The current process of regionalisation in Spain can be traced to the period of democratic consolidation after the death of General Franco in 1975, its outcome heavily shaped by the institutional design of the 1978 Spanish Constitution; the resurgence of nationalist political cleavages (particularly in Catalonia and the Basque Country); and the subsequent behaviour of parties and legislators in the Spanish parliament (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Regionalisation in Spain also has more historical roots, such as the Second Republic (1931-6) which created self-governing institutions for the Catalan, Basque and Galician peoples, and the First Republic in 1873 which created 17 states with their own Constitution, Parliament, Executive and Judiciary (Beramendi and Maiz, 2004). Both these attempts at accommodating regional ‘diversity’ within the national ‘unity’ of the state were brought down by centralising and nationalistic dictatorships, illustrating the
5 Constitutional reforms approved by less than 2/3 of both Houses may be subject to a nationwide
referendum. While the centre-left sponsored Constitutional reform (2001) was convincingly approved by referendum (Yes 64.2%, No 35.8%), the centre-right sponsored Constitutional reform (2006) was clearly rejected by referendum (Yes 38.7%, No 61.3%). Although the centre-right reform was overwhelmingly rejected in central and southern Italian regions, a majority of voters supported the reform in Veneto and Lombardia. This highlights the close association of this reform with LN and the reluctant campaigning in its favour by other centre-right statewide parties, particularly AN and UDC (Roux, 2008)
perennial difficulty that Spain has encountered in managing its ‘nation’ and ‘state’ building processes in a democratic manner (Linz and Stepan, 1996). The 1978 Constitution reflected the difficult compromise between accommodating resurgent regionalist cleavages suppressed under the Franco regime, and ensuring that national legislators retained control over key policy areas and the process of decentralisation itself (Colomer, 1998). The enduring fear of a ‘military coup’ (actually attempted in 1981) served to reinforce this cautious attitude on the part of both national legislators and regionalist politicians (Gunther et al, 2004).
The 1978 Constitution neither reflects classic federal models, nor does it reflect a unitary model, and is instead tailored to the political realities of post-Franco Spain rather than any over-arching ideal form of institutional design (Colomer, 1998). The notion of ‘shared sovereignty’ between national and regional levels is not present, with Article 1.2 stating that ‘national sovereignty is vested in the Spanish people, from who emanate the powers of the State’. Article 2 nevertheless “recognises and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it (Spain) is composed”, and provides for the existence of regions, known as Autonomous Communities (AC). This must be considered alongside other provisions that stress the “indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and indivisible unity of all Spanish people” (Article 2) and the principle of “solidarity between regions” (Article 2), with a “just and adequate economic balance guaranteed by the wtate” (Article 138). While regions are able to proceed towards developing Statutes of Autonomy that outline their electoral system and fundamental rights, define their territorial boundaries, and list their legislative competences (Article 81), these do not have the status of Constitutional laws but are instead Organic Laws, which need to be ratified by the Spanish parliament in order to enter into force, with the further provision that they can be amended or repealed by an absolute majority of votes in the Congress (Article 81). Spanish is affirmed as the official language of the Spanish state, while other languages can be made co-official only within the region (Article 3). Although the competences of the Spanish government are extensive and clearly listed (Article 148), the competences of the regional governments are to be developed in the Statutes of Autonomy, with only a Constitutional list of the
powers and functions that regional governments can accede to with national approval (Article 149), subject to the framework of national laws establishing ‘harmonising principles’ (Article 150). While the principle of self-government is granted to all municipalities, provinces and regions (Article 137), the regions are forbidden from amending or abolishing the boundaries of the 52 Spanish provinces, which can only be done by the Spanish parliament through an Organic Law (Article 141). The national government can also suspend the law of an AC while it contests its legality in the Constitutional Court (Article 160), while the AC has no formal influence in the selection of the Constitutional Court (Article 159).6
Although the Senate is nominally the ‘House of Territorial Representation’ (Article 69), containing over 50 members delegated by the regional governments, around four-fifths (208) of Senators are actually elected on a provincial basis (4 senators per province), simultaneously with elections to the Congress (Article 69). Meanwhile the Senate has weak legislative powers and only acts as a minor revising chamber. The main ‘territorial’ features of the Senate are its ultimate capacity to decide on issues relating to the inter- territorial compensation fund; oblige divergent AC to comply with national laws and constitutions; and ratifiy inter-regional agreements (Stepan, 2001; Caravita, 2002). The 1978 Constitution did not automatically establish the AC but outlined two different routes for creating them. The ‘fast route’ (Article 151) was intended for the ‘historical communities’ of Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia, which had Statutes of Autonomy ratified during the Second Republic. The ‘slow route’ (Article 143) was intended for all other regions, so any AC created would be based on provincial units given the option to fuse and form larger units. Any such fusion would require the assent of a majority of regional and provincial voters as expressed in a referendum. In neither track was it possible to abolish the Spanish provinces.
