Métodos analíticos

It is no less true for being a cliché that our character is, at least partially, defined by what we do when no one is watching. In light of this, the end of moral action should be one that

transcends the natural desire to avoid punishment, as the motivational efficacy of such an end is attenuated in situations in which we believe that our activities will not be discovered. At the same time, an important component of moral character is the capacity to resist the sometimes deleterious influence of group dynamics and pressures. However, if ethical behavior can be shown to contribute to an end upon which soldiers place value, one that transcends external praise or censure, it stands to reason that they will be far more motivated to act in a morally appropriate manner.

It is an advantage of Aristotelian virtue theory that it provides such an end. One of the purposes of Aristotle’s ethical inquiry is to ascertain what constitutes the “highest good,” that good to which all other goods are subordinate. Aristotle acknowledges that there are many competing conceptions concerning what is, in fact, the highest good. Despite the variety of answers apt to given, Aristotle proposes that the highest good can be identified as follows:

Clearly not all ends are final ends; but the chief good is evidently something final. Therefore, if there is only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more than one, the most final of these will be

what we are seeking. Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of something else more final than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing and therefore we call final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else.80

On Aristotle’s analysis, the chief or highest good possesses three primary characteristics. First, it must be desirable in its own right. Second, the desirability of the highest good cannot be predicated on the desirability of some other good and, third, all other goods must be desirable for the sake of the highest good. Aristotle identifies happiness as the only good that satisfies all three of these requirements.

The rationale for placing happiness at the pinnacle of human goods becomes clearer when we look at other things often assumed to represent the highest good and determine what disqualifies them from consideration. For instance, while many people conduct their lives as though the attainment of wealth represents the highest good, no one, not even a miser,

accumulates wealth purely for its own sake, but rather for what she perceives wealth contributes to her happiness. From this perspective, wealth fails to satisfy both Aristotle’s first and second conditions, since wealth is not desired for its own sake and it derives its desirability for the sake of some other thing.81 Furthermore, other things commonly identified as human goods, such as health, honor and friendship are not desirable for the sake of wealth.

Initially, health appears to be a plausible candidate for consideration as the highest good. It is certainly desirable in and of itself, thus satisfying Aristotle’s first condition. Health also seems to meet Aristotle’s second condition, as the desirability of health is not predicated on the

80 _{Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009), I.7 1097a28-37.}

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While misers acquire and hoard money, seemingly for its own sake, they do so under the mistaken the belief that the mere accumulation of wealth will bring them happiness. On Aristotle’s account wealth and material possession contribute to happiness by the fact that they allow one to exercise other virtues such as liberality and magnificence, as well as provide the minimum standards for maintaining health and physical well being.

desirability of some other thing. However, Aristotle argues that to be considered the highest good, something must be good for its own sake and for nothing else. [Emphasis added] While good health is desirable for its own sake, it is also desirable for happiness. For instance, it is difficult to be truly happy if one is chronically ill. However, happiness is not necessarily a component of good health, at least not in the physical sense. Not only is health subordinate to happiness, the desirability of all other goods is not desirable for the sake of health. So, while health is prized for its own sake, it doesn’t meet all of Aristotle’s requirements for consideration as the highest good.

Some cultures promote the concept of honor, either invested in the individual or the group, as the highest good. However, honor derives its worth from the external validation of others, a feature that is contrary to what the highest good should represent for, as Aristotle observes, “The good we divine to be something of one’s own and not easily taken from one.”82 A distinction such as honor, which can be easily bestowed and arbitrarily taken away, is too transitory and cannot represent the highest good.

While this process could be continued for many other human goods, such an exhaustive analysis is beyond the scope of this discussion. However, when commonly acknowledged human goods are measured against Aristotle’s three fundamental conditions, happiness emerges as the only good that consistently satisfies all three requirements.

