Macrolocalización

Power entails a set of actions done on another person’s actions and reactions (Foucault, 1977). Power may also be defined as ‘influence or the outright exertion of force’ (Hanna, Talley, & Guindon, 2000). The initial problem to define power is to recognise its particular features with regard to social relations (Wrong, 1968). As people exercise mutual control and influence over each other’s behaviours, power has to be caused by someone thus making it a causal phenomenon (Wrong, 1968). In the past, however, power was considered a non-causal phenomenon because the actors were not deemed to cause it and its understanding was limited (Clegg, 2006a, p. 176). It could, therefore, not be related with phronēsis in the past. Since the time of the famous philosopher Thomas Hobbes, however, power is treated as a causal concept determined by the actions of the actors involved (Clegg, 2006a, p. 176; Dahl, 1957). The shift was based on the observation that for gaining or losing power someone had to do something (Clegg, 2006a, p. 176). The observation was further strengthened by Bachrach and Baratz’s (1963) earlier debate on ‘non- decision-making’ and ‘nonissues’ (little things). They attempted to anticipate things

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that should have happened but they did not. This suggests that ‘they were more interested not in the things that did happen, but the things that did not’ (Clegg, 2006a, p. 176). Being highly improbable in occurrence, the ‘things that did not happen’ come as a surprise in planning issues with tremendous effects on a project (Taleb, 2011). This observation was formulised as the black swan theory (ibid). The theory refers to those unexpected events of large magnitude that come as surprise despite being highly improbable in occurrence.

Such improbable occurrences, however, do not deny the fact that power is not just an inherent character of particular actors because it also acts as the outcome of specific strategies (Foucault, 1977). This strategic relationality is illustrated by Dahl’s (1957) example. Supposing, I start commanding people to drive on the right side of the road telling them I have enough power to do that. Some people might obey me but most of them will think that I am mentally retarded. However, if a policeman commands the people to drive their cars in a particular direction of the road, they will obey him. It is because the action of the police officer is an exercise of power, whereas power itself lies in the strategies pursued by the police department and the government to control traffic. This example suggests that power is not just the exercise of authority but a wider concept in which power, as a relational concept, emanates out as an outcome of visions, ideologies and strategies. As Russell (1966, p. 9) rightly pointed out that ‘everyman would like to be God, if it were possible; some few find it difficult to admit the impossibility’, it is about admitting or not admitting the ‘impossibility’. Such impossibilities are handled by advancing certain ideologies, strategies and visions to gain power by adopting a particular decision- making process. In this regard, Callon (1998, p. 261) argues that once ‘the possible world states are already known or easy to identify: calculated decisions can be taken’. In that sense, governance is all about applying specific strategies ‘as an arrangement of governing beyond-the-state’ (Swyngedouw, 2005). For example, the National-led government’s strategy of enhancing economic growth by building RONS is based on some political vision which is different from the power exercised by the NZTA, say, in finalizing the route alignments and carrying out public

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consultations. This suggests that power, as a social relation, has special features different from exercise of power by one actor over the other (Wrong, 1968).

The concept of comparability of power, therefore, stands at the core in understanding the wider concept of power beyond its mere exercise by the actors. It is, for example, generally believed that Stalin was more powerful than Roosevelt and that McCarthy was less powerful than before when the Senate censured him (Dahl, 1957). Unless the terms ‘more powerful than’ and ‘less powerful than’ are defined, such perceptions of power are based on their relative comparisons. Russell’s (1966, p. 9) distinction between ‘power’ and ‘glory’ is another example of comparisons based on the argument that ‘Prime Minister has more power than glory, the King has more glory than power’. However, in relational terms, the best way to attain glory is to gain power suggesting that both notions may be regarded as the same (ibid). Therefore the desire of power is contained in visions and strategies which may act as the sources of power depending on the extent to which such strategies are ready to admit ‘impossibilities’. The notion of ‘technological economy’ (Barry & Slater, 2002), for example, reflects the power contained in specific strategies to challenge ‘impossibilities’. As most decisions involve politics, ‘focusing on the technology of politics makes politics too much of a technical and instrumental matter’ (Barry, 2002). Dealing with impossibilities, therefore, marks the troubled area between ‘ambition’ and ‘reality’ (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothengatter, 2003) through such strategies as ‘quis custodiet ipsos custodies’ – or ‘who rules the rulers, guard the guardians, oversees the overseers’ (Wrong, 1968). This suggests that power, in addition to being causal, is a wider concept in relational terms which is not just confined to its exercise by particular actors but rather encompasses those ways and means which challenge real impossibilities through ambition. Underestimation of costs and overestimation of benefits of mega projects, for example, is a result of such power dynamics (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003).

