Manifestaciones de violencia interna

FACTS

- January 17, 1921, the plaintiff sold two parcels of lands to the defendant for the lump sum of P47,000, payable in installments.

- The conditions of the payment were: P5,000 at the time of signing the contract Exhibit A; P20,000 upon delivery by the vendor to the purchaser of the Torrens title to the first parcel described in the deed of sale, P10,000 upon delivery by the vendor to the purchaser of Torrens title to the second parcel; and lastly the sum of P12,000 one year after the delivery of the Torrens title to the second parcel.

- The vendee paid P5,000 to the vendor when the contract was signed. The vendor delivered the Torrens title to the first parcel to the vendee who, pursuant to the agreement, paid him P20,000. In the month of March 1921, Torrens title to the second parcel was issued and forthwith delivered by the vendor to the vendee who, however, failed to pay the P10,000 as agreed, neither did she pay the remaining P12,000 one year after having received the Torrens title to the second parcel. - The plaintiff here claims the sum of P22,000, with legal interest from the month of April 1921 on the sum of P10,000, and from April 1922 on the sum of P12,000, until full payment of the amounts claimed.

- Defendant admits that she purchased the two parcels of land referred to by plaintiff, but alleges in defense: (a) That the plaintiff knowing that the second parcels of land he sold had an area of 60 hectares, by misrepresentation lead the defendant to believe that said second parcel contained 98 hectares, and thus made it appear in the deed of sale and induced the vendee to bind herself to pay the price of P47,000 for the two parcels of land, which he represented contained an area of no less than 200 hectares, to which price the defendant would not have bound herself had she known that the real area of the second parcel was 60 hectares, and, consequently, she is entitled to a reduction in the price of the two parcels in proportion to the area lacking which ought to be reduced to P38,000

- The lower court, having found no fraud when the parties agreed to the lump sum for the two parcels of land described in the deed Exhibit A, following article 1471 of the Civil Code, ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P19,300 with legal interest at 8 per cent per annum from April 30, 1921 on the sum of P7,300, and from April 30, 1922, on the sum of P12,000.

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ISSUE

WON there was fraud in the circumstances leading to the agreement in the contract

HELD

NO

- There is no evidence of record that the plaintiff made representation to the defendant as to the area of said second parcel, and even if he did make such false representations as are now imputed to him by the defendant, the latter accepted such representations at her own risk and she is the only one responsible for the consqunces of her inexcusable credulousness. In the case of Songco vs. Sellner (37 Phil., 254), the court said:

The law allows considerable latitude to seller's statements, or dealer's talk; and experience teaches that it as exceedingly risky to accept it at its face value. Assertions concerning the property which is the subject of a contract of sale, or in regard to its qualities and characteristics, are the usual and ordinary means used by sellers to obtain a high price and are always understood as affording to buyers no grund from omitting to make inquires. A man who relies upon such an

affirmation made by a person whose interest might so readily prompt him to exaggerate the value of his property does so at his peril, and must take the consequences of his own imprudence.

- The defendant had ample opportunity to appraise herself of the condition of the land which she purchased, and the plaintiff did nothing to prevent her from making such investigation as she deemed fit, and as was said in Songco vs. Sellner, supra, when the purchaser proceeds to make investigations by himself, and the vendor does nothing to prevent such investigation from being as complete as the former might wish, the purchaser cannot later allege that the vendor made false representations to him.

- "One who contracts for the purchase of real estate in reliance on the

representations and statements of the vendor as to its character and value, but after he has visited and examined it for himself, and has had the means and opportunity of verifying such statements, cannot avoid the contract on the ground that they were false or exaggerated."- She did not complain of the difference in the area of said second parcel until the year 1926.

- More so, it appears that by the contract Exhibit A, the parties agreed to the sale of two parcels of land, the first one containing 102 hectares, 67 ares and 32 centares, and the second one containing about 98 hectares, for the lump sum of P47,000 payable partly in cash and partly in installments. Said two parcels are defind by means of the boundaries given in the instrument. Therefore, the case falls within the provision of article 1471 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:

ART. 1471. In case of the sale of real estate for a lump sum and not at the rate of a specified price for each unit of measure, there shall be no increase or decrease of the price even if the area be found to be more or less than that stated in the contract.