Initially, it may seem odd for Aristotle to identify happiness as the highest good, particularly since modern conceptions of happiness are often narrowly identified with the satisfaction of material desires, a view of happiness that is not only superficial but also highly sensitive to the vicissitudes of life. From this perspective, happiness appears to be as transitory and unstable an

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end as honor, wealth or good health. However, the concept of happiness that forms the basis of Aristotelian virtue theory is far more than a shallow, psychological state. Rather, happiness is a modern rendering of the ancient Greek concept of eudaimonia, a term that resists exact

translation although the terms ‘flourishing’ and ‘living well’ come close to capturing its meaning, especially as both words denote action and convey the sense in which eudaimonia is essentially concerned with activity.83 For eudaimonia is not merely a passive state of

psychological contentment, but an active process concerned with living a life in which arete, the pursuit of excellence, plays a central role.

The ancient Greeks were devoted to the pursuit of excellence in all aspects of life and the term arete was generally applied to anything that performed its function well. From an

Aristotelian perspective, all living things, as well as man-made objects, have a telos, translated as a purpose, function or an end, that can be performed well or poorly. A knife can possess arete in that it performs its function of cutting in a superior manner. Likewise, the artisan who fashions the knife possesses arete by virtue of his craftsmanship. Just as a tool or an artisan has a purpose through the performance of which excellence can be displayed, Aristotle asserts that human beings also have a unique function that sets them apart from all other living things.84

In making this argument, Aristotle observes that biological entities possess a nutritive capacity as well as the capacity for reproduction. A smaller set of biological entities also possesses the capacity for locomotion and perception. Along with these capacities, a much smaller subset has the capacity for a limited degree of cognition. However, only humans possess the capacity for guiding our actions through the use of reason and this sets us apart and

83

Kraut, Richard, "Aristotle's Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/aristotle-ethics/>.

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gives us our special function. It is through reasoning well that we display the excellence that is unique to our species and which, in turn, promotes well-being.

Given the human ability to guide our actions through reason, the form of excellence required for living well is also unique. Living well requires the rational ability to determine how the human goods discussed above contribute to well-being in the way in which we display excellence through the management of our material possessions, caring for our health and in our behavior towards others. It is just these excellences, guided by reason and exhibited through a well-lived life in all its various facets, that are synonymous with the virtues. So, given these considerations, well-being, identified as the highest human good, consists of living a life guided by reason in accordance with virtue.85

A legacy of Aristotle’s ethical theory is that most modern interpretations of virtue ethics are ‘naturalistic’ in some way, positing that living a moral life is grounded in facts about human nature. For instance, Philippa Foote argues that by observing how humans characteristically live and what they need to flourish, we can derive ethical norms meant to govern how we should live.86 Rosalind Hursthouse defends a concept of virtue theory that is similarly naturalistic in that the virtues are those acquired traits that allow those persons that possess them to function well in relation to certain natural ends.87

Despite the various interpretations of naturalism that have been developed, the following discussion will focus more narrowly to objections to the original Aristotelian form of ‘moral naturalism,’ which faces a number of challenges. For instance, when thinking about Aristotle’s ethical theory and its implications for how we should live, it is important to keep in mind that the

85

Ibid., I.7 1098a16-18.

86

Philippa Foote, Natural Goodness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 42-43.

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intended beneficiaries of Aristotle’s ethical theory were young men from aristocratic Athenian families. At the time Aristotle wrote, Athens was a homogeneous society that practiced slavery and in which women were considered intellectually inferior to men. These social circumstances undoubtedly were instrumental in shaping Aristotle’s ethical perspective, particularly his

assertion that only a circumscribed range of choices, moral and non-moral, contribute to a form of well-being that is unavailable to women and slaves, or indeed anyone that did not belong to the Greek polis.88 Considering this, in order for well-being to serve as a basis for moral behavior, a more expansive concept of well-being needs to be articulated, one that accounts for the many variables that constitute life in a modern, pluralistic society.