Maneras de asegurar la calidad

Heavy artillery preparation of firing positions, command posts, manmade obstacles, and artillery and mortar battery firing positions preceded the breakthrough of German defenses on Sredniy Peninsula. For this combined artillery effort in support of the breakthrough forces, Northern Defensive Region artillery was divided into long range artillery, artillery in direct support of 12th Naval Infantry Brigade, artillery in direct support of 63rd Naval Infantry Brigade, shore battery artillery, and direct lay artillery. The organization of artillery forces and the distribution of targets for the artillery preparation are shown in figures 18 and 19.

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[Figure 19. Distribution of targets for suppression by Northern Defensive Region artillery.]

The preliminary destruction of German defensive fortifications was begun 24 hours prior to the beginning of the offensive. It was carried out by batteries of 104th Cannon

Artillery Regiment and the howitzer battalion of 12th NIB’s direct support group. Thirty- one firing positions and many enemy observation points were destroyed, which disrupted his system of fires in the breakthrough sector to a significant degree.

Prior to the beginning of the offensive, artillery preparation was conducted in the following phases:

A five-minute barrage on targets along the forward edge, and against command posts and reserves in the area of Hill 388.9 was conducted first. All Northern Defensive

Region artillery participated in this barrage. After the barrage, artillery groups carried out their respective missions for the remainder of the preparatory period.

• the long range artillery group fired upon batteries and parts of batteries, at fortifications in the forward edge and against observation posts;

• shore batteries conducted fires on enemy coastal artillery and, in some cases, field artillery;

• _{direct-fire artillery groupings engaged enemy bunkers, unimproved positions,} and trenches with aimed fire, using vertical and horizontal limits established for their guns during daylight, and illuminated aiming posts.

Batteries designated for blinding and suppressing enemy observation posts fired a combination of smoke and high explosive rounds, and successfully executed their mission. The low intensity, disorganization, and inaccuracy of enemy mortar and artillery fires in response to Northern Defensive Region’s massive artillery preparation attest to this.

Another barrage was fired at the forward edge of the enemy’s defenses in the final 10 minutes of the 90-minute artillery preparation. The effectiveness of the artillery

preparation was so great that almost all of the enemy’s fire support was silenced, and only scattered batteries and firing positions were able to conduct unaimed fire. The naval infantrymen, concentrating for the attack, went forward in the offensive almost without losses.

The guns and mortars of Northern Defensive Region expended 47,000 artillery and mortar rounds during the artillery preparation, which lasted from 0330–0500 on 10 October.

The offensive was supported by rolling accompanying fires, fired by 12th and 63rd NIB direct support artillery. The shifting of fires from one line to another was

accomplished by signals from the infantry. In addition, artillery forward observer teams located with attacking units were able to provide support to the infantry with adjusted artillery fire throughout the depth of the attack.

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Northern Defensive Region engineer units prepared an attack position during the preparation for the breakthrough of the German defenses. While the artillery preparation was being fired, engineer troops were clearing passage lanes into the forward edge of the enemy’s defenses. Utilizing dead space in the terrain, the breakthrough forces moved unnoticed by the enemy up to the line of attack. The point of departure at the line of attack for the breakthrough forces is shown in figure 20.

[Figure 20. Start positions of the breakthrough forces at the line of attack and their offensive.]

One or two engineer soldiers accompanied each naval infantry subunit, acting as guides through the minefields and barbed wire obstacles as it began the attack. More than 1,000 anti-personnel mines, four high-explosive, and two flame devices were removed from enemy minefields prior to the attack. An additional 200 anti-personnel mines, 130 high- explosive, and one flame device were removed during the occupation of Hill 146.0.

At 0500 on 10 October, on signal, the artillery shifted fires into the depth of the enemy defenses, and the battalions launched the attack on the forward edge of the

German positions. 2nd Battalion and 3rd Battalion of 12th Naval Infantry Brigade, along with 614th Separate Punishment Company, advanced slowly under heavy machinegun fire on their designated axes. 1st Battalion was delayed in its sector, because on the way to Hill 146.0, it came upon a barbed wire obstacle that the engineers had failed to eliminate. The battalion went to ground at the foot of the hill and managed to reach the top only at 0930. This delayed the tempo of the battle along the entire forward edge, and the breakthrough forces were able to reach the southern slopes of Musta-tunturi ridge only by 1200 on 10 October. There, near Lake Tie-yarvi, they linked up with 3rd Battalion of 63rd Naval Infantry Brigade, which had landed during the night of 9–10 October on the southern shore of Maattivuono Bay.

