Método Matricial de la Rigidez en 3 Dimensiones

This dissertation deals with three main research questions. First, to what extent are party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa institutionalized? Second, why do the levels of PSI vary across countries and time? Third, what mechanisms underlie the different patterns of PSI? These questions are sequentially analyzed given that it is only by defining and measuring PSI that it becomes possible to investigate the sources and the mechanisms of its variance.

The first question – to what extent are party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa institutionalized? – encloses the problem of defining and measuring institutionalization. It may not be an original question, in the sense that it has been dealt with in the past (Welfling 1973) and more recently by Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and Lindberg (2007); however it remains crucial in two aspects. On the one hand, there is a need to revise the existing measures in light of important theoretical contributions that call attention to a conflict between levels, elements and dimensions of institutionalization; on the other hand as more

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and more elections take place it becomes necessary to update the level of institutionalization of African party systems. As previously demonstrated, scholarly work has produced several definitions, dimensions and indicators of institutionalization since Huntington’s (1965, 1968) seminal studies (see summary in Table 1.3). Over the years, his theoretical definition remained largely accepted – even if partly reviewed (e.g. Mainwaring 1999; Randall and Svåsand 2002b) – while his four-fold typology has been more contested. Indeed, controversies persist on whether to treat institutionalization (i) as a one-dimensional or multidimensional concept, (ii) as a structural or attitudinal phenomenon, or both, and (iii) applicable to study of individuals or systems. We begin by clarifying our positions over each of these dilemmas with the choice of the theoretical definition.

In this study, institutionalization is defined as «the process by which a practice or organization becomes well established and widely known, if not universally accepted» (Mainwaring 1999, 25). This Huntington-based definition encompasses both a structural (stability) and an attitudinal (legitimacy) element, which have been treated variously within this research field. While much attention has been devoted to the study of structural institutionalization, either alone or in combination with the attitudinal element, the latter has never been autonomously assessed. Furthermore, the way it has been measured is rather dubious. Even though several indicators9 have been suggested to quantify it, they fail to actually express how far party systems create a distinct culture or value-system (Randall and Svåsand 2002a, 13) that provides for cohesion and long term stabilization and durability10. The structural element has been measured more consistently across models (see Table 1.3); however its assessment may also prove problematic when combined or equated with attitudinal institutionalization (Huntington 1965; Huntington 1968; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). In fact, before Ben-Dor (1975), Levitsky (1998) and Randall and Svåsand (2002b) have sustained that both elements deserve a distinct empirical approach as they relate to distinct organizational phenomena.

Building upon these contributions we have assembled a set of indicators that measure the structural institutionalization of party systems, only. Lacking comprehensive data prevents us from accurately measuring the attitudinal element, which is, thus, not analyzed in this

9 _{As depicted in Table 1.3, according to Mainwaring (and Scully 1995, and alone 1998, 1999) legitimacy of} parties and elections can be measured by surveys questions such as: sympathy index [scale ranging from 1 (less sympathy) to 10 (greatest)] towards parties, whether respondents approved of dissolution of parties and parliaments, etc. The Afrobarometer includes some of these questions; however the data is not available for all countries/years covered in this study. The first round of surveys started in 1999 and included 12 countries. 10 _{Basedau’s (2007) option for turnout is problematic as this is an indicator of political mobilization (Huntington} 1965, 1968). Kuenzi and Lambright’s (2001) indicators, on the other hand, are more an expression of the attitudes towards democracy (Wolinetz 2006; Casal Bértoa 2010) (see full list of indicators in Table 1.3).

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study, although its relevance is acknowledged. Additionally, based on Huntington’s understanding of institutionalization as a multidimensional concept we propose a three-fold framework for the analysis of PSI, which combines indicators put forward by Welfling (1973), Mainwaring and Scully (1995)11, Mair (1996) and finally Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and Lindberg (2007) who have specifically measured institutionalization in party systems of Sub-Saharan Africa. The first dimension is stable patterns of interparty competition and is measured by (1) electoral volatility, (2) legislative seats volatility, (3) total percentage of votes won by new parties, (4) alternation in government and (5) share of seats for the most voted party. The second dimension is stable roots in society, and is measured by the (6) share of seats for parties founded by 1960, 1970 and 1980 and by (7) share of seats for independent candidates. The third dimension is organizational continuity and is measured by the (8) legislative and (9) electoral strength of (10) merging and (11) splitting political parties. This third dimension has never been measured in the way here proposed, despite suggested in the earlier models of Janda (1970) and Welfling (1973). As we shall see in more detail in Chapter III, the inclusion of indicator (4) and the way indicator (6) is computed is also innovative vis-à-vis preceding measures of PSI.

To calculate these eleven indicators we use the results of systematic and competitive lower house elections, held in Sub-Saharan Africa until 201112. Given that the units of observation are national elections, the measure here proposed is applicable to the study of national party systems. The specification of the unit (party systems) and the level (national) of analysis is critical in the study of institutionalization (Ben-Dor 1975; Randall and Svåsand 2002b) since there is a temptation to fall into the ecological/individual fallacy (Landman 2005, 50-52). In the present research we would incur in this fallacy if from the level of institutionalization of national party systems, the level of institutionalization of individual political parties and of subnational party systems was also inferred. In addition to the unit and the level of analysis, it is important to take into consideration that political parties operate across different arenas – electoral, legislative, governmental, and societal – within a polity, and thus that the degree of PSI might vary across these different arenas. Furthermore, institutionalization is said to vary not only in level but in quality (Huntington 1965; Huntington 1968; Ben-Dor 1975), depending on how its interaction with other processes

11 _{This seminal work has been taken further mainly by Mainwaring, either alone (1998 and 1999) either in co-} authorship (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007).

