Rather than attempting to build inter-societal ties between the newly-formed Tajikistan and Iran, Soviet authorities instead used the real and imagined linguistic and cultural commonalities which existed between these two societies to politically undermine Iran throughout the twentieth century. Such efforts on an unofficial level included pro-Soviet
87 Roy, The New Central Asia, 67.
88 Rakowska-Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism, 89 Ibid., 74.
126 Persian radio broadcasts beamed into Iran and the distribution of communist literature, and on an official level, the facilitation of a range of cultural, political, and social exchanges between Iran and Tajikistan’s intelligentsia which were developed as a means to spread communist and revolutionary messages and to highlight the superiority of the Soviet system to Iran’s population. The Soviets even went as far to shelter Iranian dissidents and anti-monarchy figures within Tajikistan’s borders.90 However, while Soviet propaganda efforts were extensive and at times acted as a major irritant to Iranian political authorities, inter-state interactions both on an inter-societal and now at an “inter- state” level between Iran and Soviet Tajikistan were indeed minor and almost non- existent throughout the rule of the Pahlavi dynasty. Although the Tajik intelligentsia took a greater interest in their Iranian roots, and embraced a range of Iranian symbols, histories, and myths, which were interpreted in a nationalistic and decidedly Tajik fashion,91 Iranian political elites continued to have very little interest in events occurring among their Persian-speaking brethren within the Soviet Union.
A number of factors, both domestic and international, explain the lack of interest among Iran’s political elites towards the Persian-speaking populations of Tajikistan throughout the Pahlavi rule, the most prominent of which lay in Iran’s inability to interact freely and fully with the Tajik SSR in a direct and “normal” state-to-state manner. The strongly centralised Soviet political system did not allow any form of independent foreign policy
90For instance, Abul Qasem Lahuti (1887–1957), an Iranian poet and writer, was involved in a number
of anti-monarchical activities in Iran during the 1910s and 1920s, the most famous of which was the Tabriz Rebellion of 1922. Lahuti fled to Tajikistan in the 1920s, becoming a close associate of Stalin and a key figure within Tajikistan’s intelligentsia. Under his pseudonym ‘Iransky’, Lahuti was responsible for a number of Comintern and Soviet publications relating to Iran for almost a quarter of a century. See Farhad Atai, "Soviet Cultural Legacy in Tajikistan," Iranian Studies 45, no. 1 (2011): 88; Stephanie Cronin, The Army and Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 1921-1926 (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), 49- 50.
91 For brief examples, see Muriel Atkin, “Religious, National, and Other Identities in Central Asia,” in
Muslims in Central Asia, ed. Jo-Ann Gross, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992); Marlene Laruelle, "The Return of the Aryan Myth: Tajikistan in Search of a Secularized National Ideology," Nationalities Papers 35, no. 1 (2007): 51-70
127 for its subject republics. All interactions with states outside of the Soviet Union occurred through, and at the behest of, central authorities in Moscow. This effectively placed Tajikistan out of the reach of Iranian policy planners, who in any event displayed very little interest in the small, and somewhat peripheral, population of Persian-speaking Tajiks in Central Asia. Although this was generally the case, Tajikistan—as the locale of “past Iranian glories”—did occasionally emerge within Iranian public discourse, with evidence that members of the Iranian majlis had at various times called for the return of Caucasian and Central Asian territories lost to Tsarist Russia, however no serious claims were ever made in the international arena to return these lands. In any event, concerns and international challenges much larger than grandiose visions of re-forming the borders of Greater Iran focused the minds of Iranian elites throughout the Pahlavi dynasty, and minimised Iran’s interests in Tajikistan and the wider Central Asian region. 92 Furthermore, Iran’s often tense relationship with the Soviet Union throughout the rule of both Reza Shah, and Muhammad Reza Shah placed considerable obstacles in front of Iran’s interests in, or relations with, the peripheral Central Asian regions under Soviet central control.