Thus, overcoming determined enemy resistance, the breakthrough forces moved only one kilometer in seven hours of action in this sector. 1st Battalion lost up to 40 personnel killed and wounded, 2nd Battalion and 614th Separate Punishment Company lost up to 60 personnel. 12th Naval Infantry Brigade did not advance farther on this day, but instead consolidated its units and cleared mines in its positions.

During the night of 10–11 October, reconnaissance was conducted of sectors of the German defenses that were not attacked during the day. Several firing positions

abandoned by the Germans were occupied. By 0700 on 11 October, reconnaissance had determined that the enemy had abandoned positions in the area of Hill 270. At 0800, it was noted that the enemy had laid down a smoke screen in the areas of Hills 122.0 and 388.9, apparently to cover his withdrawal. The enemy had abandoned all his positions on the isthmus of Sredniy Peninsula during the night.

At 0630 on 11 October, 12th Naval Infantry Brigade commander received the order to continue the offensive and reach the area of Hills 270 and 194.7. The 4th Battalion, which was in the reserve of the Northern Defensive Region commander, was sent to the area of Lake Ozerko (on Sredniy Peninsula) for employment by the brigade commander.

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Brigade units began to move forward to their designated objectives, meeting no enemy resistance. Contact with the enemy was lost. Battalion artillery, which was supposed to stay with the infantry units, moved with extreme difficulty. At first horses pulled the guns, but soon the horses gave out, due to the fact that the forces were advancing over extremely broken terrain without roads. The guns had to be dragged by hand. This demanded a great deal of time and energy. Artillery fell behind and was able to catch up with the infantry only when it reached the road leading from Musta-tunturi to Hill 388.9.

347th and 348th Separate Machinegun Battalions went into the attack at dawn on 11 October, simultaneously with the advance of 12th Naval Infantry Brigade units.

Overcoming barbed wire and mine obstacles in its sector, 348th Battalion reached the southern slopes of Yaukhonokan-tunturi hill, and 347th Battalion was occupying the area of Hill 109.0 by 2200.

While units of 12th NIB, attacking on 11 October, were trying to establish contact with enemy forces that had withdrawn during the night, 63rd Naval Infantry Brigade was moving southeastward with its 3rd and 4th Battalions. By 1000 on 11 October, they reached the area of Hill 388.9. The battalions attacked the German units on this hill from the march and defeated them.

Pursuing the retreating enemy, 3rd and 4th Battalions of 63rd Naval Infantry Brigade reached the southern slopes of Hills 388.9 and 326.5 by 1400. Here they cut the single road to the west along which the enemy was conducting his withdrawal. The brigade’s 2nd Battalion, comprising the brigade commander’s reserve, was moving up to the area of Lake Usto-yarvi at this time.

On this day, the brigade’s 1st Battalion fought with enemy forces of up to battalion strength in the area of Hill 268, one kilometer north of Titovka−Porovaara Road. Because of mistaken orientation, however, the battalion commander believed he was located near Hill 299. The enemy counterattacked three times near Hill 368, but each time was driven off by the battalion’s submachinegun and machinegun fires.

By 1800 on 11 October, up to 35 percent of the men were out of action, and the battalion commander went over to the defense on the southern slopes of Hill 268. At the same time, he requested aid from the brigade commander. The 4th Battalion, sent by the brigade commander from Hill 388.9 to Hill 299 to support 1st Battalion, could not find the battalion in that location, because it actually was not there, but near Hill 268.

The approach of nightfall did not permit the battalions of 63rd Naval Infantry Brigade to continue fighting. By nightfall on 11 October, they occupied the positions shown in figure 20:

• 1st Battalion, along with 3rd Company of 2nd Battalion and 2nd Company of 4th Battalion, which had linked up with it during the landing, was in the area of Hill 268;

• _{2nd and 3rd Battalions were in the area of Hill 388.9;} • 4th Battalion was in the area of Hill 299.

