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The council and executive—mayor or manager—each make substantial contributions to the policy making process. They may do so in such a way that their separate efforts reinforce and support each other. On the other hand, each may sometimes counter the other or fail to cooperate, e.g., providing less information than the other would prefer to have when making a decision. As noted in the last chapter, the working relationship between the council and the city manager is almost always viewed as positive. Coordination of effort is likely to occur because of the manager's direct accountability to the council. The council and mayor in mayor-council cities, on the other hand, have separate and offsetting powers. At times, they will pursue different approaches which put them at odds with each other. Still, a majority of council members view the relationship with the mayor as positive.

The dynamics of the relationship between council and executive are illuminated further by the council's assessment of the performance of the executive in policy making, implementation, and management of the organization. The activities included in Table IX.4 indicate how well the executive— either the mayor in mayor-council cities or the city manager in council-manager cities—takes direction from the council, provides the council with information, and runs the municipal organization to the satisfaction of the council. In each activity, council members rated performance as very good, good, satisfactory, or poor. These ratings reflect only the council's view of executive performance; the executive might assess his or her own performance very differently. Furthermore, the city manager is the employee of the council, whereas the mayor in the mayor-council city is another elected official who is accountable to voters as are the council members. Still, the responses provide an indication of how council members view the official with whom they interact extensively and, therefore, provide insight into how council members will do their jobs.

Table IX.4 Council Rating of Executive Performance (Percent who rate performance of executive very good or good for each activity*)

Total Small Medium Large

Council- Manager Mayor- Council Council- Manager Mayor- Council Council- Manager Mayor- Council Council- Manager Mayor- Council 89 01 89 01 89 01 89 01 89 01 89 01 89 01 89 01 Provides the council with

sufficient alternatives for making policy decisions.

72 75 36 41 80 75 51 40 69 76 38 46 65 70 27 41 Accomplishes the goals

established by the council. 86 80 53 42 87 79 60 42 87 84 60 42 79 70 44 45 Provides the council with

sufficient information to assess the effectiveness of programs and services.

72 74 40 41 81 76 61 44 71 73 42 30 59 65 25 45

Insures that city government is open to participation of all groups in the community.

77 76 60 64 85 76 63 66 77 76 68 62 67 80 54 55

Maintains high standards of personal conduct for self and staff. 87 90 67 61 87 91 74 64 90 87 72 60 82 95 60 52 Seeks to improve efficiency of city government. 83 86 61 61 85 88 66 64 87 84 68 54 73 70 53 59

*Remainder satisfactory or poor.

differently. In the first three measures, the city manager emerges as an official who works for the council and supports its functions. Although there are critics of "bureaucratic government" who portray the city manager as aloof, most council members see the manager as accountable and forthcoming with alternatives and information. The ratings overall have increased slight since 1989 with three quarters of the council members offering positive assessments. The mayor in mayor-council cities, who occupies a position with separate powers, is seen by many council members as independent in pursuing goals and less open in providing information to the council. Only two fifths of the council members overall give the mayor positive ratings on providing sufficient policy alternatives, seeking to accomplish the goals of the council, and providing information to support assessment of programs. The ratings have gone down compared to 1989 in small cities regarding providing policy alternatives and in small and medium-sized cities regarding accomplishing council goals and providing information for assessment in medium-sized cities. They have gone up regarding providing policy alternative and providing information for

assessment in large cities.

The mayor is a major force in policy initiation in mayor-council cities, as we have noted, but these ratings suggest that the mayor is somewhat distant from the council. As the council seeks more information about policy alternatives or program performance—as these results indicate they might do—, there may be tension with the mayor even if they are largely in agreement about policy objectives. The results indicate that the mayor's ratings are more consistent across cities of different sizes than in 1989. Although the assessment of the mayor's performance in providing policy alternatives and information for program assessment are particularly low in large cities in 1989, those ratings have either gone up or remained the same and the ratings in other size cities have dropped to the same level as found in the large cities.

There is greater similarity in ratings of the ways that the executive relates to the public and the organization, although the assessment of the city manager is consistently higher and these ratings match those received in 1989. Three quarters of the council members give the manager good ratings for insuring that city government is open to the participation of all groups in the community. Over three fifths of the council members in mayor-council cities give this rating to their mayor. City managers are overwhelmingly credited with maintaining high standards of conduct and seeking to improve the efficiency of city government, as are most mayors although the ratings have dropped for mayors in certain settings. The ratings on promoting efficiency are somewhat lower for both mayors and managers in large cities.

The ratings for the two kinds of city government executives are not intended to suggest that they can or should be identical. The executive mayor can not be under the control of the city council any more than the city manager can have independent powers like the veto that could be used to check the council. Rather, these measures illuminate the contrasting circumstances of the city council as it seeks to fill its service and governance roles. Since the council in the council-manager city has a complementary relationship with its executive, it can seek to expand its own effectiveness with the expectation of support from the city manager. On the other hand, since the council in the mayor-council city has a potentially adversarial relationship with the mayor whom it cannot control, it may be inclined to seek ways to expand its capacity to compete with the mayor or secure greater independence from the mayor.29 This is a natural inclination, but the approach may not be productive. Councils and mayors in mayor-council cities need to find ways to advance their shared interests in improved performance without abandoning their separate official interests. A minority of officials in council-manager cities may need to recognize the bases for cooperation that are built into their form of government and look for ways to enhance interaction. In 1989, there was also evidence in council-manager cities, especially the large ones, that some council members view the city manager with distrust, although in general the assessments are positive and manager ratings of performance have tended to go up in 2001.

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