M ECANISMO DE ACCIÓN

Relationships in both neighbourhoods during the project implementation demonstrated two stages: pre-conflict relations and post-conflict relations. This section presents the results and implications of the cases’ pre-conflict relations, which exhibited different nuances and influencing factors.

Accordingly, the project pre-conflict relations of both Friendship and Binh Dong 1 featured

interesting conflicts. Binh Dong 1, in addition, accentuated the lack of interpersonal trust and other psychological behaviours such as the lack of self-confidence, governmental subsidy expectation and over-spending habits.

5.3.1 Interest conflicts

Interest conflicts happened in both neighbourhoods and related to land issues, which implied an economic motivation behind land values and, consequently, an ineffective urban planning system.

Friendship

Friendship’s interest conflicts happened when the neighbourhood was developing the upgrade plan and remarkably slowed the project’s progress. Data showed that conflict happened between a family and other members of the neighbourhood relating to a decision on land distribution. The following quotes described the situation:

The project already started and all families agreed to join but conflicts happened after that, when [the residents of Friendship] discussed about the [neighbourhood planning] design, (NP5);

…The solution of re-blocking60 _{the houses was agreed by most of the}

families, except some who did not agree and strongly disputed…very tense [at the meeting discussing about the neighbourhood planning], (VC4);

60 _{The houses were to be demolished and rearranged to make efficient use of land area. See chapter 7 for}

…we did actually come across some arguments, even conflicts between some residents. You know, when it is related to interests, not easy at all… (VC1).

The following statement details the conflict, alluding to the notion of uncontrolled house expansion, therefore implying the ineffectiveness of the broader regulatory system:

The plan was to equally divide the whole piece of land among all

families…Most families agreed with this option. But some families did not like that because their houses were occupying bigger areas, like 76m2_,

because they had…[slang] illegally expanded the house to surrounding areas. They were not happy to equally re-block with other smaller ones that were only 23m2 _(VC9).

Interest conflicts in Friendship were eventually resolved by other factors such as the role of the Friendship community project leader, the common desire to change the housing condition, and the common sense of the neighbourhood’s attachments (to be presented later). The resolution of interest conflicts, therefore, enabled the upgrading project to proceed in a cooperative manner. As two participants put it: “Finally …the decision to equally re-block the housing area was agreed by everyone, making way for the project to proceed…,” (VC1); “We were so happy to see the signature of [the difficult resident] on the planning document. It took quite a while,” (VC2).

Binh Dong 1

Like Friendship, the interest conflicts of Binh Dong 1 residents happened in the project planning stage, circling around issues of land and house allocation. The following are examples:

Everyone thought for themselves and wanted to be prioritized to get a good land spot. They did not want to balance their interests (TC2); No one listened to one another. The planning session failed because they did not agree on any solution, (TC6)

A planning session was supposed to last 3 days but it finished one day earlier because everyone left the room and did not come back (NP5); A resident [living in the central area of the land] was not happy because he thought it was unfair for someone from the riverside to come into the central land,” (TC9)

There was no way for the community’s agreement on anything despite so much effort in explaining things to them (TP2)

Like the Friendship, Binh Dong 1’s conflicts were eventually resolved. However, Binh Dong 1’s conflict resolution introduced a process of internal discussion facilitated by the national coordination

team and city project management team, which relates to the vertical dimension of relations (linking capital) presented in chapter 7.

5.3.2

Neighbourhood psychological behaviours

Apart from interest conflicts, and unlike Friendship, Binh Dong 1’s pre-conflict relations accented the neighbourhood’s psychological behaviours including the lack of interpersonal trust, the lack of self- confidence, governmental subsidy expectation and over-spending habits. These psychological behaviours resulted from the neighbourhoods’ socio-economic problems. The lack of interpersonal trust is expressed in the following examples:

There were many obstacles at the beginning of the project. People did not trust each other, especially when discussing about money, (TC9); …No one listened to each other (TP2); The residents did not anyone in the

community to keep the money and wanted the [project staff] to keep the money for them, (TP1).

The low level of interpersonal trust of the Binh Dong 1 Neighbourhood was illustrated even when a cashier was finally selected to collect saving money. As one participant stated: “We finally chose Ms [the selected cashier] to be the cashier, but only to collect the money and then deposited it right into the bank” (TC7). Views regarding the residents’ lack of self-confidence are demonstrated in the following statements:

We earned little money on a daily basis, for each meal, so at that time, we thought it was impossible and ridiculous… you know … how could we save and build the house while we were still struggling to earn money for each meal (TC7); They were so poor and did not believe that the project could be implemented, (NP5); We could never dare to dream about such a luxury thing like a playground for our kids, (TC8);

The theme of the people’s governmental subsidy expectation arose, for example, in the following statements:

Because they had heard about programmes that were totally sponsored by the Government, they did not make an effort (TP5); Discussion on the saving activities took long time to proceed as they did not try hard to put money in, (TP2); It was very complicated as some people did not

cooperate. They did not want join the saving group. (TC10)

An over-spending habit was stated as another psychological problem that led to uncooperative ties in the planning stage of the Binh Dong 1 project. This view came in the following statement: “When discussing about the saving plan, no one believed that the saving activity would work because they were always in debt,” (NP5); “Many times, the people thought that their saving could not be

sustained due to overspending habit,” (TP2); “…Quite hard you know…, the habits of spending up whatever they had on the day…” (TP1).

Socio-economic problems of the neighbourhood were perceived to result in the neighbourhood’s psychological behaviours. This view was expressed by participants when they discussed the circumstances that that led to the project’s early challenges. For example, a participant reported:

All the 15 families were very poor, mostly having problems regarding either economic status, or/and health issues. They earned the living by doing weather-based jobs like street vendors, taxi motorbike driver, fishing, casual scavengers, housework… Some families have sick members, or some others are separated. They just lived on a daily basis, with hardly any saving (NP5)

This view was reiterated by other participants that:

[Binh Dong 1] consisted of illegal squatters or immigrants, who were homeless, in debt and had no means of living… (TP2); In fact, the

community was a gambling and criminal area (TC4). The community was an illegal settlement, most of the occupiers were earning the living by

informal activities and committed social evils… so it was no surprising that they did not trust each other, (NP5).

In addition, Binh Dong 1’s situation featured other social issues. Based on other interviews with residents and project staff, among the 15 families, four were single elderly people unable to work and two families had a member with a severe health problem.

In summary, the above depicts the distinctive nuances of the pre-conflict relations that supposedly impeded the cooperation of both neighbourhoods’ residents in the project’s early stages. The two cases also had interest conflicts that related to land distribution issues that seemingly resulted from issues of a broader regulatory system. Binh Dong 1 reported other neighbourhood psychological behaviours as a consequence of the neighbourhood’s socio-economic problems (social evils, debt, and unemployment). The following section describes the cases’ post-conflict relations.