Every theory rests on a foundation of epistemological assumptions, and the present theory is no exception. Many of its assumptions are so generally acknowledged and accepted that it would be tedious and counterproductive to discuss them here. Some are not, however, and need to be made explicit.
To begin with, it should be noted that ecological-evolutionary theory (as I have called the present theory) assumes that valid theory construction in the social
sciences requires frequent and continuous alternation between the processes of induc- tion and deduction. Neither process alone is sufficient, as is evident from the fail-
ure of countless efforts to build a viable theory of human societies “from the bottom up” by a process of induction or “from the top down” by the use of deduc- tive logic. Because of the fantastic complexity of sociocultural systems, we are compelled to shuttle back and forth endlessly between tentative theoretical asser- tions and empirical tests of those assertions, with the latter often leading to modi- fications of the theory and those, in turn, leading to new empirical tests.
In short, theory must be open-ended. This is one of the important differ- ences between science and religion and quasi-religions, such as the “scientific so- cialism” of Marxists of the recent past. The new evolutionary theory embraces the processes of self-correction and modification that are necessary consequences of a method involving the use of both induction and deduction.
Second, ecological-evolutionary theory assumes the necessity of the compara-
tive method. To say that the method is comparative is merely another way of say-
ing that the methodological basis of the theory is the same as that which underlies all of the sciences. From the perspective of science, nothing can be understood except when seen in relation to other things. No science can be based on the study of a single tree, a single star, or a single society, since all the characteristics that the sciences consider important—force, mass, speed, temperature, age—are abstrac- tions derived from a process of systematic comparison. In fact, it seems safe to say that the degree of scientific understanding of any entity or phenomenon tends to be proportional to the range and diversity of entities or phenomena to which it has been compared.
Unfortunately, this principle has often been ignored by sociologists, espe- cially in the United States since World War I. Ever since the rise of the Chicago school in the 1920s, the attention of most American sociologists has been focused on their own society, a tendency that Everett Hughes was once led to characterize as “ethnocentric sociology.” This tendency was greatly strengthened by the rise of functionalist theory, which sought to replace the older and more focused concept of “human societies” with the extremely abstract concept of the “social system” as the basic unit of analysis in sociological theory. By shifting the focus of theoretical concern to this vastly more inclusive concept, it became tempting to believe that theory could be constructed satisfactorily merely by comparing various social sys- tems within a single society. Thus, the comparisons of primary groups with bu-
Problem and Method 15 reaucracies, for example, could substitute for the comparison of one kind of soci- ety with another.
Had this logic been made more explicit, its inadequacy would have become obvious. Instead, it remained largely unstated with the result that a subtle, but profound, change occurred in the nature of the problems sociologists studied. Increasingly, American sociology became, as Hughes observed, the study of Ameri- can institutions and American organizations. Worse yet, it became the study of
contemporary American institutions and organizations, as functionalist theory le-
gitimized static, structural analyses in which the time dimension was ignored or largely neglected. Thus, the study of change—especially macrochronic change— almost disappeared during the heyday of functionalism.
Ecological-evolutionary theory seeks to restore the comparative study of human societies to its former place at the core of sociology. The theory assumes that subsocietal systems, such as families, religious groups, and work groups, can- not be adequately explained without substantial understanding of the societal systems in which they are embedded, and this understanding can come only from the systematic, comparative study of the universe of human societies, past
as well as present. One reason for the frequent allegation that American soci-
ology is little more than common sense packaged in obfuscating jargon is the failure of American sociologists to employ the tools of the comparative method. For, while substantial knowledge of one’s own society is acquired by most people simply as a part of the socialization process, systematic knowledge of human societies as a whole, and the relevance of this knowledge to one’s own society, is not.
Third, the new evolutionary theory assumes the necessity of incorporating the
time dimension into both theory and research. No amount of knowledge of the
characteristics of a society, or set of societies, at any single point in their history can substitute for knowledge of these characteristics over the entire history of the society, or set of societies. Data pertaining to change are especially important in efforts to explain the characteristics of societies. In fact, the experimental method— the most powerful tool available to science—presupposes the possibility of ob- serving and measuring phenomena at two or more points in time.
Unfortunately, data on extended sequences of change that measure up to the rigorous requirements of the experimental method are rarely available in the social sciences, and methodological compromises are unavoidable. Where better data are lacking, we are forced to rely on correlational data and on data for which many relevant controls are lacking. Such efforts, though subject to criticism by purists, can be justified on the grounds that some evidence is better than none at all, and that weak inferences based on such evidence are better than pure specula- tion or the refusal to deal with important questions merely because the evidence leaves much to be desired. Moreover, there is a measure of protection against possible abuse in such cases, since multiple imperfect tests of hypotheses are often possible. Furthermore, elements of a theory that are based on limited evidence
and weak inferences must always be congruent with other elements of the theory that rest on firmer foundations.
Fourth, modern evolutionary theory assumes that human societies are systems,
but imperfect systems. In other words, it assumes that human societies are entities
made up of interrelated parts, and that this is critical to an understanding of their various characteristics. They are not simply aggregations of unrelated elements in chance conjunction with one another, as are the contents of a typical trash container. Thus, students of human societies cannot safely adopt the reductionist strategy of analyzing only the components of societies in the expectation that the sum of the explanations of the components will be the explanation of the society as a whole.
At the same time, however, it is important to keep in mind that human societies fall far short of what we expect of a true, or ideal, system. The actions of the parts are not nearly as well coordinated as we find them in mechanical or electronic systems, and the interests of the members of human societies, unlike those of the members of certain insect societies, often lead to intrasystem conflict. Failure to take these facts into account can lead to a very misleading view of human societies, especially the larger, more complex, and interdependent of them. Thus, while it is necessary to take account of the substantial interdependence of the parts of every human society, it is important not to exaggerate the degree of that interdependence (W. Moore, 1963).
Fifth, the new theory is committed to what Marvin Harris (1968, 1979) has called the etic principle. In other words, the scientific community—rather than the members of the societies whose organization and activities are being analyzed— is considered the ultimate judge of the adequacy of categories, concepts, and ex- planations relating to individual societies or sets of societies. Thus, evolutionary theory today differs from ethnomethodology, symbolic interactionism, deconstructionism, and other subjectivist theories. Members of societies may sug- gest categories, concepts, or explanations, but they are not considered the best judges of their adequacy.
Finally, the theory presented in this volume is probabilistic and
nondeterministic. The theory does not claim that it will ever be possible to explain
and predict with precision all of the characteristics of human societies. On the contrary, it assumes that many of them will remain unexplainable and unpredict- able. In part, this is due to the phenomenon of emergence, which, as we have seen, is an essential element of the evolutionary process. Also, because of the com- plex nature of human societies, the relatively small number of cases available for study and analysis, the imperfections in the data sources, and the impossibility of controlled experimentation, formulations of relations can rarely be both precise and highly specified at the same time. Finally, there is an inevitable tradeoff be- tween the goal of explanatory parsimony and the goal of explanatory adequacy: Striving for adequacy alone leads to a theory that explains everything in terms of everything. In effect, the development of a parsimonious theory of human societ- ies requires that some information be deliberately ignored. For example, while there is reason to believe that every individual and every event in a society has
Problem and Method 17 some influence, however minuscule, on the subsequent development of that soci- ety, ecological-evolutionary theory makes no attempt to take all of these forces into account. However, by excluding them from its explanans, the theory neces- sarily introduces an element of unpredictability into its analysis.1