Many arguments, however, revolve around the importance of nonissues or little things suggesting that power is a causal phenomenon. One such nonissue, for

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example, was the chances of the world’s largest tunnel boring machine Bertha to be stuck during the underground highway construction in Seattle in 2015. However, actually Bertha got overheated and stuck during construction causing several other complications putting a question mark on the credibility of the Seattle tunnel decision-making process (New Yorker, 2015). The example shows how big events come as a surprise highlighting the critical issues of the decision-making process in which power plays a pivotal role. Here little things also refer to those insignificant issues or practices in urban planning which, Flyvbjerg (2004, p. 284), terms as taken- for-granted truths. For example, if a junior clerk in a local council, having no authority in the decision-making process, just puts his initials on some files to assist his seniors; this practice may apparently be a little thing, but the consequences of putting initials may have huge impacts on the entire decision-making process (for details, see, Flyvbjerg, 1998b, pp. 174-182).

In line with four themes and eight sub-themes of phronēsis outlined earlier, four dimensions of power connect it with phronēsis and decision-making: power as perception, power as relationship, power as enabling or disabling agent, and, power as prerogative. The first dimension of power is perception, which is itself power, because perception is related with exercising the power of awareness such as recognition, cognizance and noticing (Hanna et al., 2000). For example, when an employee is promoted by a company to the next level, his perception as an employee is changed because of greater recognition, cognizance and noticing. Therefore, perception, decision-making and values remain interconnected (Ravlin & Meglino, 1987). Perception is also a synonym of Sternberg’s (1986) term ‘perspicacity’ which, being a characteristic of wisdom, means the ability to see beyond appearances or read between the lines. The actors’ perception through pre- conceived ideas or notions behind the power of perception may be context- dependent or context-independent. For example, state bureaucracies derive their socio-political power from the rules and regulations of a government. Their perception of power is context-independent, in the sense, that a change of government may not change their administrative powers under the rules. For the

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common people, however, the perception regarding a change of government is context-dependent because the new government policies will influence their lives. Furthermore, the perception of planning as an interactive process underscores several government activities shaped by various economic, social and environmental forces (Healey, 2003). In this context, powerless actors often develop their perceptive abilities against the powerful as a means of surviving or coping (Miller, 2012).

Transport decision-making, according to Edwards and Mackett (1996), is not purely based on some objective criteria, therefore, powerful actors feel justified in ridiculing or stereotyping the powerless actors (Hanna et al., 2000). This approach may also be advanced through certain ideological agendas in stabilizing their power at the local government level. However, according to Cheyne (2015), it is rather a robust assessment of efficiency and effectiveness gains and losses that matters. This requires stable and just power relations in the decision-making process through democracy and accountability. Therefore, the improvements in the quality of public places, such as roads, depend on the governance capacity based on the quality of local policy cultures (Healey, 1998). For example, the cost of building Pakistan’s Terbela dam quadrupled because of an unexpected 384% rise in inflation contrast to the decision-makers assumptions of 7.5% rise only (New Yorker, 2015).

As perceptions, both negotiable and non-negotiable, are handled through some kind of relationship, the relationship becomes the second dimension of power. In this regard, Foucault (1977) treats power as relationship by establishing a link between power relations and creativity of knowledge. He observes that power relations do not exist without the creative constitution of a field of knowledge (Clegg, 2006a, p. 174). Foucauldian power, therefore, resides in relationships because power relations are unstable, complex and part of social construction in which repressed group is dominated for the benefits of the oppressors (Taylor & Hallsworth, 2000). For example, a local authority may claim to be pro-community in finalising a new road route. The affected people under its administrative power,

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however, may perceive the authority’s claim as clandestine institutional exploitation because their fates depend on the decision-making of that agency working under some institutional rules.

