Material y Métodos
4.5. MÉTODOS ESTADÍSTICOS
its principles could be sufficient. To this end, the fundamental function of copyright needs to be taken as a guideline.297 The interpretation of
copyright and of its limits should be underpinned by its democratic function, rather than by utilitarian justifications. Thus contracts overriding copyright limits would be preempted by copyright law.298
In short, even in the absence of an express indication in copyright laws, court should hold end- user agreements incompatible with copyright law unenforceable.299
In conclusion, in the view of the above literature, while contracts have always been part of copyright, they have often created an imbalance between the interested parties. Initially, the authors were victims of the overreaching bargaining power of the publisher; and legislators enacted norms intended to protect them. Now, end-users are the weakest party in the relationship among copyright players. To assist them, either legislators should take normative action, or courts should inform their interpretation of copyright law in a different way.
3.2.2 Contracts are more efficient than
Copyright
Another stream of the literature is significantly more positive on the effects of private ordering on copyright law. They reckon that contracts and technological protection measures are more efficient than public ordering. This is because the law is not capable to quickly adapt to the needs of copyright users, whereas the market is able to generate the most efficient transaction terms for the benefit of both owners and users. Fair use and other instruments to address traditional copyright market failures would then be safely replaced by ‘fared use’.300
This stance in the copyright literature is based on the assumption that copyright limits are based on the inefficiencies of the market: mainly, the impossibility to negotiate licences one by one with end-users. Digital technology bypasses this market failure by offering an individual negotiation. Thus, the intrusion of public policy tools to regulate copyright matters is no longer necessary, and the interaction between owners and users is left to the more efficient instrument of private ordering. Thanks to price discrimination,301 for example,
users will get only the usage privileges they are ready to pay for.
297 Geiger 2008.
298 Netanel 1996, at 382. But see Nimmer 1998, at 828, arguing that only a naïve observer can claim that policy in intellectual property can trump contract.
299 Derclaye 2006.
300 Bell 1998; Dam 1999; Easterbrook 1996; Hardy 1996; Merges 1997; O’Rourke 1997. 301 Fisher 2004; Ganley 2004.
Providing Government with strategic, independent and
evidence-based advice on intellectual property policy. ADVISORY BOARDSTRATEGIC
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
POLICY
SABIP
PAPER 3: USER CONTRACTS
This, in the final analysis, will not restrict users’ privileges: it will broaden them.302 Against this
scenario, it has been argued that information goods cannot be completely commodified, because of their peculiar characteristics. They are inherently different from other commodities, and therefore they cannot be efficiently subjected to the laws of the market.303
Private agreements are also recognised as a vehicle for opportunities rather than threats in the field of open-access licences.304 These are new
ways in which authors and creators make available their work to the general public (normally on the Internet) without charges, but under given terms and conditions (‘some rights reserved’). The General Public Licence (GPL), originally issued by the GNU Project, is designed for software developers.305
Literary works, instead, can be licensed under the Creative Commons (CC) terms.306 These new
forms of licensing are conceived to facilitate access to copyright works by the broadest possible share of the public, while at the same time protecting authors from abuse and misuse of their creations. According to some, open-access contracts are perfectly fit for the borderless digital environment, unlike copyright law. By acting worldwide, they offer unprecedented opportunities to improve the general functioning of the copyright system.307
However, on this issue some commentators are cautious. According to Elkin Koren, for example, the multiple choices offered by CC licences augment the costs of information searching for users of CC works. This, in turn, ends up screening access to information rather than facilitating it.308 Moreover,
Dusollier1 argues that the culture and philosophy
at the basis of CC and GNU projects can lead to unintentional negative consequences. In particular, the relevant focus on the user and their need to access copyright works shadows the interests of the author. CC authors selflessly make available their creations to the public, for the benefit of the circulation of culture. But the diffusion of this type of licensing somewhat generates the expectation that all works of art should be made available for free. Moreover, the tool utilised by open-access projects to provide an alternative to the existing copyright system, is ironically the same tool that the copyright industry is using to tip the balance of copyright towards the owner: the ‘viral’ contract. This type of contract stipulates terms and conditions that bind not only the first user, but also every following user of the work. Thanks to ‘viral’ contracts, the rights enforceable with respect to the copyright work are more similar to property rights than to contractual rights.309 The open-source licensing system is
therefore criticised with the same arguments opposing commercial electronic licences.
302 Easterbrook 1996, at 211. 303 Benkler 2000.
304 Dizon 2009.
305 The project took off in 1984 and was supported by the Free Software Foundation. To avoid free software being copied by commercial software producers (and then patented), GNU elaborated the General Public Licence (GNU GPL). The functioning of the GNU GPL is simple: whoever wants to cooperate to produce and distribute free software has to patent it, in order to control the exploitation of the work. Afterwards, they can give away for free the software licence, thus ensuring that the creation will circulate for free and remain free. See http://www.gnu.org/copyleft.
306 Creative Commons found inspiration in the GNU GPL model, and it applied its concept to copyright. Some authors want their works to be freely accessible by the public, in order to maximise their distribution. This purpose cannot be achieved by simply putting a work in the public domain, because others could copy the work and claim its paternity. That is where the Creative Commons licence comes into play. On the CC website a licence is automatically generated according to the rights that the creator wishes to retain. For example, they can choose to claim the reproduction right only partially, by allowing free reproduction but only for non-profit activities. See http://creativecommons.org.
307 Dizon 2009.
308 Elkin Koren 2005 and 2009. 309 Dusollier 2006b.
Providing Government with strategic, independent and
evidence-based advice on intellectual property policy. ADVISORY BOARDSTRATEGIC
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
POLICY
SABIP