Magnituds i unitats de mesura dels camps electromagnètics o CEM

‘The concept of enforced self-regulation is a response to the delay (Weidenbaum, 1979), red tape (Neustadt, 1980), costs (Moran, 1986), and stultification of innovation (Schwartzmann 1976; Wardell, 1979; Stewart, 1981) that can result from imposing detailed government regulations on business, and to the naiveté of trusting companies to regulate themselves (Cranston, 1978: 61-64)’ (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992: 106)

The limitations of the state have resulted in traditional enforcement practices and ‘policing’ approaches aiming for criminal prosecution as in the deterrence model, to be rethought. This has resulted in what some analysts have termed the new ‘regulatory state’ (Braithwaite, 2000; Moran, 2001). This new ‘regulatory state’ reflects a shift away from crime control as a problem of the state and has seen a transformation of the self-regulation model, as understood in traditional British society (Moran, 2001: 22-23). As Gill (2002: 537) notes, within this ‘regulatory state’, the most that the authorities can do is establish a structure of enforced self-regulation. Moran (2001: 22-23) highlights this transformation through reference to the regulation of the medical profession, the accountancy profession, and the financial markets. In each example, where traditional forms of self-regulation involving the creation and controlling of rules by the actors themselves used to exist, recent times have seen an encroachment on this way of operating towards governments prescribing how these actors should act. The Financial Services Act 1986 and 2000 and the role of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) represent this transformation. Such enforced self-regulation also shifts away from traditional methods of command and control (see Baldwin and Cave, 1999) and more direct methods of enforcement, as outlined above (see also Braithwaite, 2000: 224-225; Ogus, 1998: 374-388). A similar transformation can be seen in further analyses of ‘post-Keynesian policing’ whereby the focus on community policing highlights the extent to which the public are seen as ‘competent and skilled agents’ who are able ‘to govern themselves in ways approved by the appropriate experts (police, insurance companies, criminologists)’ (O’Malley and Palmer, 1996: 146).

Ayres and Braithwaite (1992: 101) suggest enforced self-regulation involves negotiation between the state and individual firms to establish regulations that are particularized to each firm, rather than its associated industry. In their model, each firm in an industry must propose its own regulatory standards in order to avoid more stringent and less tailored state

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imposed standards. Thus, the firm is required by the state to conduct the self-regulation but the privately created rules can be publicly enforced, and if inadequate, can be sent back for revision: in certain contexts it will be more efficacious for the regulated firms to take on some or all of the legislative, executive, and judicial regulatory functions, ‘a form of subcontracting regulatory functions to private actors’ (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992: 103), and a way of internalising enforcement duties and costs within the firms (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992: 106). Such enforced regulation can be distinguished from ‘coregulation’ theory, which refers to industry-association self-regulation with potential for oversight and ratification by government (Grabosky and Braithwaite, 1986: 83). Enforced self-regulation should also be embedded within schemes of escalated intervention, therefore retaining an element of public enforcement (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992: 103; see also ‘Integrated theories of regulation’ below). Thus, state involvement does not involve only monitoring but also sanctioning violations of privately written and publicly approved rules.

Numerous strengths and weaknesses are evident in such models of enforced self-regulation. Ayres and Braithwaite (1992: 110-116) outline a number of key strengths. First, rules would be tailored to match the company, would be more comprehensive in their coverage and could also be adjusted more quickly to changing business environments. Companies would also be more committed to rules they wrote. Second, the confusion and costs of having two rulebooks (government and company) would be reduced while business would bear more of the costs of its own regulation. This would foster regulatory innovation whereby more offenders would be caught more often, caught offenders would be disciplined in a larger proportion of cases and it would be easier for prosecutors to obtain convictions. Compliance would become the path of least corporate resistance.

The authors also point out a number of weaknesses (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992: 120-128). First, regulatory agencies would bear the costs of approving a vastly increased number of rules each year and in some cases state monitoring would sometimes be more efficient than private monitoring. Similarly, companies would bear increased costs in delay and paperwork from getting new company rules approved. This may worsen cooptation of the regulatory process by business. Second, in legal terms, Western jurisprudence might not be able to accommodate privately written rules being accorded the status of publicly enforceable laws

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and particularistic laws might weaken the moral force of laws that should be universal. Furthermore, companies would write their rules in ways that would assist them to evade the spirit of the law and even if not, companies cannot command compliance as effectively as government or their independence could never be fully guaranteed. The model may therefore encourage the trend to ‘industrial absolutism’. How these various issues would apply to companies of different sizes is unclear, as is the applicability of the approach to varying criminal activities. For example, would enforced self-regulation only be beneficial in regulating individuals within companies acting against the company, or also for the company? Whether the company is culturally and structurally corrupt would also present difficulties.