Statutes of Autonomy were approved in Catalonia and the Basque Country by 1980, and were followed by regional elections won by nationalist parties (CiU in Catalonia, PNV in
6
The 12 members of the Spanish Constitutional Court are elected as follows: 4 by the Congress (3/5 majority), 4 by the Senate (3/5 majority), 2 nominated by the government and 2 nominated by the General Council of the Judiciary.
the Basque Country). The governing Union for a Democratic Centre (UDC) eventually agreed for the region of Andalusia to be given autonomous powers through the ‘fast track’ procedure for ‘historic’ regions, after considerable political mobilisation by the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE). Andalusia subsumed eight southern provinces and thereafter constituted the largest region in Spain, while the recognition of its dubious claims to ‘nationality’ status diluted the more distinctive nature of the Basque and Catalan claims (Genieys, 1998). The first regional elections were held in Andalusia in 1982, shortly after those held in Galicia (1981), the former region becoming a stronghold for the centre-left PSOE, while the latter became a stronghold for successive centre-right statewide parties (UCD, AP, PP). The main statewide parties developed bi-partisan agreements that sought to circumscribe and control (‘harmonise’) the entire process of regionalisation (Acuerdos Autonomicos), in recognition of its potentially centripetal tendencies. The first clear example of this was the LOAPA (Ley Organica de
Armonizacion del Proceso Autonomico), an Organic Law agreed in 1981 by the two main
statewide parties (UCD, PSOE), which sought to symmetrise the process of regionalisation (Colomer, 1998). While many aspects of this controversial Law were struck down by the Constitutional Court for violating the autonomy of regional governments, including a provision whereby the Spanish state could enact ‘basic laws and norms’ in areas of exclusive regional competence, other aspects of this agreement went unchallenged. Above all the decision was taken to establish regional governments across the national territory, subject to the development of Statutes of Autonomy. This eventually led to the creation of 13 ‘new’ regions, whose elections would be held concurrently with those of Spanish municipalities (1983, then at 4 year intervals) (Aja, 2001; Beramendi and Maiz, 2004). This provided full territorial coverage for regional governments in Spain, and transformed the regional question from an exclusively ‘vertical’ one (i.e. negotiation between the centre and a few autonomous ‘nationalities’) to one that incorporated a ‘horizontal’ dimension (i.e. negotiation between different regions over the allocation of power and resources).
