Métodos de análisis de datos

Even with the Permanent Force elements already deployed, it was apparent that the police could not save the situation. The Union Government was thus obliged to mobilise the UDF to suppress the disturbance. The UDF was ready to deploy at a moment’s notice, because Smuts had anticipated the probability of deployment. The UDF had gone ahead organising men and equipment for possible deployment on the Rand throughout the downsizing and rationalisation of the Defence Force after the First World War. When the situation on the Rand got out of hand the Union Defence Force’s mobilisation plan was implemented.90

On 10 March 1922, the Government proclaimed Martial Law on the Rand and surrounding areas, including Benoni, Bethal, Boksburg, Ermelo, Germiston, Heidelberg, Johannesburg, Klerksdorp, Krugersdorp, Middelburg, Potchefstroom, Pretoria, Roodepoort-Maraisburg, Springs and Standerton. The Government also issued two more proclamations, whereby the ACF and the CFR, which had not yet been called up, could be mobilised. The ACF units involved were the 10th Infantry (Witwatersrand Rifles), the 11th Infantry (Rand Light Infantry), the 3rd Mounted Brigade Train, 3rd Infantry Brigade Train and the 1st Sanitation Section (SA Medical Corps). The CFR units that were called up numbered 26 commandos from the areas where Martial Law was proclaimed. These commando units were immediately called up per telegram and the first commando moved out to its assembly point within 34 hours of the call. Approximately 55 hours from receiving their call-up instructions commandos started arriving at their assembly points.91 With the proclamation of Martial Law in the above-mentioned areas, the Deputy Commissioner of Police on the Witwatersrand, Lt Col R.S. Godley, handed over the responsibility of maintaining law and order and protecting life and property to the Union Defence Force. Aeroplanes accompanied the ACF and CFR units that were called up and who marched from their various assembly points to suppress the disturbances.92

The military authorities had worked out a system to co-ordinate co-operation between air and ground forces by the end of January 1922. The Air Force had a two-part role. Aeroplanes were firstly used for reconnaissance and secondly to disperse illegal gatherings. Pilots received clear

89 Anon.: The Red Revolution on the Rand, Nonqai, vol. 13, no. 5, 1922, pp.259-61, 268-9; A.G.

Oberholster: Die Mynwerkerstaking 1922, pp.159-60.

90 Union of South Africa: Abridged Annual Report of the Department of Defence for the year end

30th June, 1921, pp.9-17; Union of South Africa: Union of South Africa Government Gazette Extraordinary, vol. XLVII, no. 1216, 10 March 1922, Proclamation no. 50 of 1922; SANDFA, DC 498, 6/2/52454, Secretary for Defence - Minister of Defence, 28 January 1922.

91 Union of South Africa: Union of South Africa Government Gazette Extraordinary, vol. XLVII, no.

1216, 10 March 1922, proclamation no 51-2 of 1922.

guidelines on how they had to go about dispersing illegal gatherings. The Government printed the procedure for the utilisation of aeroplanes in the local papers where the unrest occurred, informing the strikers and the local population of what to expect. The papers stated categorically that the aeroplanes would take three steps to disperse an illegal gathering. The pilot’s first step was to fly at a height of 500 feet and shoot red signal flares with a Very flare pistol while circling the crowd. If the crowd did not disperse, the pilot’s second step would be to fly low over them while firing machine-gun bursts into the air. If this was also unsuccessful, the pilot’s third step was to fire into the crowd with the machine-guns.93

A secret document was distributed by the authorities amongst the commanding officers of the Government forces that stipulated more steps, in conjunction with the three steps mentioned above, regarding actions and communication procedures between air and ground forces. This document informed the pilot that if the third step was unsuccessful he had to continue with step four, throwing bombs into the crowd. Every ground commander was issued with strips of white sheet one metre wide and varying in length. The aim was firstly to show a previously determined letter to the pilots as identification of Government forces. The letters H, I, L, T, V, X, and Z were used for this purpose since they could easily be laid out on the ground. The rest of the commander’s white sheet inventory was a circle and an arrow. As is shown in the Figure 2.2, the commander would lay out the circle, with the arrow inside it pointing towards the crowd against which steps one to four were to be taken. The identification letter of the day was laid out next to the circle.94

Figure 2.2: Method of Communication between Aeroplanes and Government Ground Forces.

93 SANDFA, DC 3520, Union of South Africa, Air Operations from March 10th to March 15th; SANDFA,

Industrial Disturbances-Rand 1922; SANDFA, DC 3520, DAS 7/2, Annexure A: Action by Aircraft if Ordered to Assist the Civil Power to Disperse Illegal Assembly to Air Operations from March 10th to March 15th; SANDFA, Accessions 47, Gen. Brink Collection, General G.E. Brink papers, The Rand Revolution 1922, Dispersal of Illegal Assemblies by Air Force; A.G. Oberholster: Die Mynwerkerstaking 1922, p.168.

94 SANDFA, Accessions 47, Gen. Brink Collection, General G.E. Brink papers, The Rand Revolution