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At this same time, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions of 12th Naval Infantry Brigade were located east of Lake Usto-yarvi, and 4th Battalion was on the move from Ozerko to the area of Hill 388.9.

1st Obstacle Detachment, which was operating in the second echelon of the

breakthrough forces, occupied defensive positions on Musta-tunturi ridge on 11 October. Thus, by the end of the second day, Northern Defensive Region attacking units had executed their assigned mission, to reach Titovka–Porovaara Road. This was

accomplished 24 hours earlier than envisioned by the operational plan, because the enemy offered less resistance than expected. In the course of two days, the forces advanced only six kilometers (as far as the area of Hill 388.9). This cannot be

acknowledged as a sufficiently high rate of advance, given the conditions under which it was conducted. This allowed the enemy to break contact with the naval infantry units that were breaking through his defensive positions and avoid their attacks on the night of 10–11 October.

The necessity to have pursued the enemy more energetically after breaking through his defensive positions is attested to by reports from aerial reconnaissance. An air reconnaissance sortie flown from Pummanki airfield at dawn on 10 October observed, for example, the enemy’s southward withdrawal from the isthmus of Sredniy Peninsula. The same pilot observed heavy westward vehicle and cart traffic along Titovka–

Porovaara Road on the morning of 10 October. Separate groups of retreating enemy infantry units were also observed.

Fleet Air Forces carried out continuous observation behind the front line and on roads leading out of the battle area in order to stay informed on the current situation. On 11 October, air reconnaissance observed an accumulation of enemy vehicle transports, carts, and personnel in the road sector near Lakes Suormus-yarvi and Mutka-yarvi. Air strikes were called in on these targets, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy (figure 21). [Figure 21. Northern Fleet Air Forces strikes on ground targets.]

With the arrival of naval infantry units in the area of Hill 388.9, air strikes were shifted to German forces retreating along the road to Porovaara. It was clear that the enemy was withdrawing ahead of Northern Defensive Region units, covering his retreat with

rearguard units in positions prepared earlier. By this time, the Northern Defensive Region commander was aware of the enemy’s retreat along the entire sector of the Western Litsa line, in front of Karelian Front’s forces. Liaison officers periodically transmitted operational information about the situation in 14th Army’s sector to fleet headquarters.

By dawn on 12 October, it had also become clear that the enemy had abandoned his positions in front of 1st Battalion, 63rd Naval Infantry Brigade near Hill 268 during the night, and was retreating toward Porovaara. The commander of 63rd NIB received the order from the Northern Defensive Region commander to begin pursuit.

With this objective, 1st Battalion reached the road to Porovaara at 0700. By 1000, the entire brigade was on the march, with the reconnaissance company out in front and 2nd Battalion acting as rear guard. The enemy did not offer any resistance, and the

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brigade, clearing the road of mines and explosive demolitions, reached the 1940

international border23 _{by 1830. Nightfall forced brigade units to halt and spend the night}

here.

With the departure of 63rd Naval Infantry Brigade toward the west, 12th Naval Infantry Brigade battalions took up defensive positions southwest and south of Lake Usto-yarvi, with the mission to prevent any enemy withdrawal from Titovka.

Late on 11 October, and again on 12 October, Fleet Air Forces maintained

continuous observation on the road to Porovaara and conducted air strikes on retreating German troop and vehicle columns. Air reconnaissance on 12 October observed the retreat of units and movement of German vehicle columns also from Pechenga toward the west. Air reconnaissance reports indicated that the enemy was apparently not planning to hold in the Pechenga area. It would seem that this information about the change in the situation should have generated a decision by the Northern Defensive Region commander to employ the forces available to him to move more quickly to the shore of Petsamovuono Inlet. The more so because the arrival of the naval infantry brigade at Titovka–Porovaara Road was the fulfillment of his subsequent mission in his combat order.

