Since the Carnation Revolution of 25 April 1974 many aspects of Portuguese life have changed irreversibly. While the foreign policy-making process has not been protected from fundamental change, there are some notable continuities. Where change has occurred, it can, generally, be attributed to the broad Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy, which has its roots in the political will to pursue the ‘European option’ post-1974. However, to categorically state that contemporary Portuguese foreign policy is formulated in a Europeanised institutional structure would be to overplay the influence of ‘Europe’. Pressures for change have come as much from within as they have from outside influences. There are four important distinctions that should be made when trying to establish any overall trend towards the Europeanisation of the foreign policy-making process in Portugal.
Firstly, organisational structures, and the nature of public sector organisations, make change a slow and gradual process. Marked changes in light of European integration are, in practice, not easy to observe and it is even harder to determine causality for such changes. The creation of the DGCE, on the eve of Portugal’s accession to the EEC, is an example where the European effect on the domestic structure, and Portugal’s response, is more clearly evident. Since accession to the EEC, isolating the European effect is more difficult because of Portugal’s readiness to pursue its core foreign policy goals in a multilateral context. Secondly, the multilateralisation and Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy are aspects of the externalisation of traditional foreign policy priorities. Thirdly, Europeanisation is, in some areas, more accurately described as the domestication and co-ordination of EU business. Inevitably, this led to the creation of new mechanisms to deal with this burden, giving REPER an increasingly important role in setting out how Portugal defines its strategy on key negotiating issues. However, this has not resulted in a fundamental shift in priorities. Fourthly, Europeanisation can impact upon individual actors as well as institutional structures. Socialisation and increased communication flows mean that the Europeanisation of individuals makes change at the institutional level possible, but, at the same time, actors are constrained by the institutional framework. This moderates the impact of Europeanisation pressures on the more macro levels of the policy process that reflect aspects of national identity
(namely levels 2 and 3), where the Atlantic and the Lusophone world are more firmly embedded as being distinct historical roles for Portugal.
The broader multilateralisation of Portuguese foreign policy helps to preserve Portugal’s unique ties to its former colonies, and gives it greater legitimacy because it is advocating EU and international norms. The MNE has evolved to be able to deal with the changing climate of international affairs and the rise of international multilateral organisations in the latter half of the twentieth century, not least the emergence of the EU as an international actor. It is an organisation which is small enough to be flexible, but large enough to be independent and to continue to pursue Portuguese interests at a bilateral level, if multilateral relations flounder. Therefore, Portuguese foreign policy- making is attuned to the emergence of shared political challenges and transnational cultures. These include: aspects of normative adaptability, stemming from pressure to converge with Europe; more general transnational bonds forged during the Cold War; and the interconnectedness of states due to increasing globalisation. With a myriad of external forces shaping Portuguese foreign policy-making it is difficult to isolate Europeanisation as a single factor in promoting a more European or international awareness in contemporary Portuguese foreign policy (on level 1 of the policy process), but Portugal wants to fit into the broader international community and to internalise external values in order to strengthen its diplomacy and to legitimise its actions.
As with level 1, aspects of national identity that give Portuguese foreign policy its sense of purpose (levels 2 and 3) also do not reflect significant Europeanisation. This stems from the fact that Europe was not the only course available to Portugal during the twentieth century. The historical legacies, upon which Portuguese national identity is constructed, put the Atlantic, not Europe, at the centre of Portuguese foreign policy. Consequently, the Europeanisation of the policy-making process has not penetrated this level. With NATO and the Lusophone world still occupying prominent positions, the core pillars of Portuguese foreign policy remain centred on the Atlantic. European integration is not a contradictory path that undermines Portugal’s position in these Atlantic-centred priorities. The Europeanisation, or the broader multilateralisation, of Portuguese foreign policy is about externalising core national foreign policy interests. By going through international institutions, not least the EU, and aligning Portuguese foreign policy with the norms promoted by such bodies, i.e. the rule of law, human rights etc., Portuguese foreign policy-makers can use rhetoric to portray Portugal’s
mission as being more legitimate, and consistent with the broader interests of the international community. This allows Portugal to act as a potential intermediary between African states and Brazil and the EU and NATO. It also suits Portugal’s strategy of seeking to serve as a champion of smaller states’ interests in international fora, such as the United Nations. Thus, the actions of ‘projecting national influence and finding a role since decolonisation’ and manipulating international organisations, suggest that the alternative explanations on levels 2 and 3 seem more convincing than the hypothesis of Europeanisation taking a hold on these levels.