Under Reza Shah for instance, Iran’s relations with the Soviet Union were characterised by larger and much more pressing issues, such as Iran’s efforts to remove the series of unjust agreements signed between Iran and Tsarist Russia, and to prevent consistent Soviet meddling in Iran’s domestic affairs. The Soviets were key supporters of Iranian communist opponents, and were considered by a number of scholars as instrumental in the creation of the anti-monarchical Tudeh party.93 The material and ideological support
92 See Parker, Persian Dreams, 1-5.
93 The Tudeh (masses) party was nationalist, left-wing and anti-Western organisation, which was deeply
sympathetic to Stalinist-Marxist ideologies. Chaqueri, examined a wide array of primary sources emanating from the early 1940s, relating to conversations and meetings between Iranian communists and Soviet officials. According to Chaqueri these documents “clearly” show that the “Tudeh was a creation of the Soviet state, through the agency of its Red Army, thus demolishing the thesis that this organization was a genuine party established independently by the progressive elements who had been released from Reza
128 provided by the Soviets for communist movements in Iran was the cause of significant domestic instability and turmoil, and led to direct challenges to Iran’s ruling monarchy on a number of occasions.94 The Soviet-instigated domestic challenges faced by Reza Shah carried over to the international arena, where he had to carefully balance the demands and interests of Soviet authorities. Although Reza Shah made noteworthy gains in restoring Iranian independence following the humiliation it had suffered at the hands of European powers during the rule of the Qajars, he was ultimately unsuccessful. In 1941 the Soviet Union and Great Britain overthrew his rule and occupied Iran for five years, ostensibly as punishment for his pro-German stance and unwillingness to allow the Allies to use Iranian railway networks to resupply the Soviet Union.95
Following Reza Khan’s exile from the country, the occupying forces installed his more pliable son, Muhammad Reza to the Iranian throne. Throughout his reign, Muhammad Reza engaged in a tense and at times toxic relationship with Soviet authorities in Moscow. Whilst often proclaiming an independent and staunchly nationalist stance on international relations, Muhammad Reza Shah was heavily dependent upon, and deeply beholden to, the interests and influence of the United States, the Soviet Union’s Cold War adversary. Throughout his reign, the United States had great influence over Iran’s economic, political, cultural, and social affairs. This influence, according to Saikal,
Shah's jails on the morrow of Iran's occupation by the Allies.” See Cosroe Chaqueri, “Did the Soviets Play a Role in Founding the Tudeh Party in Iran?” Cahiers du Monde russe 40, no. 3 (1999): 523. Also see Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1973: A Study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975), 92; Maziar Behrooz, “Tudeh Factionalism and the 1953 Coup in Iran,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 33, no.3, (2001): 363-382.
94 Wheeler provides a number of examples of Soviet interference in Iran during the early twentieth
century, declaring that: “In Persia, Soviet tactics included an attempt to create a Soviet Republic in the northern province of Gilan, the establishment of eight Soviet consulates and a number of commercial organizations, clubs, and propaganda agents, the creation of a Persian Communist Party, and the exploitation, if not the actual instigation, of mutinies in the Persian army.” See Geoffrey Wheeler, “Soviet and Chinese Policies in the Middle East,” The World Today, 22, no. 2 (1966): 66-67
129 implied a narrowing of the Iranian regime’s policy options to a pro-Western, mainly pro-American stance in its domestic and foreign policy. Thus the regime, both officially and unofficially, tied Iran’s national development and foreign policy objectives to the interests of the West, which ensured Iran’s “dependence relationship” with the United States. In this relationship, Washington acted as a “Patron Power” preserving the Shah’s regime and influencing the direction and the content of its policies in line with western regional and international interests.96 The entrenchment of Iran within the “Western camp” was solidified by Iran’s entrance into the pro-Western Baghdad Pact, or the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in 1955, and the signing of a bilateral military agreement with the United States in 1959. Iran’s ties with the Soviet Union remained icy for almost 20 years, with the beginnings of a thaw in relations only taking place in 1962, when the Iranian government announced that it would not allow the stationing of foreign missiles on its soil, a move which was looked upon favourably by Soviet authorities in Moscow.97
The tentative beginnings of rapprochement between Iran and the Soviet Union brought to an end a number of the Soviet radio and press propaganda efforts, many of which had emanated across Iran’s Central Asian and Caucasian borders. Furthermore the Soviet Union declared its support for the Shah’s land reforms, and sought to rein in the anti- government actions of the Tudeh party.98 Although Iran remained closely allied to the United States, Iran did accept a number of low interest loans, and technical, economic, and military assistance from the Soviet Union, and in 1967 signed a series of long-term agreements with the Soviet Union to export Iranian oil and natural gas to bordering Soviet Republics Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.99 The warming of ties between Iran and the Soviet Union had finally opened up small but important opportunities for Iran to interact
96 Amin Saikal, “Iranian Foreign Policy, 1921-1979,” in The Cambridge History of Iran Volume 7, From
Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic, ed. Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly, and Charles Melville, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 445.