It is because power inheres in institutions rather than individuals making those institutions function (Foucault, 1977). Foucault focuses on the principles of order and control that tend to de-personalize power with an appearance as if power inheres in the prison, the factory or some institution (ibid). As knowledge constitutes all three intellectual virtues of Aristotle, power becomes an inseparable component of phronēsis because of contextual sensitivities involved in the generation of creative knowledge. Following Foucault’s approach, planning may be associated with the dominating power of systematic reason (Healey, 1992). In the decision-making process, Foucault reminds us of the crucial importance of power in controlling and shaping of discourses, the social construction of spaces and production of knowledge (Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002). Foucault, therefore, presents power as local, relational and productive rather than hierarchical and oppressive suggesting opportunities for change (McNay, 2013). In the transport decision-making processes, both individuals and institutions experience and exercise power at various levels.

The third dimension of power is its ability as an enabling or disabling agent in the decision-making process. This ability is the practice of imposing something that is harmful to or undesirable for the interests of a person or group (Hanna et al., 2000). This dimension may also be called oppression which may take place overtly or covertly. In overt or obvious oppression, the oppressor perpetrates it through force or deprivation (ibid). Countries having martial laws or military regimes, for example, may experience this kind of oppression. In the transport policy context, such oppressions may take the form of dictatorial policies with strict top-down approach. In democratically advanced countries, covert or clandestine oppression usually takes place through advancing ideologies and specific interest-based interpretations of rules and regulations. In covert oppressions, the oppressed usually does not

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know that he is being oppressed (ibid). In the transport policy context, limited participation of the stakeholders in the decision-making process reflects this kind of oppression.

Historically, dominant groups may be more or less oppressive but their interest in power, status and wealth remains consistent across countries and cultures (Garraty & Gay, 1981). The power of such groups is based on certain presuppositions enabling or disabling them in affectively governing in the corridors of power. For example, advancing roads on the basis of achieving economic prosperity is a presupposition on the basis of which the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) [PML (N)]-led government was re-elected in Pakistan’s Punjab province in 2013 elections. Therefore, according to Berstein (1991), no interpretations are made without presuppositions. In explaining presuppositions, language plays a pivotal role because it has the power to create and present epistemological traditions and codes (Gadamer, 1975). Therefore, the language of policy documents is indeed reflective of the political and economic presuppositions behind.

Language also has the power to translate presuppositions into visual interpretations. This suggests that before accepting text as valid data, one needs to understand how this text was generated (Fuhrman & Oehler, 1986). This dimension highlights the importance of text and language as power and discourse to advance certain ideologies particularly on economic, political and social fronts. Therefore, the city as a site of complex processes revolves around several urban phenomena determined by semiotic, visual, linguistic and textual representation (Mele, 2000). This makes discourse relevant to cities because it informs the making and breaking of urban processes (ibid). This dimension helps to understand the ideologies and visions advanced through specific linguistic and textual representations, for example, in linking roads investment with economic growth in developed and developing countries.

The ability of power to act as a prerogative in the decision-making process is the fourth dimension. As community problem-solving and decision-making is the area

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of expertise of technicians and planners (Aleshire, 1970), power itself acts as prerogative. The treatment of power as prerogative may also be referred to as ‘hegemonic planning practice’ in which the power of interpretation falls in the hands of technicians and planners (Miraftab, 2009). For example, the public consultation process in advancing road projects. Therefore, power as prerogative also tends to act as mediatory in bridging differences usually through hegemonic practices. Such hegemony brings forth fixed solutions in which extremes are preferred over the middle-range.

Lukes (1974), in his debate with Marx and Nietzsche on power, explains the term hegemony within the broader social theory agenda in which power is constituted within practical social contexts. For example, hegemonic policies such as water privatisation may be advanced on the grounds that they achieve economic efficiency (Miraftab, 2009). As practice defines practical contexts, Gadamer (1982) focuses on practical issues and highlights the importance of practice in the exercise of power and decision-making. He treats practice as choosing and deciding something against something. Flyvbjerg (2001, p. 55), however, argues that Gadamer’s approach of phronēsis overlooks power issues. The analysis suggests that power is constituted within practical contexts of social science and urban planning. Power, therefore, remains an integral part of phronēsis and decision- making.