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We stopped in 2011 to allow fieldwork activities in the countries/case studies selected to start in 2012 and 2013.

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occurs. All these aspects will be developed at greater length in Chapter III. Hence, for now, we summarize the basis of our framework for analysis in four premises:

- (i) institutionalization is a multidimensional concept (e.g. Huntington 1965; Huntington 1968; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 1998; Mainwaring 1999); clustering both attitudinal and structural behaviors that should be separately assessed (Levitsky 1998; Randall and Svåsand 2002b);

- (ii) the institutionalization of parties is different from that of party systems (e.g. Welfling 1973; Randall and Svåsand 2002b; Casal Bértoa 2010);

- (iii) the institutionalization of party systems varies across the different territorial levels (national and subnational) and the different arenas of competition (electoral, legislative, governmental) within a polity (Bardi and Mair 2008);

- (iv) institutionalization varies in level and in quality; therefore it is possible to identify patterns of adequate, inadequate and overinstitutionalization (Huntington 1965; Huntington 1968; Ben-Dor 1975).

Reconciling these principles, our framework for analysis can be characterized as a multidimensional structural measure of institutionalization which applies to national party systems observed across the electoral, the parliamentary, the governmental and the interparty/organizational arenas.

The second stage of our study researches the causes of PSI variance. As stated earlier this question remains quite unexplored after more than forty decades of research, particularly in the case of African countries. So far, the literature about party system development has provided several evidences of the distinctive nature of party systems emerging after 1974. These have been commonly portrayed as having higher levels of volatility and fragile links with civil society, whereas political parties suffer from low organizational capacity and are highly dependent on state resources (e.g. Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 1998; Mainwarin 1999; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Lindberg 2007; Salih and Nordlund 2007). While these labels have been consistently reinforced, little is known about what is going on behind them. Even though the sources of party system stability (usually measured by electoral or legislative volatility) have been analyzed in numerous studies13, the question of what explains weaker levels of institutionalization, or more broadly put «what explains the

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variation in the level of institutionalization across countries and time?» has attracted much less interest. This dissertation offers a contribution to abridge this gap as it focus on PSI as a dependent variable and examines how far differences in the timing of political events, level of competition as well as in the structural, institutional and economic settings explain the panorama of African party systems.

In the final stage of this study the attention is placed on the mechanisms of PSI. But what do we mean by mechanisms and how do we move from mechanisms to processes? Tilly (2001, 25-26) provides very clear-cut answers to these questions. He defines mechanisms as «a delimited class of events that change relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations», and processes as «occurring combinations or sequences of mechanisms». Concomitantly, he identifies three sorts of mechanisms: environmental, cognitive, and relational. Quoting at length:

Environmental mechanisms are externally generated influences on conditions affecting social life; words such as disappear, enrich, expand, and disintegrate – applied not to actors but their settings – suggest the sorts of cause-effect relations in question. Cognitive mechanisms operate through alterations of individual and collective perception, and are characteristically described through words such as recognize, understand, reinterpret, and classify. Relational mechanisms alter connections among people, groups, and interpersonal networks; words such as ally, attack, subordinate, and appease give a sense of relational mechanisms Tilly (2001, 24).

Building on Tilly’s conceptual framework, the relevance of this question is three-fold. Firstly, to add a micro perspective to the study of institutionalization by discussing the patterns observed at the macro level in case studies. Secondly, to understand what are the environmental and relational mechanisms that underlie the process of institutionalization; thus we leave aside the cognitive element as we do not have enough information to assess it14. Moreover, as Barley and Tolbert (1997) have argued, we also believe that this is the most effective way to analyze the scripts and the lines of action of political organizations; therefore we consciously emphasize «the behavioral and the structural rather than the cognitive and the cultural. Although we believe such an approach has value because it enables systematic empiricism, it does so at the cost of relegating interpretations to the background.

14 _{Cognition has been described as «the capacity of human beings to acquire and store knowledge, communicate} it and use it for behavioral purposes» (Martens 2004). This condition is very difficult to assess, especially in a study like this, where the type of quantitative and qualitative (semi-structured interviews, party documents etc.) data collected focuses more on the institutional and the structural conditions of PSI than on how the individuals’ search for knowledge is mobilized into – or promotes – greater PSI.

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Consequently, our approach is far less sensitive to the role that cognitions and interpretive frames play in institutionalization (Barley and Tolbert 1997, 18). Thirdly, to explore the mechanisms of concurrent explanations of PSI, which are either omitted, or poorly assessed, at the quantitative strand. We are particularly thinking of the strategies developed by political parties to promote changes in existing distributions of power and on the effect of informal political practices – clientelism and patronage – on institutional change. Furthermore, the focus on the mechanisms of PSI is relevant because it brings together the two faces of institutional change: on the one side the model or schema of resources and interactions that defines the possible paths for the political action of self-reflective actors and on the other side the interpretive processes that make a certain pattern self-sustaining or not (Clemens and Cook 1999).