97 Parker, Persian Dreams, 3; Saikal, “Iranian Foreign Policy,” 436. 98 Yodfat, The Soviet Union, 29.
130 with Soviet Central Asia, a region that had ostensibly been sealed off from Iran for centuries. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Iranian authorities discussed a number of projects, which would economically link Soviet Central Asia to Iran, and Iranian officials often visited Tajikistan and the other Soviet Central Asian Republics on official and unofficial business.100
Although there was an increase in links between Iran and Tajikistan throughout the 1960s and 1970s, such links were largely restricted to the upper rungs of both societies’ intelligentsia, and usually revolved around discussions and exchanges in the fields of art and culture. Furthermore, while these cultural ties were important, the sense among Tajiks that they had a shared history and culture with Iran had been considerably weakened throughout the Sovietisation process. From the moment Tajikistan was conferred republican status within the USSR, Tajik academicians sought to reinterpret and create their own national culture, which although built upon symbols, myths, and histories familiar to Iranians, were however interpreted by Tajikistan’s elite in a nationalistic and decidedly Tajik fashion. From the changing of the alphabet from Arabic to Cyrillic by Soviet authorities, to Bobojon Ghafurov’s101 staunchly nationalistic attempts to claim much of Iran’s history solely for Tajikistan, Tajiks began to strongly and at times fervently view themselves not in terms of a greater Iranian civilisation, but rather in much narrower national terms, which had a major impact on weakening cultural links between Tajikistan and Iran throughout Soviet rule, but also had the effect of strengthening a Tajik national “self”.102
100 The most notable of these visits to Tajikistan was by the Shah’s sister, Ashraf Pahlavi in 1964. Amir
Taheri, Crescent in a Red Sky, The Future of Islam in the Soviet Union, (London: Hutchinson, 1989), 176.
101Bobojon Ghafurov was the First Secretary of the Tajik Communist Party between 1946 and 1956, and is widely considered as one of the most important figures in the development of Tajik historiography. 102 Ghafurov strongly argued that the Samanid state was the ‘endpoint’ for the development of a Tajik
national and ethnic identity. By making such a claim Ghafurov, according to Suyarkulova, sought to differentiate “Tajiks from Persians, arguing that although the Tajiks are of Persian stock, they have had an independent path in history and that it would be unfair to attribute all Persian heritage to contemporary Iran alone”. For instance, historical figures such as Omar Khayyam and Hafez were no longer Iranian but rather
131 Apart from these cultural links and developments, which occurred throughout the Pahlavi dynasty, Iranian authorities throughout the 1960s and 1970s discussed a number of projects which would economically link Soviet Central Asia to Iran. According to Taheri, “one proposal envisaged the construction of a railway line connecting Central Asia to the Gulf of Oman via Afghanistan and the Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchistan”.103 These plans, if they had come to fruition, would have eventually led to greater interaction at least on an economic level between Iran, Tajikistan, and the other Soviet Central Asian republics, however this plan was never enacted. Tajikistan remained isolated from the Iranian government, which had throughout the twentieth century been hamstrung by domestic concerns, had consistently implemented a deeply Western compromised foreign policy agenda, and had almost obsessively attempted to establish Iran as a “great power” in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regions.104 In these circumstances Tajikistan and the wider Soviet Central Asian region came a distant second in Iran’s regional foreign policy interests and agendas. Great changes however were only around the corner, and with the eventual fall of Muhammad Reza Shah, and the promulgation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iranian policy planners took a newfound interest in the Muslim populations of Central Asia, which would usher in the beginning of greater Iranian interest and influence in Tajikistan.
were Tajiks. See Mohira Suyarkulova, "Statehood as Dialogue: Conflicting Historical Narratives of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan," in The Transformation of Tajikistan: The Sources of Statehood, ed. John Heathershaw and Edmund Herzig (London: Routledge, 2013), 166-67. Ghafurov’s works were and remain extremely popular in Tajikistan. According to Nourzhanov and Bleuer, “Ghafurov’s monumental work The Tajiks: Archaic, Ancient and Mediaeval History, which laid claim to most of the classical Persian canon, was a milestone in the process of reinventing Tajik history. It quickly became the bible of every Tajik intellectual: in 1989, 62 per cent of tertiary students of the titular nationality had this book in their possession.” See Nourzhanov and Bleuer, Tajikistan: A Political and Social History, 173.
103 Ibid.
104 Ervand Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, 125; Suzanne Maloney, “Identity and Change in
132