In this chapter, we tried to develop a theory about the competence condition and semantic content of PNs. The upshot was that the ascriber needs to grasp the A-meaning which helps him to designate the customary meaning possessed by the ascriber. Moreover, we tried to take the meaning to be part of the semantic content of PN, without taking it to be part of the semantic content of that-clause. In this section, we examine the consequence of our theory for the puzzles.
6.4.1
Frege’s Puzzle reconsidered
At the beginning of the previous chapter, we said that the assumption that two co-referring proper names are intersubstitutable salva veritate is based on two assumptions: (1) the semantic content of names are their referents (2) the substitution principle. Most of the theories that appeal to the notion of the “mode of presentation” reject the first of these two assumptions. Frege takes the sense as the semantic content of names in the scope of attitude verbs. Richard takes the vey linguistic expression to be part of the semantic content of the name within and outside these scopes. Therefore, we can see that philosophers have tried to solve the puzzle by giving an alternative theory about the semantic content of that-clauses.
This option is not available for us since we have already said thatmeaning is not part of the semantic contribution of a name to the that-clause. However, and our theory.
6.4. TWO PUZZLES RECONSIDERED 103 considering the meaning of names might help us to provide a more accurate explanation of the case. Assume that Maria is able to distinguish themeanings of Venus possessed by ancient astronomers. Consider the following reports as stated by Maria.
(i) Ancient astronomers believed that Hesperus shines in the evening. (ii) Ancient astronomers believed that Phosphorus shines in the evening. The intuition behind Frege’s puzzle is that the truth-values of the above ascriptions are different. Now, consider the following analysis of (i) and (ii):
(iii) There is a meaning which is designated by the ascriber and ancient astronomers grasped the semantic content of “Hesperus shines in the evening” under that meaning and ancient astronomers believed under that meaning that Hesperus shines in the evening.
(iv) There is ameaningwhich is designated by the ascriber and ancient as- tronomers grasped the semantic content of of “Phosphorus shines in the evening” under that meaning and ancient astronomers believed under that meaning that Phosphorus shines in the evening.
According to the above analysis, (iii) is true since ancient astronomers be- lieved the content of its that-clause under the meaning which is designated by the ascriber (i.e. Maria). (iv) is not true since ancient astronomers did not believe the content of its that-clause under themeaningdesignated. Therefore, “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” are not interchangeable salva veritate.
There is one important point that should be mentioned here. The linguistic expression that is used in the report by the ascriber does not matter. What makes a report true or false is the meaningof the subject through which the ascriber intends to refer. We can imagine a language in which they do not have the two terms for “Venus” and are still able to distinguish (i) from (ii). Exactly in a way that we can distinguish between two uses of the expression “Aristotle”26.
However, we can see that “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” are exceptional to some extent. We usually define a terms based on its semantic content. For instance, we define the term “tiger” as the name of the kind animal which has this or that descriptive feature. Usually, we do not define a term as the name for an object about which certain people have this specific belief. In other words, we do not take one of the A-meaningsof an expression to be part of the definition of a name. In this respect, “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” are exceptions. They are defined based on a A-meaning associated with them. Hence, using one of them by the ascriber also informs us about the A-meaning that she has in mind. This is the reason that we stated that “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” are not interchangeable salva veritate.
Here, we can see that our account accomplishes the goal that Soames tried to achieve. He tried to make the following assumptions compatible: a) two co-referring are not interchangeable salva veritate b) the semantic content of names are their referents. We tried to solve the puzzle without rejecting either
26As used to refer to the great ancient philosopher or to the second husband of Jacqueline
104 CHAPTER 6. PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES
of these assumptions. In our theory, the semantic contents of both “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” are their referent which is Venus. However, they are not interchangeable salva veritate. In the next subsection, we examine Kripke’s puzzle.
6.4.2
Kripke’s puzzle reconsidered
In this subsection, we suggest a solution to Kripke’s puzzle. In the example introduced by Kripke, Pierre does not know that the references of “Londres” and “London” are the same. He rationally has contrary beliefs about them. He takes the first one to be pretty and the second one not to be pretty. The question is how it is possible for an ascriber to report Pierre’s attitudes. Assume that an ascriber state the following ascription:
(i) Pierre believes that London is pretty.
It is not clear whether the above ascription is the report of Pierre’s beliefs about “London” or “Londres”. There are two problems concerning Kripke’s puzzle that need to be solved. First, we need to clarify in which sense Pierre is rational in believing that “Londres est jolie” and “London is not pretty” at the same time. Moreover, we need to explain how it is possible to meaningfully report Pierre’s attitudes.
In order to solve the first problem, we can say that the two seemingly incom- patible attitudes are not about the same object27 since the semantic content of
“Londres” and “London” as used by Pierre is different. Theother way is to say that they are about the same objectbut in different ways. By this, we mean that Pierrecharacterizes London in two different ways. The difference in his beliefs about “London” and “Londres” are not due to the different semantic contents of these two names but due to different way that he refers to these objects. A subject can rationally have different attitudes about the single object, provided that she characterizes that object in different ways and does not realize that they are different characterization of the same object.
As has been said, the notion of meaning28 is related to the way that a language user refers to an object. For instance, the reference of “Cicero” in the sentence “Cicero was an orator” as stated by James is determined by James meaningof Cicero. Kelly might have a differentmeaningof Cicero and there- fore determine the reference in another way. These different ways of determina- tion does not necessarily influence the content as far the mechanism of referring properly functions. It is also possible to say that a person may have different meaningsof a single object. Therefore, the content of his beliefs29 about that
object are determined in two different ways. In the above example, Pierre has
27The object of an attitude is what the attitude is directed at.
28Here, we mean customarymeaning.
29By the expression “the content of his belief”, we mean the proposition which is believed
by him. For instance, if Jay believes “Paris is the capital of France”, the content of his belief is the proposition expressed by this sentence (i.e. the truth-condition of this sentence). Given
this explanation, the meaning of “Paris” is not part of his content of belief, although it
functions like a guise under which Jay grasp the truth-condition of “Paris is the capital of France”.
6.5. CONCLUSION 105