- As the hectares were paid due to a lump sum and not based of a defined unit of measure – if the sale was made for a price per unit of measure or number, the consideration of the contract with respect to the vendee, is the number of such units, or, if you wish, the thing purchased as determined by the stipulated number of units. But if, on the other hand, the sale was made for a lump sum, the consideration of the contract is the object sold, independently of its number or measure, the thing as determined by the stipulated boundaries, which has been called in law a determinate object.

- From all this, it follows that the provisions of article 1471 concerning the delivery of determinate objects had to be materially different from those governing the delivery of things sold a price per unit of measure or number.

- The reason for the regulation is clear and no doubts can arise from its application. It is concerned with determinate objects. The consideration of the contract, and the thing to be delivered is a determinate object, and not the number of units it contains. The price is determined with relation to it; hence, its greater or lesser area cannot influence the increase or decrease of the price agreed upon. We have just learned the reason for the regulation, bearing in mind that the Code has rightly considered an object as determinate for the purposes now treated, when it is a single realty as when it is two or more, so long as they are sold for a single price constituting a lump sum and not for a specified amount per unit of measure or number.

TRINIDAD V IAC

;

3, 1991

CRUZ December

Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS

- Sometime in early 1969, Laureta Trinidad, petitioner, approached Vicente J. Francisco and offered to buy the property. The house was Bungalow No. 17, situated at Commonwealth Village in Quezon City. Francisco was willing to sell. Trinidad inspected the house and lot and examined a vicinity map which indicated drainage canals along the property. The purchase price was P70,000 with a down payment of P17,500. The balance was to be paid in 5 equal annual installments not later than July 1 of each year at 12% interest per annum.

- On March 29,1969, Trinidad paid Francisco P5,000 as earnest money and entered into the possession of the house. She heard from her new neighbors that two buyers had previously vacated the property because it was subject to flooding. She talked to Francisco who told her everything had been fixed and the house would never be flooded again. Thus assured, she gave him P12,500 to complete the down payment. They signed the Contract of Conditional Sale on August 8,1969.

- The Contract of Conditional Sale contains a *condition that should Trinidad fail to make any of the payments the contract shall be considered automatically rescinded and cancelled without the necessity of notice or of any judicial declaration to that effect, and any and all sums paid shall be considered rents and liquidated damages for the breach, and Trinidad shall vacate the property peacefully.

- Trinidad paid the installment for 1970 and 1971 on time but asked Francisco for an extension of 60 days to pay the third installment due on July 1, 1972. However, she eventually decided not to continue paying the amortizations because the house was flooded again on July 18, 21, and 30, 1972, the waters rising to as high as five feet on July 21. Upon her return from the US on October 11, 1972, she wrote the City Engineer's office of QC and requested an inspection to determine the cause of the flooding. The finding of City Engineer Pantaleon P. Tabora was that "the lot is low and is a narrowed portion of the creek."

- On January 10, 1973, Trinidad filed her complaint against Francisco alleging that she was induced to enter into the contract of sale because of his misrepresentations. She asked that the agreement be annulled and her payments

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refunded to her, together with the actual expenses she had incurred for the "annexes and decorations" she had made on the house. She also demanded the actual cost of the losses she had suffered as a result of the floods, moral and exemplary damages in the sum of P200,000 and P10,000 attorney's fees.

- Francisco denied the charge of misrepresentation and stressed that Trinidad had thoroughly inspected the property before she decided to buy it. The claimed creek was a drainage lot, and the floods complained of were not uncommon in the village and indeed even in the Greater Manila area if not the entire Luzon. In any event, the floods were fortuitous events not imputable to him. He asked for the rescission of the contract and the forfeiture of the payments made by the plaintiff plus monthly rentals with interest of P700 for the property from July 2, 1972, until the actual vacation of the property by the plaintiff. He also claimed litigation expenses, including attorney's fees.

