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Madness, subject and enunciation Damián Coirin

Residing in the 3% of the archipelago’s land not designated as national park and

surrounded by a marine reserve, conservation governance permeates life in general and specific ways for Galápagos fishers and other residents. This section highlights some of the ways in which conservation governance and livelihood pathways intersect for Galápagos fishermen.

 

 

A1. Socioeconomic Effects on Fishing Operations & Livelihood Diversification

Most visibly and tangibly, governance rules meant to strengthen environmental protections act to constrain the ways fishers can use their capital. For instance, regulations

restricting fishing boat sales (Chapter 3) arguably constrict the ability of fishermen to accumulate wealth in traditional ways. Specifically, boats are becoming more expensive because of the cap placed on new fishing vessels. Thus the ability to move up from fisher to fisher-owner is no longer within as easy reach as it once was, pointing to an erosion of fishers’ abilities to substitute asset types, or turn cash into boats and improve their fishing returns over time.

Secondly actions by the Galápagos National Park (GNP), charged with managing marine resources, have the effect of facilitating but sometimes prohibiting the exercise of labor choices and changes, creating livelihood uncertainty in various ways. A recent clear example is

illustrated by Executive Order 1416 of the tourism permit competition of 2008-9. This order proclaimed that no individual could be granted a tourism permit if one had previously existed in their family, which “shall be deemed the relationship to the fourth degree of consanguinity and second of affinity” (INGALA 2009). For unknown reasons, this Order was announced after the date for submitting proposals for the competition, and thus many fishermen who had already spent up to $8000 each in preparing applications were disqualified and took on unneeded debt.

An additional source of uncertainty introduced by the GNP is firing people in ways that the locals connect to political changes more than actual job performance (also extending to hiring and promotions). If one inspects job losses and gains of respondents by sector from 2009-11, it is notable that the only jobs lost from all government institutions except for the GNP, loosely categorized as “professions”, were from voluntary retirements. Jobs at the GNP however (categorized here under “management”) were more unstable – several respondents had been let

 

go or had short-term contracts not renewed (Fig 4.4).

Finally, regulations have significant consequences by forcing individuals to take on more uncertainty in terms of their business operations, specifically for local tour agencies run by former fishermen on San Cristobal (a noted issue throughout the archipelago). The undercapacity of legal tour permit operations in contrast to the actual volume of tourists visiting the islands has been a long-running and highly political issue that is clear to both the GNP and local residents (Epler 2007). One response to this backlog has been turning a blind eye to small tour agencies and operators that fill a necessary void in the tourism market, often act responsibly, but are technically illegal operations. The illegality of many local tour operations on San Cristobal is openly acknowledged at the same time it is explained.

Fisher 69972: We do this activity with much enthusiasm, we participate in conservation, but the GNP, it is a political institution. They don’t give us an opening. Neither to us nor to others, they say, ok come, let’s achieve, you want to do this, that, others want to do this, that…then they say no. You cannot do that. The Park could do that tomorrow, and then we could not do tourism. We, the locals. The Park could say it, and we could no longer do [tourism work]. Because we don’t have the GNP required document, to do tourism.

[on having applied for tour permits:]

Many times. We have spent a lot of money, our capital, our monetary investments. Yes, we have done it all – through 10, 12 years, reinvested [in trying to get a legal permit]. But at the same time, we do not have the support of the GNP, especially. There is no support, up until now.

An owner of another dive shop, when asked about why he did not possess a Park permit, said simply “Because it’s impossible (to get)”. A former Park director acknowledged the difficult bureaucracy, but also added “It’s easier for them not to have one”, because they do not have to pay taxes on unreported activities.

A2. Institutions & Uncertainty

 

 

tourism work show that the adaptive potential to switch between these livelihood pathways does exist, and that there has long been at least some potential to cope with fisheries changes by tapping into the richer tourism economy, at least under certain conditions. The scarcity of recent transitions however implies that conditions have changed, including in the institutional realm.

From a livelihoods perspective, the interactions of fishers with other actors in state, market, and civil society are the conduits through which they reshape their livelihood strategies and constantly negotiate their returns from existing strategies (Bebbington 1999). The histories of change in tourism and conservation governance reviewed here show a slowly degrading ability to defend, control and transform assets over time. This loss comes from both a transfer of some resources to other actors and an overall constraining effect from institutions on fisher ability to defend their assets (e.g., loss of financial capital in boats and the 2009 competition, legal uncertainty over local businesses).

Ospina (2006) draws from an anthropological understanding of institutions which emphasizes their practices rather than just their functional purpose (i.e., existing to provide a public good and fulfill a specific function), affected by layers of historical (re)organization, connected to place-based social networks, and therefore having the effect at different times “…to embrace, moderate or exacerbate uncertainty” (Mehta et al. 1999: 37).26 Galápagos stakeholders use institutions as tools for political fights and negotiations, partially defining themselves and their stances in opposition to one another (Ospina 2006). Drawing from this understanding, several factors contribute to the inconsistent and economically inefficient functioning described in Section A1 above. First is the legacy of historical instability that includes the 1990s and 2000s, where for instance, the GNP changed directors five times from 2003-05 (Ibid., 144).

                                                                                                               

26 This contrasts with Ellis’s (2000) view that “the role of institutions is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a

 

Secondly, institutional and family networks are highly overlapping on the islands, where over 35% of the economically active population work for government. The percentage on San Cristobal is the highest of all of the islands, since it is the archipelago’s capitol. The lines between political and civil society are therefore blurred. Combined with a client-like sytem for delivering jobs, as in Ecuador, these above factors serve to make institutions and laws far from impartial or neutral spaces; the law is rather “an expression of will” (Ibid., 153). As one

government manager noted, “The Special Law helps if it is applied to everybody. But the Special Law is applied only for those who are defenseless. Those who have resources or political

connections go over the Special Law”.

Finally, scholars have noted the influential role of governance institutions in “the discursive construction of what is meant by risk” (Mehta et al. 1999: 12). Underlying all of the above dynamics are a privileged perspective of the Galápagos as a unique ecosystem in need of protection since 1959, when European scientists advocated for and established the Galápagos National Park (Quiroga 2009). “Risk” in terms of fishing boat regulations for instance is framed in terms of the risks of overexploitation of the marine environment. Less considered has been the social “risk” to fishermen of reduced economic security and adaptive capacity, or the ability to change with circumstances as one so desires as this study emphasizes.