A second Acuerdo Autonomico in 1992 between PSOE and PP agreed a ‘limit’ to regional competences, and endeavoured to bring the competences of ‘ordinary’ regions in
line with those of ‘historic’ regions. This not only occurred through statute reform, but also through the transfer of powers and financial resources by the Spanish Parliament without statute reform, a possibility envisaged under Article 150 of the Constitution (Beramendi and Maiz, 2004). This led to the functions of ‘ordinary’ regional governments becoming increasingly symmetrical with those of ‘historic’ regions. Government policies in education, culture, social welfare (except unemployment insurance) and health-care7 became almost entirely transferred to the regional government, which began to develop an important role in economic and environmental policy (Gunther et al., 2004). This was reinforced by a complementary process of administrative decentralisation in the 1990s, whereby the regional governments increased their administrative capacity significantly, alongside a reduction in the central bureaucracy (Gibbons, 2000).8 Yet several factors have prevented the enduring symmetrisation of regional competences. The first is the status of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia in the 1978 Constitution, where they are recognised as ‘historical nationalities’. This distinction was diluted after Andalusia became a ‘historic nationality’ and regional governments across Spain were given enhanced powers (Genieys, 1998), but it remains crucial in framing the political discourse of regional nationalists. The second factor is the process of bilateral negotiation to reform Statutes of Autonomy, which never occur simultaneously in all regions and can result in an asymmetrical distribution of regional competences and resources. The third is the retention of asymmetric ‘foral arrangements’ for fiscal transfers in the Basque Country and Navarre, allowing these regions to retain 90% of their revenue from taxation (Aja, 2001). This has encouraged other wealthy ‘historic’ regions (e.g. Catalonia) to demand similar arrangements. A fourth and crucial factor in fostering asymmetry is the presence of strong NSWP in ‘historic’ regions, which often control the regional government and may also have a determining impact on national government formation (Beramendi and Maiz, 2004).
7
In the case of healthcare legislation, around 60% of Spanish regions have full legislative authority, while in 40% of regions the national level retains some legislative authority on health matters, largely for financing reasons. (Rico et al.,1999).
8
In 1990, 60% of the Spanish administration was at the national level, 25% at the regional level and 15% at the local level. In 2001, this was reduced to 34% at the national level, increased to 46% at the regional level, and increased to 20% at the local level (Gibbons, 2000).
Although regional policy competences were mainly transferred in the 1980s, the transfer of financial resources was only completed in the 1990s. These fiscal reforms allowed Spanish regions to collect more of their ‘own resources’, reducing their dependence on the fiscal flows and policy priorities of the Spanish government. The reforms took place in two key stages, once under the PSOE minority government (1993), and once under the PP minority government (1996), which successively raised the level of income tax collected in non-foral regions to 15% and 30% (Beramendi and Maiz, 2004), and allowed regions to collect a series of indirect taxes (Aja, 2001). These reforms reflected significant pressure from NSWP on the PSOE and PP minority governments at national level, which relied on NSWP for their governing majority (Colomer, 1998; Beramendi and Maiz, 2004). NSWP in most bi-lingual regions (Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia) continue to insist on their ‘fundamental difference’ with the rest of Spain, and signed the Declaration of Barcelona (1998) that supported the differentiation of the ‘historic nationalities’ from other regions (Gunther et al., 2004). More recently Catalonia and the Basque Country embarked on a process of reforming their Statutes of Autonomy, creating considerable political conflict and generating somewhat asymmetrical outcomes (Keating and Wilson, 2009). The Ibarettxe Plan in the Basque Country, named after the incumbent regional president affiliated to the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), proposed a confederal model that recognised the sovereignty of the Basque Country and granted it almost total autonomy. This was approved in the regional parliament by Basque nationalists yet decisively rejected in the national parliament, because of the concerted opposition of the main statewide parties (Keating and Bray, 2006). The Maragall Plan in Catalonia, named after the regional president that led the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC), was an ambitious attempt to recognise a pluri-national State and increase the regional autonomy of Catalonia, supported by PSC and the main Catalan NSWP. Although its content was significantly modified by PSOE in the Spanish parliament, it was eventually approved by PSOE despite the hostility of PP, suggesting bi-partisan agreements on symmetrising the ‘State of Autonomies’ no longer hold (Keating and Wilson, 2009).The formal role of Spanish regions in national decision-making remains weak, while attempts to reform the Senate into a genuine ‘chamber of territorial representation’ have failed, partly because of the 3/5 majority required for Constitutional revision. This reflects the
lack of agreement between PSOE and PP on the ‘ideal’ design of the Spanish state, and unease among NSWP at wielding limited influence in a regionalised Senate. NSWP would inevitably form a parliamentary minority in such a body, because most regional governments are still controlled by SWP (Gunther et al, 2004). The absence of formal mechanisms for joint national decision-making has instead encouraged ‘competitive bargaining’ between regional leaders, who exert pressure on the national government for greater fiscal resources and enhanced policy competences (Colomer, 1998).