The consequences of entrusting the sheltering together for personal wellbeing and security to colonially constructed states have been colossal in Africa. Rather than forge cooperation and consensus amongst its pre-colonial authorities, African states resorted to regime security, ethno-politics and elitism. They entrenched themselves in power through state terror and patronage, thereby undermined the sheltering together under the state tent for ‘wellbeing’ and ‘prosperity’ to which Hobbes refers. Barely 15 years into statehood in Africa, Martin van Creveld warned that, “[any]
state…which cannot safeguard the lives of its members, subjects, citizens, comrades …is unlikely either to command their loyalty or to survive for very long…” (1975: 42). Van Creveld’s observation became real in Africa once the superpowers, whose proxy war kept the lid on the grievances boiling within most African states, withdrew their support. The myth of the state’s monopoly over violence, as a result, has begun to unravel and given way to what du Toit (1999) and Job (1992) refer to as “insecurity dilemma”. Boys and girls aged as young as seven years now march into the public realm to lay claims to the predatory state and thereby displace old dictators for new warlords, thanks to the availability and efficient use of the AK-47 (Doe, 2001). The random and widespread violence which their long repressed rages have caused them to unleash has not only shattered state institutions, but cut at the seams of the fabric of society; thus leading to the total collapse of state and society. These post-Cold War developments have prompted international calls for a rethink of the so-called national security doctrine, which gave the state the exclusive rights to the security of its territory and people. Holsti (1996) points out that the traditional realist framework that singles out the state as the sole securitising object—custodian of sovereignty, and defender of society against external threats—is seriously out of sync with today’s realities. He calls for the widening of the security discourse to include non-military issues that impact human security (ibid).
An avalanche of concepts and theories has followed since Holsti made his groundbreaking call. Buzan et al (1997) arguably offer the first comprehensive and compelling response. They question the singular and exclusive position of the state as the only securitising object, while at the same time remaining the sole custodian of security. They call for widening the scope and content of securitised objects by
including individuals, nation and regime as equally salient securitising objects (ibid). Buzan et al make the case that just as the state can be mobilised to make the ultimate sacrifice to defend itself, similar sentiments should be evoked when individuals and their national collectivity are threatened (ibid). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the 1994 Human Development Report takes the case of security for humans to the international policy arena. The report identifies seven threats to security and proposes humans instead of the state as the central securitising object.111 The human security approach departs from traditional understanding and application of security in three fundamental ways. First, it returns human beings and the threats defined from their perspectives to the centre of the security discourse. Second, rather than focus on containment of threats, human security seeks to systematically prevent threats before they endanger the wellbeing and prosperity of human beings and their communities. Alkire emphasises that human security “urges institutions to offer protection which is institutionalised, not episodic; responsive, not rigid; preventative, not reactive” (Alkire, 2003: 2). The third difference is that the human security notion of security seeks to preserve and promote the vital core of life. Alkire defines the vital cores as agency (freedom ‘to be’ or the ability and freedom to independently determine one’s existence and wellbeing), survival (freedom from threats to life), community (freedom to interact and belong to a community), and
dignity (respect for individuals, their values, beliefs and worldviews).
Aside from calls to rethink the securitising objects, there are also calls to broaden the scope of security beyond the national. Given the proximity and porosity of borders of most third world countries, especially in Africa, coupled with the phenomenal rise in
111
The UNDP’s seven threats to security include physical, economic, community, environmental, political, health and food.
transnational organised crime and bad neighbourliness, Buzan et al observe that classical international relations is in grave error for confining security to state parameters. They call for complementing the ‘national security’ structure and doctrine with ‘regional security’ structure and doctrine (cited in Francis, 2005: 91). Agreeing with Buzan et al, Dahl (1999) makes the case that because the “…boundaries of a country… are much smaller than the boundaries of the decisions that significantly affect the fundamental interests and security of its citizens”, the tent under which people shelter must include sub regional and regional tents if effective and durable security is to be assured (p. 319). Dahl argues further that regional security brings particular benefits that cannot be obtained through national security. For instance, sub regional and regional security can: a) enhance awareness about transnational threats; b) reinforce regional cooperation, confidence building and good neighbourliness; and c) enhance effectiveness in the security sector by strengthening coordination and integrated responses (ibid).
While there are obvious advantages, especially for fragile African states, to shelter together under regional as well as national tents, there are also challenges with the concept. In most cases, regional cooperation tends to be an excuse for regional hegemons to bully smaller states and extend their authority beyond their borders. Rivalries between Anglophone and Francophone West Africa and the visible dominance of Nigeria in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), has led to apprehension amongst countries of the sub region about the implications of ceding some of their national responsibilities for security to a sub regional body. This fear was substantiated during the seriously flawed interventions of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG)—the sub regional peacekeeping force established at the behest of Nigeria to end wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau.112 These realities account for the difficulty in the practical application of regional security policies, particularly in West Africa, although heads of states appear to be positive about the regional proposals (van Nieuwkerk, 1998). Besides the fear of hegemony, Nieuwkerk indicates that too much emphasis on regional security, given limited financial support, may leave much needed overhauling work on national security institutions undone (ibid). It may also create the false impression that strengthening regional security architecture automatically guarantees national security (ibid).
Notwithstanding its disadvantages, today’s threats with their transnational characters make a compelling case for regional security, even if a cautious case. Adebayo Oyebade and Abiodun Alao (1998) are more enthusiastic about the concept. In their edited book, Africa After the Cold War: The Changing Perspective on Security, the authors argue that the abandonment of African states by Western powers presents a golden opportunity to construct a “Pan-African security system”, with economic integration and cooperation as well as collective conflict resolution functions (1998: 189). Besides, it is important to point out here that African heads of states seem to have come to the conclusion long before the concept was written—that with their marginal place in global politics and sheer abandonment by world powers, sheltering together remains their only option for survival. All regional and sub regional institutions in Africa are actively developing regional security architectures, including conflict early warning systems—a domain that was only recently exclusive to the
state. ECOWAS, as a case in point, has taken the lead in Africa in overhauling its policies and institutions. Heads of States of ECOWAS revised the 1975 Treaty establishing the ECOWAS and a range of other supplemental protocols to establish the principle of supra-nationality. The principle in theory allows the sub regional body to intervene in member states in cases of gross human rights violations, internal violence with threats to sub regional security, crisis of governance, the forestalling of inclusive politics and trans-border insecurity, among others. The treaty also explicitly enjoins upon member states to ensure that all their peoples enjoy their fundamental human rights as well as uphold pluralism and market economy.113