Métodos para comprobación de errores

least part of the several hundred million pounds per annum earned from the insurance of vessels and cargoes through Lloyd's. It is important, however, not to exaggerate the importance to the insurance business of the maintenance of a strong UK-based shipping industry, since Lloyd's has largely maintained its global pre-eminence throughout a very long period of decline in the proportion of the world's shipping flying the British flag. There are also important policy implications for government stemming from the threat to Lloyd's contribution to the balance of payments from large insurance payouts to foreign shipowners. Since most successful insurance claims result in payouts by the City, it was important that the Board of Trade encourage, through IMCO, the development of internationally-agreed ceilings for the financial liability of shipowners.

Strategically the UK was heavily dependent upon overseas trade, and upon imports of raw materials and foodstuffs. In two world wars the destruction of British merchant vessels by enemy action had brought the UK close to defeat, and HMG was anxious to ensure the continued prosperity of UK shipowners in preparation for future national emergencies. In addition the industry was well-organised to influence government- The shipping companies were organised as the General Chamber of Shipping (GCS). Consultation under the auspices of the Chamber meant that the Board of Trade, the government department mainly responsible for shipping policy, was presented with clear and unambiguous statements of the interests and policy of the UK shipping industry. This was in marked contrast to the conflicting signals emanating from the fishing industry (see Chapter it). Consultation across state boundaries, both between shipowners

and between shipping states, produced the same unanimity of purpose. The larger shipowners were organised in the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), and in addition many tanker-owners belonged to the Oil Companies' International Marine Forum (OCIMF). Shipowning states discussed their mutual interests within the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO). IMCO was based in London, staffed entirely by Board of Trade civil servants, and voting in its Council was on the basis of registered tonnage, rather than by sovereign equality. This made it a very suitable body as far as the shipowners and the Board of Trade were concerned, since up until 1967 the UK had the largest vote of any state. IMCG helped to maintain common international standards for the construction, use and navigation of vessels, thus simplifying seaborne trade.

The Board of Trade's traditional international duty as a sponsoring department was simple: it was to resist attempts by states, other than flag states, to erode freedoms of navigation or to appropriate parts of the High Seas. Such a role was not obstructionist; the Board's counterparts in other shipowning states had long been in agreement. They were willing to tighten and to refine construction and use regulations, provided that the new rules were global and that sufficient time was allowed for their implementation, in order to avoid imposing undue hardship on owners of existing vessels. In this vein IMCO had met with considerable success in combatting pollution, principally in reducing the incidence of the intentional discharge of oily water at sea IMCO was thus in no way a bar to the constructive development of international maritime law, even at the expense of derogations from the absolute freedom of navigation. However, it was not an authority vested with executive power but a consultative body which could formulate Conventions for ratifying

states to implement- The latter role was the prerogative of states, and the implementation of IMCO Conventions was slow. Policing was dependent upon flag states, many of which showed little willingness to enforce regulations against their own citizens. Theoretically a signatory state could denounce an IMCO Convention in the same way as any other international Convention. Despite these faults, the UK was strongly committed to IMCO, with its headquarters in London, its empnasis on technical rather than diplomatic consultation, and its built-in majority for important shipowning states 9.

Also ranged behind narrow limits to coastal state jurisdiction was a variety of public and private authorities engaged in the disposal of wastes at sea. Marine waste disposal was not a unified industry with a sponsoring department convinced of its value; it stemmed largely from piecemeal neglect and cost-cutting by local authorities, firms and consumers. There was thus no strong, unified waste disposal lobby pressing government for the maintenance of High Seas freedoms, but the philosophy underlying waste disposal at sea was a laissez-faire one, with a High Seas flavour, associated with the medieval idea of the common, the inexhaustible resource. Essentially, waste disposal at sea fell into three broad categories: the dumping of noxious wastes, dredgings and sludge; the runoff and direct discharge of chemicals and sewage from the land; and the jettisoning of routine waste from vessels in transit. It may seem improper to think of marine waste disposal as an industry with an economic value, but by preventing expenditure on more expensive forms of waste disposal it reduced costs for government, industry and consumers alike. Some indication of the value for the year 1967 of this function to the UK can be gauged from the cost later incurred by private companies and public authorities in making alternative

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