while “outsider” refers to decision-makers in dam construction and the compensation process. My basic hypothesis is that the more insiders and outsiders agree on the degrees of loss and opportunities in three dimensions of wealth, the more reasonable the compensation policies would be, and the less dissatisfaction affected villagers would have. I will test this hypothesis by further examining the villages visited during this study along the Upper-Mekong River.
The opinions of insiders were collected by interviewing affected people in the 10 study villages (far- and near-relocated villages at three dam sites), and those of outsiders were gleaned from government documents related to relocation and compensation. The outsiders’ comprehension of the villagers’ loss could determine the compensation, as well as some other subsidy policies. I compared the degree of dissatisfaction and the degree of agreement insiders and outsiders reached for the loss, and explored the relationship between them (The State Council of China 1991; The State Council of China 2006).
The perceptions for loss in material wealth are close for insiders and outsiders. Both of them agree that houses and farmland are the most important properties that were lost during dam construction. Therefore, various governmental policies were implemented to compensate villagers either by providing new properties, such as building new houses and/or clearing new farmlands, or money. Fair compensation for material wealth is the
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minimum requirement for an overall fair compensation policy, because it is the easiest to perceive and meet. Material wealth is quantitative and relatively easy to measure, thus if the compensation for it is unfair, villagers would know it immediately and be unhappy and disgruntled. In many government documents the government promised that the compensation policy would as least maintain the standard of living of relocated people. However, by addressing “at least maintain”, in most cases they only focused on material wealth, and compensated villagers with properties and money at least equal to their previous situation.
As for embodied wealth, farmers might not be able to use one or more of their skills due to environmental differences between their old and new location, but the government generally is not able to totally understand such loss. For example, sometimes the climate in the new area is different from that in the original area, which makes it unsuitable for growing the same crops. But compensation policies do not take this loss into consideration, and instead merely compensate with the same area of farmland. However, the government sometimes does generate opportunities for relocated villagers to develop new skills, thus enhance their embodied wealth. For example, the government might waive the business tax for relocated people for several years to encourage them to run small businesses.
When it comes to relational wealth, the government might build some basic physical infrastructure in the new villages to compensate the villagers’ loss in this type of wealth. For example, some migrant villagers have newly built clinics and schools, and some even have sanitation systems, which are rare in much of rural China. Road construction, which actually improved the transportation conditions of relocated people, is in most cases
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required for dam construction instead of being an intentional compensation policy for local people. In addition, some villages were moved to places closer to a county town, where the transportation, healthcare, and education conditions are better, and this could also be regarded as compensating for losses in relational wealth, or an opportunity for them to expand their relational wealth.
Manwan Dam was completed in 1995, and at that time the compensation for relocation was very low in China. The compensation for these villages was based on a government document enacted in 1991, Statute of Land Compensation and People Relocation in Large Hydraulic Project Construction. According to this document, farmland was to be compensated 3 to 4 times the average value of the yields over the last three years. If the land was used for irrigation or flood control projects, the compensation should be lower than the above rate. This was a very low compensation standard, and one that would not cover losses incurred by local people, even in material wealth. For example, near- relocated villagers in the Manwan affected area received unfair compensation for their material wealth during that period, which made the living conditions for local people extremely difficult and caused vehement complaints from villagers.
Completed in 1999, the Dachaoshan Dam project raised the compensation standards much higher than those associated with Manwan Dam. New houses were built with brick and timber, and the loss of land and forests was also fairly compensated. There were also compensations for embodied and relational wealth losses. The government began to realize losses occurring in these two types of wealth, and emphasized that: “when considering the allocation of education, healthcare and infrastructure funding, the government should give the counties who have relocated people high priority to help
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them recover the standard of living”; and “When constructing buildings in the affected area, the operating institutions should provide job positions to the affected people. The local government should also provide job opportunities to relocated people by invests and construction.” Therefore, people in far-relocated Dachaoshan villages thought that there were no major changes in their standards of living before and after the dam construction, even though they expressed concerns about irrigation limitations in their new villages.
Xiaowan Dam was in full operation in 2009. Compared to villagers affected by Manwan and Dachaoshan dams, people in the Xiaowan area got much higher compensation in terms of material wealth. The government once more raised the compensation standard for material wealth: farmland compensation was now to equal 16 times the average yields over the last three years, and if the compensation was unable to maintain the standards of living of the affected residents, the compensation could be adjusted to a higher level. Far- relocated villagers from Xiaowan Dam thought that they were much better off in housing. However, the compensation for their embodied and relational wealth was not put into effect, and villagers who had abandoned their agricultural activities had difficulties finding new jobs. This ineffective implementation of policy also caused widespread dissatisfaction.
After analysis, I conclude that the government’s increasing awareness of multi- dimensional wealth loss by villagers was the major reason for the different degrees of satisfaction in the three dam areas. In early 1990s, the government asked the people to “sacrifice their own rights to support the nation’s construction.” The dominant idea at that time was to put nation’s interest above individuals’. Therefore, compensation standards were very low in all the dimensions. In late 1990s, the government began to realize the
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importance of individual rights, and intended to provide fair compensation, at least in material wealth. After 2000, more dimensions of the wealth loss were taken into consideration in the compensation policies, such as creating job opportunities, and enhancing education and healthcare resources for the affected people. The results of my interviews show that the more the dimensions of wealth loss are perceived by the government, the more reasonable and fair the compensation policies are, and the less dissatisfaction affected people will have.