemption strategy capable of effectively mitigating the Active Shooter threat is impractical for an already overburdened and underfunded aspect of student health. Instead, these aspects of mental health seem to be more applicable in a post-traumatic incident role. The events of April 16 forever changed the Cho family along with the families of the 32 victims killed that day. Deep emotional scares are felt not only by the additional 17 victims who were injured by Cho, but by the Virginia Tech community and the local Blacksburg community as well. Life will truly never be the same for the Virginia Tech and Blacksburg community. While this case study admittedly includes questions without answers, it is done with great solidarity and respect to the victims. Our hope is that through the process of examining the horrific events, such as the one that occurred on the Virginia Tech campus on April 16, 2007, we will be able to offer suggestions for how to effectively mitigate these events in the future.