The changing roles and responsibilities of key actors in Portuguese foreign, security and defence policy had a lot to do with the Carnation Revolution and the transition to democracy, rather being a result of European integration as such, although exploring the ‘European option’ was part of that process. The civilianisation of the Presidente da República, and public life more generally, took many years. The structures of ministries have evolved over time, with some new organs added, which reflect how Portugal’s broad place in the world changed over the course of the twentieth century. Portugal has to engage with the EU, but NATO remains central. Portugal still deals with Africa but in the context of postcolonial relations. The preservation and promotion of the Portuguese language is also a major factor in Portugal returning to a foreign policy focused on its former colonies, but very much centred on multilateral institutions in order to give it greater legitimacy. Therefore, to a degree, Europeanisation has facilitated the rescue of the Portuguese nation-state, but the myriad of other internal factors which have contributed to its transformation since 1974, mean that to conclude that Europeanisation was the single determining factor would be problematic.
By conducting day-to-day business in the EU context, and by attending meetings in Brussels, Portuguese foreign and security policy-makers are now highly attuned to the European context within which contemporary national foreign policy-making takes place. Portuguese foreign policy elites now factor in the positions of European partners and, increasingly, the wider ‘European’ perspective when preparing for international negotiations. The Europeanisation of individuals and small diplomatic networks within Portugal’s foreign policy apparatus is not, necessarily, predetermined by socialisation and the fact that time is spent in Brussels. The EU is not the only organisation which could socialise Portuguese diplomats to change their behaviour. However, the fact that time in Brussels appears to be a prerequisite for progression through the ranks of the
Portuguese diplomatic service, means that the experience of being on secondment to Brussels is likely to leave its mark with those powerful enough to be able to change institutional practices in response to the realities of policy-making within the EU context. This suggests that ‘exposure to Brussels’ has the potential to promote the Europeanisation of the policy-making process by virtue of the experiences of certain individuals. This has the potential to feed up the chain. This makes the more outward- looking MNE, staffed by career diplomats who are more exposed to European ways of doing things than home civil servants, more susceptible to Europeanisation pressures. This is partly due to the MNE’s central role in co-ordinating EU business domestically and the fact that many senior positions in the MNE will be staffed by diplomats who have spent a prolonged spell of their careers interacting with the EU institutions, if not directly, by being posted to REPER, then indirectly, by sending instructions to the Portuguese delegation in Brussels from Lisbon.
While exploring the ‘European option’ was a foreign policy goal in itself, the resulting integration process has meant that Portuguese administrative systems have had to adapt and respond to the demands of EU membership. This exposure, combined with the constant communications between various actors in the system, means that Portuguese national interests (the basis upon which a foreign policy is built) are more subject to change and adaptability than ever. This is because the Portuguese national position is calculated with constant reference to the positions of EU partners. As such, Portuguese foreign policy-making institutions have undergone considerable change since the end of 1985. The creation of the DGAE and the mechanisms for handling relations with the EU (its institutions, policies and laws) have put EU affairs at the heart of Portuguese foreign policy. Therefore, the Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy is partly a manifestation of the need to co-ordinate EU business at the national level. This Europeanisation as domestication idea is the most obvious and observable change in the domestic foreign policy-making process in the last quarter of a century, and reflects the need for Member States to respond to the requirements of being in the EU by adjusting their domestic policy-making structures accordingly. This means that Europeanisation has clearly penetrated the institutional and policy levels through socialisation, learning and top-down pressures.
The foreign policy-making apparatus in Portugal has been subject to considerable pressures, and has had to adapt to reflect Portugal’s transformed place in the world.
These pressures do not emanate solely from the EU, but the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the Europeanisation of Portugal’s foreign policy-making institutions can be readily identified. The exploration of the ‘European option’ presented opportunities for elite socialisation and institutional change to take place, particularly between 1976 and the mid-1990s. Adapting to, and learning from, Europe was the default position for Portuguese elites during the early years of its integration. Consequently, institutions have evolved in ways that reflect Europeanisation. The EU’s impact is one that has changed the domestic policy-making environment. This is particularly evident on the levels of the policy process of institutional cultures, social groups, and the behaviour of individuals. Portuguese diplomats, politicians (of various political persuasions, but principally those in power between the late-1970s and the early-1990s), and the institutional belief systems and cultures within the MNE have been shaped by European integration and have evolved to recognise the fact that the EU is an integral part of political processes at the national level. Portugal has had to adapt its institutional structures to deal with the realities of being in the EU specifically, hence the evidence of Europeanisation found on levels 5, 6 and 7 of the policy process.
The Europeanisation of the institutional structures which shape Portuguese foreign policy may create the conditions for policy outputs to reflect a more Europeanised attitude, but this is not guaranteed. Other factors may be at work, and external influences on Portugal, other than the EU, may have a significant impact in shaping policy outputs, despite the EU’s considerable impact on domestic policy-making processes. Portuguese foreign policy outputs may reveal less Europeanisation as such, and, instead, indicate a more general internationalisation and multilateralisation, of which accommodating the emergence of the EU as an international actor is only part of it. For example, even given the existence of increasingly Europeanised domestic structures, the continued importance of the Lusophone world and NATO in core foreign policy outputs would mean that the overall Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy is, in fact, rather limited.