- Pendente lite, Vicente J. Francisco died and was eventually substituted by his heirs, two of whom, Trinidad J. Francisco and Rosario F. Kelemen, filed their own joint memorandum.

ISSUE

WON there was misrepresentation on the part of Francisco to justify the rescission of the sale and the award of damages to the petitioner

HELD

NO

Ratio One who contracts for the purchase of real estate in reliance on the

representations and statements of the vendor as to its character and value, but after he has visited and examined it for himself and has had the means and opportunity of verifying such statements, cannot avoid the contract on the ground that they were false and exaggerated.

Reasoning It has not been satisfactorily established that Francisco inveigled the

petitioner through false representation to buy the subject property. Assuming that he did make such representations, as the petitioner contends, she is deemed to have accepted them at her own risk and must therefore be responsible for the consequences of her careless credulousness. The law allows considerable latitude to seller's statements, or dealer's talk, and experience teaches that it is exceedingly risky to accept it at its face value. Assertions concerning the property, subject of a contract of sale, or in regard to its qualities and characteristics, are the usual and ordinary means used by sellers to obtain a high price and are always understood as affording to buyers no ground for omitting to make inquiries. A man who relies upon such affirmation made by a person whose interest might so readily prompt him to exaggerate the value of his property does so at his peril, and must take the consequences of his own imprudence. What we see here is a bad bargain, not an illegal transaction vitiated by fraud. While we may commiserate with the petitioner for a purchase that has proved unwise, we can only echo what Mr. Justice Moreland observed in Vales v. Villa:

“Courts cannot follow one every stop of his life and extricate him from bad bargains, protect him from unwise investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts, or annul the effects of foolish acts. Courts cannot constitute themselves guardians of persons who are not legally incompetent. Courts operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome by another, but because he has been defeated or overcome illegally. Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose money by them-indeed, all they have

in the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore. There must be, in addition, a violation of law, the commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it.”

The fraud alleged by the petitioner has not been satisfactorily established to call for the annulment of the contract. This finding is based on the following considerations. - First, it was the petitioner who admittedly approached the private respondent, who never advertised the property nor offered it for sale to her.

- Second, the petitioner had full opportunity to inspect the premises, including the drainage canals indicated in the vicinity map that was furnished her, before she entered into the contract of conditional sale.

- Third, it is assumed that she made her appraisal of the property not with the untrained eye of the ordinary prospective buyer but with the experience and even expertise of the licensed real estate broker that she was. If she minimized the presence of the drainage canals, she has only her own negligence to blame.

- Fourth, seeing that the lot was depressed and there was a drainage lot abutting it, she cannot say she was not forewarned of the possibility that the place might be flooded. Notwithstanding the obvious condition of the property, she still decided to buy it.

- Fifth, there is no evidence except her own testimony that two previous owners of the property had vacated because of the floods and that Francisco assured her that the have would not be flooded again. The supposed previous owners were not presented as witnesses and neither were the neighbors. Francisco himself denied having made the alleged assurance.

- Sixth, the petitioner paid the 1970 and 1971 amortizations even if, according to her Complaint, "since 1969 said lot had been under floods of about one (1) foot deep,"' and despite the floods of September and November 1970.

- Seventh, it is also curious that notwithstanding the said floods, the petitioner still "made annexes and decorations on the house," all of a permanent nature, for which she now claims reimbursement from the private respondent.

Regarding Trinidad’s refusal to continue paying the amortizations, we cannot say that the petitioner was, strictly speaking, in default in the payment of the remaining amortizations in the sense contemplated in the contract. If she asked for the annulment of the contract and the refund to her of the payments she had already made, plus damages, it was because she felt she had the right to do so. Given such circumstances, the Court feels that the stipulation [see condition in facts] should not be strictly enforced, to justify the rescission of the contract. To make her forfeit the payments already made by her and at the same time return the property to the private respondents for standing up to what she considered her right would, in our view, be unfair and unconscionable. Justice demands that we moderate the harsh effects of the stipulation.

Disposition Appealed decision is AFFIRMED with modification.

SONGCO V SELLNER

;

4, 1917