Changes in the situation in connection with the fleet commander’s decision to capture Liinakhamari port on the night of 12–13 October, and also the rapidly changing situation of the reconnaissance detachments of Northern Defensive Region and fleet headquarters in the battle on Cape Krestovyy, also should have prompted his thinking.

Nonetheless, until dawn on 13 October, the commander of Northern Defensive Region did not dispatch a single unit from 63rd Naval Infantry Brigade to reestablish contact with the enemy or to reach Cape Krestovyy and support the reconnaissance detachments. Only at 0530 on 13 October, after spending the night at the 1940 international border, did 63rd NIB units set out for Porovaara. Their mission was to assemble on Cape Krestovyy by the end of the day, and to cross over to Liinakhamari for actions to seize Trifona settlement upon the arrival of boats.

12th Naval Infantry Brigade units set out from the area of the road intersection between Lakes Usto-yarvi and Suormus-yarvi at 0850 on 13 October, for movement to Porovaara behind 63rd NIB.

The insufficiently rapid forward advance of the naval infantry on 11 and 12 October can be explained by delays along the way caused by mineclearing on the road, bridge construction, and obstacle removal, as well as the large gap between the infantry and the supporting artillery. The latter resulted from the fact that artillery units were not able to employ their designated march routes, because the single road across Musta-tunturi toward Hill 388.9 was mined. The artillery was forced to bypass through Kutovaya and Titovka. On 11 October, all the artillery and tanks were moving along this road, which was also mined, blocked with rubble, or had bridges destroyed in many places.

Therefore, movement along it was also greatly delayed. Under these conditions, the

23 _{Recall that Finland ceded territory here to the Soviet Union in March 1940 after being defeated in the}

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artillery was able to link up with the forward naval infantry units only by the morning of 14 October.

By 1100 on 13 October, naval infantrymen of the forward elements of 63rd Naval Infantry Brigade were meeting enemy resistance east of Mikulan-tunturi. Having

defeated the enemy security forces, the naval infantrymen were engaging in the battle for the approaches to Hill Mikulan-tunturi.

The enemy attempted to delay the attack on Porovaara at this hill with a force of up to a battalion. Brigade units, at this time still lacking artillery support, used their infantry weapons systems and air strikes to defeat the fierce enemy resistance. They occupied the area of Hill Mikulan-tunturi at approximately 1600. While this battle was being fought, 3rd Battalion of 63rd NIB, operating on the brigade’s southern flank, linked up with units of 95th Rifle Regiment, 14th Rifle Division, at 1410.

The capture of the area around Hill Mikulan-tunturi opened the path for subsequent movement of 63rd Naval Infantry Brigade toward Porovaara. But due to the onset of darkness, it was unable to develop a sufficiently energetic pursuit. The brigade had only reached the outskirts of Porovaara by 2000 on 13 October, with 4th Battalion on the right flank, 3rd Battalion on the left, 2nd Battalion in the center, and 1st Battalion in reserve.

The Northern Defensive Region commander decided that 63rd Naval Infantry Brigade was sufficient by itself to destroy the enemy in this area and reach the shore of Petsamovuono Inlet. He ordered 12th Naval Infantry Brigade to turn off the Porovaara road on the evening of 13 October and move to Cape Krestovyy. Their mission was to assemble there by 0100 on 14 October for loading on cutters and transit across the bay to Liinakhamari, there to assist in the capture of Trifona.

12th NIB, carrying out its assigned task, left Porovaara road at 1800 on 13 October and headed toward Cape Krestovyy. The cross-country movement during darkness was so difficult that brigade units lost contact with each other enroute. They had to halt in order to reestablish command and control and reconnoiter the route. As a result of this, the brigade did not arrive at Cape Krestovyy at the designated time, but reached it only by 0800 on 14 October. By this time, the reconnaissance detachments had already crossed over to Liinakhamari.

The men of 12th NIB were exhausted by the difficult night march. Their units did not have provisions and ammunition beyond that carried by the troops on their backs. The brigade began to cross the bay to Liinakhamari at noon on 14 October, and finished by 1700. Having designated part of its force for extinguishing fires in Liinakhamari, the brigade set off to capture Trifona settlement. 1st and 3rd Battalions of 12th NIB occupied Trifona without a fight by late in the evening of 14 October.